From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v27 14/31] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 15:11:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210521221211.29077-15-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210521221211.29077-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
A shadow stack PTE must be read-only and have _PAGE_DIRTY set. However,
read-only and Dirty PTEs also exist for copy-on-write (COW) pages. These
two cases are handled differently for page faults. Introduce
VM_SHADOW_STACK to track shadow stack VMAs.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 +
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 2 ++
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++
include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
index 81bfe3c800cc..46e3ab2da9c6 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ encoded manner. The codes are the following:
mt arm64 MTE allocation tags are enabled
um userfaultfd missing tracking
uw userfaultfd wr-protect tracking
+ ss shadow stack page
== =======================================
Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index c90c20904a60..f3f52c5e2fd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy)
const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)
+ return "[shadow stack]";
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index fc9784544b24..4f9f6e188be9 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -664,6 +664,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR
[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)] = "ui",
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ [ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)]= "ss",
+#endif
};
size_t i;
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 923f89b9f1b5..587f7399847b 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -322,11 +322,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5 37 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -342,6 +344,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5
+#else
+# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_NONE
+#endif
+
#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-21 22:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-21 22:11 [PATCH v27 00/31] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 01/31] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 02/31] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 03/31] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 04/31] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 05/31] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 06/31] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 07/31] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 08/31] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 09/31] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 10/31] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 11/31] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 12/31] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 13/31] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:25 ` Axel Rasmussen
2021-05-22 1:58 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-21 22:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 15/31] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 16/31] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 17/31] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 18/31] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:11 ` [PATCH v27 19/31] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 20/31] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 21/31] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 22/31] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 23/31] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-19 18:23 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-07-20 17:13 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 24/31] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-22 23:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-25 15:04 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-21 18:14 ` John Allen
2021-07-21 18:28 ` Florian Weimer
2021-07-21 18:34 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-28 21:34 ` John Allen
2021-07-21 18:37 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-21 20:14 ` H.J. Lu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 25/31] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 26/31] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 27/31] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-25 10:54 ` Catalin Marinas
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 28/31] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 29/31] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 30/31] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-25 11:00 ` Catalin Marinas
2021-05-25 15:03 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-21 22:12 ` [PATCH v27 31/31] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
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