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* [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 01/17] x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (18 more replies)
  0 siblings, 19 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

Linear Address Masking[1] (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied to
64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the untranslated
address bits for metadata.

The capability can be used for efficient address sanitizers (ASAN)
implementation and for optimizations in JITs and virtual machines.

The patchset brings support for LAM for userspace addresses. Only LAM_U57 at
this time.

Please review and consider applying.

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kas/linux.git lam

v15:
  - Replace static branch in untagged_addr() with alternative;
  - Drop unneeded READ_ONCE();
  - Acks from Peter;
v14:
  - Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user();
  - Introduce CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING;
  - Cache untag masking in per-CPU variable;
  - Reject LAM enabling via PTRACE_ARCH_PRCTL;
  - Fix locking around untagged_addr_remote();
  - Fix typo in MM_CONTEXT_ conversion patch;
  - Fix selftest;
v13:
  - Fix race between untagged_addr() and LAM enabling:
    + Do not allow to enable LAM after the process spawned the second thread;
    + untagged_addr() untags the address according to rules of the current
      process;
    + untagged_addr_remote() can be used for untagging addresses for foreign
      process. It requires mmap lock for the target process to be taken;
v12:
  - Rebased onto tip/x86/mm;
  - Drop VM_WARN_ON() that may produce false-positive on race between context
    switch and LAM enabling;
  - Adjust comments explain possible race;
  - User READ_ONCE() in mm_lam_cr3_mask();
  - Do not assume &init_mm == mm in initialize_tlbstate_and_flush();
  - Ack by Andy;
v11:
  - Move untag_mask to /proc/$PID/status;
  - s/SVM/SVA/g;
  - static inline arch_pgtable_dma_compat() instead of macros;
  - Replace pasid_valid() with mm_valid_pasid();
  - Acks from Ashok and Jacob (forgot to apply from v9);
v10:
  - Rebased to v6.1-rc1;
  - Add selftest for SVM vs LAM;
v9:
  - Fix race between LAM enabling and check that KVM memslot address doesn't
    have any tags;
  - Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user;
  - Clarify SVM vs. LAM semantics;
  - Use mmap_lock to serialize LAM enabling;
v8:
  - Drop redundant smb_mb() in prctl_enable_tagged_addr();
  - Cleanup code around build_cr3();
  - Fix commit messages;
  - Selftests updates;
  - Acked/Reviewed/Tested-bys from Alexander and Peter;
v7:
  - Drop redundant smb_mb() in prctl_enable_tagged_addr();
  - Cleanup code around build_cr3();
  - Fix commit message;
  - Fix indentation;
v6:
  - Rebased onto v6.0-rc1
  - LAM_U48 excluded from the patchet. Still available in the git tree;
  - add ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS;
  - Fix build without CONFIG_DEBUG_VM;
  - Update comments;
  - Reviewed/Tested-by from Alexander;
v5:
  - Do not use switch_mm() in enable_lam_func()
  - Use mb()/READ_ONCE() pair on LAM enabling;
  - Add self-test by Weihong Zhang;
  - Add comments;
v4:
  - Fix untagged_addr() for LAM_U48;
  - Remove no-threads restriction on LAM enabling;
  - Fix mm_struct access from /proc/$PID/arch_status
  - Fix LAM handling in initialize_tlbstate_and_flush()
  - Pack tlb_state better;
  - Comments and commit messages;
v3:
  - Rebased onto v5.19-rc1
  - Per-process enabling;
  - API overhaul (again);
  - Avoid branches and costly computations in the fast path;
  - LAM_U48 is in optional patch.
v2:
  - Rebased onto v5.18-rc1
  - New arch_prctl(2)-based API
  - Expose status of LAM (or other thread features) in
    /proc/$PID/arch_status

[1] ISE, Chapter 10. https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368
Kirill A. Shutemov (12):
  x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()
  x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting
  x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking
  x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch
  mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote()
  x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address
    check
  x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead for systems without LAM
  x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM
  mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status
  iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid()
  x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive
  selftests/x86/lam: Add test cases for LAM vs thread creation

