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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@intel.com>,
	Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
	Mike Rapoport  <rppt@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFCv2 01/16] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 09:18:44 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201020061859.18385-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201020061859.18385-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

force_dma_unencrypted() has to return true for KVM guest with the memory
protected enabled. Move it out of AMD SME code.

Introduce new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON that has to be
selected by all x86 memory encryption features.

This is preparation for the following patches.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                 |  8 +++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/io.h        |  4 +++-
 arch/x86/mm/Makefile             |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c        | 30 -------------------------
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7101ac64bb20..619ebf40e457 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1514,13 +1514,17 @@ config X86_CPA_STATISTICS
 	  helps to determine the effectiveness of preserving large and huge
 	  page mappings when mapping protections are changed.
 
+config X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON
+	select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+	select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
+	def_bool n
+
 config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support"
 	depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD
 	select DMA_COHERENT_POOL
-	select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
 	select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
-	select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+	select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON
 	help
 	  Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
 	  This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index e1aa17a468a8..c58d52fd7bf2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -256,10 +256,12 @@ static inline void slow_down_io(void)
 
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
 
 extern struct static_key_false sev_enable_key;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
 static inline bool sev_key_active(void)
 {
 	return static_branch_unlikely(&sev_enable_key);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 5864219221ca..b31cb52bf1bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)	+= pkeys.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY)			+= kaslr.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)		+= pti.o
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON)	+= mem_encrypt_common.o
+
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)	+= mem_encrypt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)	+= mem_encrypt_identity.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)	+= mem_encrypt_boot.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 9f1177edc2e7..4dbdc9dac36b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -15,10 +15,6 @@
 #include <linux/dma-direct.h>
 #include <linux/swiotlb.h>
 #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
-#include <linux/device.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/bitops.h>
-#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
@@ -350,32 +346,6 @@ bool sev_active(void)
 	return sme_me_mask && sev_enabled;
 }
 
-/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
-bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
-{
-	/*
-	 * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
-	 */
-	if (sev_active())
-		return true;
-
-	/*
-	 * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
-	 * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
-	 * encryption mask.
-	 */
-	if (sme_active()) {
-		u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
-		u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
-						dev->bus_dma_limit);
-
-		if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
-			return true;
-	}
-
-	return false;
-}
-
 void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
 {
 	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, npages;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..964e04152417
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+
+/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
+bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
+{
+	/*
+	 * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted/shared addresses.
+	 */
+	if (sev_active())
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the
+	 * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
+	 * encryption mask.
+	 */
+	if (sme_active()) {
+		u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
+		u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
+						dev->bus_dma_limit);
+
+		if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
-- 
2.26.2



  reply	other threads:[~2020-10-20  6:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-20  6:18 [RFCv2 00/16] KVM protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 02/16] x86/kvm: Introduce KVM memory protection feature Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 03/16] x86/kvm: Make DMA pages shared Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 04/16] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for KVM memory protection Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 05/16] x86/kvm: Make VirtIO use DMA API in KVM guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  8:06   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-10-20 12:47     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-22  3:31   ` Halil Pasic
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 06/16] x86/kvmclock: Share hvclock memory with the host Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 07/16] x86/realmode: Share trampoline area if KVM memory protection enabled Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 08/16] KVM: Use GUP instead of copy_from/to_user() to access guest memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  8:25   ` John Hubbard
2020-10-20 12:51     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-22 11:49     ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-22 19:58       ` John Hubbard
2020-10-26  4:21         ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-26  4:44           ` John Hubbard
2020-10-26 13:28             ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-26 14:16               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-26 20:52               ` John Hubbard
2020-10-20 17:29   ` Ira Weiny
2020-10-22 11:37     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 09/16] KVM: mm: Introduce VM_KVM_PROTECTED Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-21 18:47   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-10-22 12:01     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 10/16] KVM: x86: Use GUP for page walk instead of __get_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 11/16] KVM: Protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  7:17   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-10-20 12:55     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 12/16] KVM: x86: Enabled protected " Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 13/16] KVM: Rework copy_to/from_guest() to avoid direct mapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 14/16] KVM: Handle protected memory in __kvm_map_gfn()/__kvm_unmap_gfn() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-21 18:50   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-10-22 12:06     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-22 16:59       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-10-23 10:36         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-22  3:26   ` Halil Pasic
2020-10-22 12:07     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 15/16] KVM: Unmap protected pages from direct mapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  7:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-10-20 12:18   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-10-20 13:20     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-10-21  1:20       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-10-26 19:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2020-10-21 18:49   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-10-23 12:37   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-23 16:32     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-20  6:18 ` [RFCv2 16/16] mm: Do not use zero page for VM_KVM_PROTECTED VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-20  7:46 ` [RFCv2 00/16] KVM protected memory extension Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-10-20 13:49   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-21 14:46     ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-10-23 11:35       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-23 12:01         ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-10-21 18:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-26 15:29   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-10-26 23:58     ` Andy Lutomirski

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