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From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	 "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	 linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	 Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	 Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	 Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	 "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	 Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	 x86-patch-review@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 19:13:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMe9rOoZazTpWcK1hr4d25z8Gv3yGbpn_48R1RHGfq-aDOJ0Eg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <E7E7A2AE-500A-4817-B00A-BE419E89C6F9@amacapital.net>

On Mon, Mar 9, 2020 at 6:21 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>
> I am baffled by this discussion.
>
> >> On Mar 9, 2020, at 5:09 PM, H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Mon, Mar 9, 2020 at 4:59 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> >
> >>>> .
> >> This could presumably have been fixed by having libpcre or sljit
> >> disable IBT before calling into JIT code or by running the JIT code in
> >> another thread.  In the other direction, a non-CET libpcre build could
> >> build IBT-capable JITted code and enable JIT (by syscall if we allow
> >> that or by creating a thread?) when calling it.  And IBT has this
> >
> > This is not how thread in user space works.
>
> void create_cet_thread(void (*func)(), unsigned int cet_flags);
>
> I could implement this using clone() if the kernel provides the requisite support. Sure, creating threads behind libc’s back like this is perilous, but it can be done.

Sure, this can live outside of libc with kernel support.

> >
> >> fancy legacy bitmap to allow non-instrumented code to run with IBT on,
> >> although SHSTK doesn't have hardware support for a similar feature.
> >
> > All these changes are called CET enabing.
>
> What does that mean?  If program A loads library B, and library B very carefully loads CET-mismatched code, program A may be blissfully unaware.

Any source changes to make codes CET compatible is to enable CET.

Shadow stack can't be turned on or off arbitrarily.  ld.so checks it and
makes sure that everything is consistent.  But this is entirely done in
user space.  In the first phase, we want to make CET simple, not too
complicated.


H.J.


  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-10  2:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-05 18:19 [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06  0:16   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06 20:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 15:55     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 17:57   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:27         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:35           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:50             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:16               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:54                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:59                   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 21:12                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 22:02                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:19                       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:11                         ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:20                           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:51                             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:59                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  0:08                                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  1:21                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  2:13                                     ` H.J. Lu [this message]
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:04   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:06   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:10   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-05 20:44     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:03   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 19:57     ` Pavel Machek
2020-03-05 20:38     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 18:05   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  1:02     ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:16       ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  2:11         ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  3:57           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 18:03             ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 18:37     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 19:02       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 21:16         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:07   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/27] Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:11   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:17   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 21:35   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:08     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:22       ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/27] x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 22:02   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/27] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:13   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:04   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-03 15:42     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:14   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:47   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/27] mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:30     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:08   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 18:14     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 22:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-08 18:18         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:59   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-13 22:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:34   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27  0:55   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:10   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:39     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:17   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 20/27] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 21/27] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:18   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 22/27] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 23/27] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:22   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 25/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:29   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 21:51     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 26/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:31 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: " Kees Cook

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