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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	x86-patch-review@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 12:12:52 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202002251212.70AA5A5B4@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205181935.3712-10-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On Wed, Feb 05, 2020 at 10:19:17AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> When Shadow Stack (SHSTK) is introduced, a R/O and Dirty PTE exists in the
> following cases:
> 
> (a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page;
> (b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed;
> (c) A SHSTK page.
> 
> To separate non-SHSTK memory from SHSTK, introduce a spare bit of the
> 64-bit PTE as _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_SW and use that for case (a) and (b).
> This results in the following possible settings:
> 
> Modified PTE:         (R/W + DIRTY_HW)
> Modified and COW PTE: (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
> R/O PTE COW'ed:       (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
> SHSTK PTE:            (R/O + DIRTY_HW)
> SHSTK shared PTE[1]:  (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
> SHSTK PTE COW'ed:     (R/O + DIRTY_HW)
> 
> [1] When a SHSTK page is being shared among threads, its PTE is cleared of
>     _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, so the next SHSTK access causes a fault, and the page
>     is duplicated and _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is set again.
> 
> With this, in pte_wrprotect(), if SHSTK is active, use _PAGE_DIRTY_SW for
> the Dirty bit, and in pte_mkwrite() use _PAGE_DIRTY_HW.  The same changes
> apply to pmd and pud.
> 
> When this patch is applied, there are six free bits left in the 64-bit PTE.
> There are no more free bits in the 32-bit PTE (except for PAE) and SHSTK is
> not implemented for the 32-bit kernel.
> 
> v9:
> - Remove pte_move_flags() etc. and put the logic directly in
>   pte_wrprotect()/pte_mkwrite() etc.
> - Change compile-time conditionals to run-time checks.
> - Split out pte_modify()/pmd_modify() to a new patch.
> - Update comments.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |  31 +++++++-
>  2 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index ab50d25f9afc..62aeb118bc36 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>   * The following only work if pte_present() is true.
>   * Undefined behaviour if not..
>   */
> -static inline int pte_dirty(pte_t pte)
> +static inline bool pte_dirty(pte_t pte)
>  {
> -	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
> +	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
>  }
>  
>  
> @@ -159,9 +159,9 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)
>  	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
> +static inline bool pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
>  {
> -	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
> +	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
>  }
>  
>  static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)
> @@ -169,9 +169,9 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)
>  	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int pud_dirty(pud_t pud)
> +static inline bool pud_dirty(pud_t pud)
>  {
> -	return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
> +	return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
>  }
>  
>  static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)
> @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)
>  
>  static inline pte_t pte_mkclean(pte_t pte)
>  {
> -	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
> +	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
>  }
>  
>  static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)
> @@ -322,6 +322,17 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)
>  
>  static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)
>  {
> +	/*
> +	 * Use _PAGE_DIRTY_SW on a R/O PTE to set it apart from
> +	 * a Shadow Stack PTE, which is R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW.
> +	 */
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		if (pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) {
> +			pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
> +			pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
>  }
>  
> @@ -332,9 +343,25 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)
>  
>  static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte)
>  {
> +	pteval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
> +
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !pte_write(pte))
> +		dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_SW;
> +
> +	return pte_set_flags(pte, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty_shstk(pte_t pte)
> +{
> +	pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
>  	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
>  }
>  
> +static inline bool pte_dirty_hw(pte_t pte)
> +{
> +	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
> +}
> +
>  static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
>  {
>  	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
> @@ -342,6 +369,13 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
>  
>  static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite(pte_t pte)
>  {
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		if (pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_SW) {
> +			pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
> +			pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
>  }
>  
> @@ -396,19 +430,46 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)
>  
>  static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean(pmd_t pmd)
>  {
> -	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
> +	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
>  }
>  
>  static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)
>  {
> +	/*
> +	 * Use _PAGE_DIRTY_SW on a R/O PMD to set it apart from
> +	 * a Shadow Stack PTE, which is R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW.
> +	 */
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		if (pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) {
> +			pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
> +			pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
>  }
>  
>  static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty(pmd_t pmd)
>  {
> +	pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
> +
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !(pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW))
> +		dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_SW;
> +
> +	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
> +}
> +
> +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty_shstk(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> +	pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
>  	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
>  }
>  
> +static inline bool pmd_dirty_hw(pmd_t pmd)
> +{
> +	return  pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
> +}
> +
>  static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdevmap(pmd_t pmd)
>  {
>  	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DEVMAP);
> @@ -426,6 +487,13 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)
>  
>  static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd)
>  {
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		if (pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_SW) {
> +			pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
> +			pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
>  }
>  
> @@ -450,17 +518,33 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
>  
>  static inline pud_t pud_mkclean(pud_t pud)
>  {
> -	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
> +	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
>  }
>  
>  static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect(pud_t pud)
>  {
> +	/*
> +	 * Use _PAGE_DIRTY_SW on a R/O PUD to set it apart from
> +	 * a Shadow Stack PTE, which is R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW.
> +	 */
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		if (pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_HW) {
> +			pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
> +			pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
>  }
>  
>  static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty(pud_t pud)
>  {
> -	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
> +	pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_HW;
> +
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !(pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_RW))