Weihong Zhang (5):
  selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for
    linear-address masking
  selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL test cases for linear-address
    masking
  selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring test cases for linear-address masking
  selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit test cases for linear-address masking
  selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA test cases for
    linear-address masking

 arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h        |    6 +
 arch/sparc/include/asm/mmu_context_64.h     |    6 +
 arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h         |    2 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                            |   11 +
 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c       |    2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h          |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h    |    8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h                  |   18 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h          |   49 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h      |    2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h             |   48 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h              |   58 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h           |    5 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |    6 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                   |    6 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                |   66 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c                     |    6 +-
 arch/x86/lib/getuser.S                      |   83 +-
 arch/x86/lib/putuser.S                      |   54 +-
 arch/x86/mm/init.c                          |    5 +
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                           |   53 +-
 drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c                   |    8 +-
 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c             |    2 +-
 fs/proc/array.c                             |    6 +
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                          |    9 +-
 include/linux/ioasid.h                      |    9 -
 include/linux/mm.h                          |   11 -
 include/linux/mmu_context.h                 |   14 +
 include/linux/sched/mm.h                    |    8 +-
 include/linux/uaccess.h                     |   22 +
 mm/debug.c                                  |    1 +
 mm/gup.c                                    |    4 +-
 mm/madvise.c                                |    5 +-
 mm/migrate.c                                |   11 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile        |    2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c           | 1241 +++++++++++++++++++
 36 files changed, 1699 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c

-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 01/17] x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 02/17] x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (17 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

The functions get_user() and put_user() check that the target address
range resides in the user space portion of the virtual address space.
In order to perform this check, the functions compare the end of the
range against TASK_SIZE_MAX.

For kernels compiled with CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL, this process requires some
additional trickery using ALTERNATIVE, as TASK_SIZE_MAX depends on the
paging mode in use.

Linus suggested that this check could be simplified for 64-bit kernels.
It is sufficient to check bit 63 of the address to ensure that the range
belongs to user space. Additionally, the use of branches can be avoided
by setting the target address to all ones if bit 63 is set.

There's no need to check the end of the access range as there's huge
gap between end of userspace range and start of the kernel range. The
gap consists of canonical hole and unused ranges on both kernel and
userspace sides.

If an address with bit 63 set is passed down, it will trigger a #GP
exception. _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() complains about this. Replace it with
plain _ASM_EXTABLE() as it is expected behaviour now.

The updated get_user() and put_user() checks are also compatible with
Linear Address Masking, which allows user space to encode metadata in
the upper bits of pointers and eliminates the need to untag the address
before handling it.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 83 ++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 54 ++++++++++++---------------
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
index b70d98d79a9d..b64a2bd1a1ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
@@ -37,22 +37,22 @@
 
 #define ASM_BARRIER_NOSPEC ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
-#define LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(n) \
-	ALTERNATIVE __stringify(mov $((1 << 47) - 4096 - (n)),%rdx), \
-		    __stringify(mov $((1 << 56) - 4096 - (n)),%rdx), X86_FEATURE_LA57
-#else
-#define LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(n) \
-	mov $(TASK_SIZE_MAX - (n)),%_ASM_DX
-#endif
+.macro check_range size:req
+.if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)
+	mov %rax, %rdx
+	sar $63, %rdx
+	or %rdx, %rax
+.else
+	cmp $TASK_SIZE_MAX-\size+1, %eax
+	jae .Lbad_get_user
+	sbb %edx, %edx		/* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+	and %edx, %eax
+.endif
+.endm
 
 	.text
 SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_1)
-	LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(0)
-	cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
-	jae bad_get_user
-	sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX		/* array_index_mask_nospec() */
-	and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+	check_range size=1
 	ASM_STAC
 1:	movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
 	xor %eax,%eax
@@ -62,11 +62,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_1)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_1)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_2)
-	LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(1)
-	cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
-	jae bad_get_user
-	sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX		/* array_index_mask_nospec() */
-	and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+	check_range size=2
 	ASM_STAC
 2:	movzwl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
 	xor %eax,%eax
@@ -76,11 +72,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_2)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_2)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_4)
-	LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(3)
-	cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
-	jae bad_get_user
-	sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX		/* array_index_mask_nospec() */
-	and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+	check_range size=4
 	ASM_STAC
 3:	movl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
 	xor %eax,%eax
@@ -90,30 +82,17 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_4)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_4)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_8)
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(7)
-	cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
-	jae bad_get_user
-	sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX		/* array_index_mask_nospec() */
-	and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+	check_range size=8
 	ASM_STAC
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 4:	movq (%_ASM_AX),%rdx
-	xor %eax,%eax
-	ASM_CLAC
-	RET
 #else
-	LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(7)
-	cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
-	jae bad_get_user_8
-	sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX		/* array_index_mask_nospec() */
-	and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
-	ASM_STAC
 4:	movl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
 5:	movl 4(%_ASM_AX),%ecx
+#endif
 	xor %eax,%eax
 	ASM_CLAC
 	RET
-#endif
 SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_8)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_8)
 
@@ -166,7 +145,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_nocheck_8)
 
 SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(.Lbad_get_user_clac)
 	ASM_CLAC
-bad_get_user:
+.Lbad_get_user:
 	xor %edx,%edx
 	mov $(-EFAULT),%_ASM_AX
 	RET
@@ -184,23 +163,23 @@ SYM_CODE_END(.Lbad_get_user_8_clac)
 #endif
 
 /* get_user */
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(2b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(3b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(3b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(4b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(4b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
 #else
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(4b, .Lbad_get_user_8_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(5b, .Lbad_get_user_8_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(4b, .Lbad_get_user_8_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(5b, .Lbad_get_user_8_clac)
 #endif
 
 /* __get_user */
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(6b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(7b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(8b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(6b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(7b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(8b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(9b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(9b, .Lbad_get_user_clac)
 #else
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(9b, .Lbad_get_user_8_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(10b, .Lbad_get_user_8_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(9b, .Lbad_get_user_8_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(10b, .Lbad_get_user_8_clac)
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S
index 32125224fcca..3062d09a776d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S
@@ -33,20 +33,20 @@
  * as they get called from within inline assembly.
  */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
-#define LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(n) \
-	ALTERNATIVE __stringify(mov $((1 << 47) - 4096 - (n)),%rbx), \
-		    __stringify(mov $((1 << 56) - 4096 - (n)),%rbx), X86_FEATURE_LA57
-#else
-#define LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(n) \
-	mov $(TASK_SIZE_MAX - (n)),%_ASM_BX
-#endif
+.macro check_range size:req
+.if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)
+	mov %rcx, %rbx
+	sar $63, %rbx
+	or %rbx, %rcx
+.else
+	cmp $TASK_SIZE_MAX-\size+1, %ecx
+	jae .Lbad_put_user
+.endif
+.endm
 
 .text
 SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_1)
-	LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(0)
-	cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX
-	jae .Lbad_put_user
+	check_range size=1
 	ASM_STAC
 1:	movb %al,(%_ASM_CX)
 	xor %ecx,%ecx
@@ -66,9 +66,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_1)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_1)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_2)
-	LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(1)
-	cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX
-	jae .Lbad_put_user
+	check_range size=2
 	ASM_STAC
 3:	movw %ax,(%_ASM_CX)
 	xor %ecx,%ecx
@@ -88,9 +86,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_2)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_2)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_4)
-	LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(3)
-	cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX
-	jae .Lbad_put_user
+	check_range size=4
 	ASM_STAC
 5:	movl %eax,(%_ASM_CX)
 	xor %ecx,%ecx
@@ -110,9 +106,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_nocheck_4)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_4)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_8)
-	LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(7)
-	cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX
-	jae .Lbad_put_user
+	check_range size=8
 	ASM_STAC
 7:	mov %_ASM_AX,(%_ASM_CX)
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -144,15 +138,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(.Lbad_put_user_clac)
 	RET
 SYM_CODE_END(.Lbad_put_user_clac)
 
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(2b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(3b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(4b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(5b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(6b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(7b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(9b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(3b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(4b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(5b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(6b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(7b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(9b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(8b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(10b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(8b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(10b, .Lbad_put_user_clac)
 #endif
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 02/17] x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 01/17] x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-02-09 14:06   ` Alexander Potapenko
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 03/17] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (16 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

So far there's no need in atomic setting of MM context flags in
mm_context_t::flags. The flags set early in exec and never change
after that.

LAM enabling requires atomic flag setting. The upcoming flag
MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA can be set much later in the process
lifetime where multiple threads exist.

Convert the field to unsigned long and do MM_CONTEXT_* accesses with
__set_bit() and test_bit().

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h            | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h    | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c          | 4 ++--
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index 4af81df133ee..aa226f451c52 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma __ro_after_init = {
 struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-	if (!mm || !(mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL))
+	if (!mm || !test_bit(MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL, &mm->context.flags))
 		return NULL;
 #endif
 	if (vsyscall_mode == NONE)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index 5d7494631ea9..efa3eaee522c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@
 #include <linux/bits.h>
 
 /* Uprobes on this MM assume 32-bit code */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32	BIT(0)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32		0
 /* vsyscall page is accessible on this MM */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL	BIT(1)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL		1
 
 /*
  * x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct.
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ typedef struct {
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	unsigned short flags;
+	unsigned long flags;
 #endif
 
 	struct mutex lock;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index b8d40ddeab00..53ef591a6166 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static inline void arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
 static inline bool is_64bit_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	return	!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) ||
-		!(mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32);
+		!test_bit(MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32, &mm->context.flags);
 }
 #else
 static inline bool is_64bit_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 4e34b3b68ebd..8b06034e8c70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ void set_personality_64bit(void)
 	task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_execve;
 	current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT;
 	if (current->mm)
-		current->mm->context.flags = MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL;
+		__set_bit(MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL, &current->mm->context.flags);
 
 	/* TBD: overwrites user setup. Should have two bits.
 	   But 64bit processes have always behaved this way,
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ static void __set_personality_ia32(void)
 		 * uprobes applied to this MM need to know this and
 		 * cannot use user_64bit_mode() at that time.
 		 */
-		current->mm->context.flags = MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32;
+		__set_bit(MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32, &current->mm->context.flags);
 	}
 
 	current->personality |= force_personality32;
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 03/17] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 01/17] x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 02/17] x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 04/17] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (15 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

Enumerate Linear Address Masking and provide defines for CR3 and CR4
flags.