> +		dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY_SW;
> +
> +	return pud_set_flags(pud, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
>  }
>  
>  static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap(pud_t pud)
> @@ -480,6 +564,13 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkyoung(pud_t pud)
>  
>  static inline pud_t pud_mkwrite(pud_t pud)
>  {
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		if (pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_SW) {
> +			pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_SW);
> +			pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_HW);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> index e647e3c75578..826823df917f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
>  #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2	10	/* " */
>  #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3	11	/* " */
>  #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE	12	/* On 2MB or 1GB pages */
> -#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4	58	/* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4	57	/* available for programmer */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5	58	/* available for programmer */
>  #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0	59	/* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */
>  #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1	60	/* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */
>  #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2	61	/* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */
> @@ -35,6 +36,12 @@
>  #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* software dirty tracking */
>  #define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4
>  
> +/*
> + * This bit indicates a copy-on-write page, and is different from
> + * _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY, which tracks which pages a task writes to.
> + */
> +#define _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_SW	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 /* was written to */
> +
>  /* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */
>  /* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
>  #define _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE	_PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL
> @@ -108,6 +115,28 @@
>  #define _PAGE_DEVMAP	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
>  #endif
>  
> +/* A R/O and dirty PTE exists in the following cases:
> + *	(a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page;
> + *	(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed;
> + *	(c) A SHSTK page.
> + * _PAGE_DIRTY_SW is used to separate case (c) from others.
> + * This results in the following settings:
> + *
> + *	Modified PTE:         (R/W + DIRTY_HW)
> + *	Modified and COW PTE: (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
> + *	R/O PTE COW'ed:       (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
> + *	SHSTK PTE:            (R/O + DIRTY_HW)
> + *	SHSTK PTE COW'ed:     (R/O + DIRTY_HW)
> + *	SHSTK PTE being shared among threads: (R/O + DIRTY_SW)
> + */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +#define _PAGE_DIRTY_SW	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_DIRTY_SW)
> +#else
> +#define _PAGE_DIRTY_SW	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
> +#endif
> +
> +#define _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS (_PAGE_DIRTY_HW | _PAGE_DIRTY_SW)
> +
>  #define _PAGE_PROTNONE	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE)
>  
>  #define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |\
> -- 
> 2.21.0
> 

-- 
Kees Cook


  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-25 20:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-05 18:19 [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06  0:16   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06 20:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 15:55     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 17:57   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:27         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:35           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:50             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:16               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:54                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:59                   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 21:12                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 22:02                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:19                       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:11                         ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:20                           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:51                             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:59                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  0:08                                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  1:21                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  2:13                                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:04   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:06   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:10   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-05 20:44     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:03   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 19:57     ` Pavel Machek
2020-03-05 20:38     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 18:05   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  1:02     ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:16       ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  2:11         ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  3:57           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 18:03             ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 18:37     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 19:02       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 21:16         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:07   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/27] Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:11   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:17   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-02-26 21:35   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:08     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:22       ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/27] x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 22:02   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/27] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:13   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:04   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-03 15:42     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:14   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:47   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/27] mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:30     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:08   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 18:14     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 22:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-08 18:18         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:59   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-13 22:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:34   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27  0:55   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:10   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:39     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:17   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 20/27] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 21/27] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:18   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 22/27] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 23/27] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:22   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 25/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:29   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 21:51     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 26/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:31 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: " Kees Cook

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