The new CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING option enables the feature support in
kernel.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                            | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h          |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h      |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |  6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 3604074a878b..211869aa618d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2290,6 +2290,17 @@ config RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING
 
 	  If unsure, leave at the default value.
 
+config ADDRESS_MASKING
+	bool "Linear Address Masking support"
+	depends on X86_64
+	help
+	  Linear Address Masking (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied
+	  to 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the
+	  untranslated address bits for metadata.
+
+	  The capability can be used for efficient address sanitizers (ASAN)
+	  implementation and for optimizations in JITs.
+
 config HOTPLUG_CPU
 	def_bool y
 	depends on SMP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 61012476d66e..bc662c80b99d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CMPCCXADD           (12*32+ 7) /* "" CMPccXADD instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMX_FP16		(12*32+21) /* "" AMX fp16 Support */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_IFMA            (12*32+23) /* "" Support for VPMADD52[H,L]UQ */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LAM			(12*32+26) /* Linear Address Masking */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
index a7f3d9100adb..d8cccadc83a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
  * On systems with SME, one bit (in a variable position!) is stolen to indicate
  * that the top-level paging structure is encrypted.
  *
+ * On systemms with LAM, bits 61 and 62 are used to indicate LAM mode.
+ *
  * All of the remaining bits indicate the physical address of the top-level
  * paging structure.
  *
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
index c47cc7f2feeb..d898432947ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_BITS	12
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_MASK	(_AC((1UL << X86_CR3_PCID_BITS) - 1, UL))
 
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT	61 /* Activate LAM for userspace, 62:57 bits masked */
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U57		_BITULL(X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT)
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U48_BIT	62 /* Activate LAM for userspace, 62:48 bits masked */
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U48		_BITULL(X86_CR3_LAM_U48_BIT)
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT 63 /* Preserve old PCID */
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH    _BITULL(X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT)
 
@@ -132,6 +136,8 @@
 #define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
 #define X86_CR4_CET_BIT		23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology */
 #define X86_CR4_CET		_BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT	28 /* LAM for supervisor pointers */
+#define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT)
 
 /*
  * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 04/17] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 03/17] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 05/17] mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote() Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (14 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

Linear Address Masking mode for userspace pointers encoded in CR3 bits.
The mode is selected per-process and stored in mm_context_t.

switch_mm_irqs_off() now respects selected LAM mode and constructs CR3
accordingly.

The active LAM mode gets recorded in the tlb_state.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  5 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 24 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h    | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                  | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
 4 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index efa3eaee522c..22fc9fbf1d0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ typedef struct {
 	unsigned long flags;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+	/* Active LAM mode:  X86_CR3_LAM_U48 or X86_CR3_LAM_U57 or 0 (disabled) */
+	unsigned long lam_cr3_mask;
+#endif
+
 	struct mutex lock;
 	void __user *vdso;			/* vdso base address */
 	const struct vdso_image *vdso_image;	/* vdso image in use */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 53ef591a6166..a62e70801ea8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -91,6 +91,29 @@ static inline void switch_ldt(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return mm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
+}
+
+static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	mm->context.lam_cr3_mask = oldmm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 #define enter_lazy_tlb enter_lazy_tlb
 extern void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk);
 
@@ -168,6 +191,7 @@ static inline int arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	arch_dup_pkeys(oldmm, mm);
 	paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
+	dup_lam(oldmm, mm);
 	return ldt_dup_context(oldmm, mm);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index cda3118f3b27..e8b47f57bd4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_TLBFLUSH_H
 #define _ASM_X86_TLBFLUSH_H
 
-#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/invpcid.h>
 #include <asm/pti.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
 void __flush_tlb_all(void);
 
@@ -101,6 +102,16 @@ struct tlb_state {
 	 */
 	bool invalidate_other;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+	/*
+	 * Active LAM mode.
+	 *
+	 * X86_CR3_LAM_U57/U48 shifted right by X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT or 0 if LAM
+	 * disabled.
+	 */
+	u8 lam;
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * Mask that contains TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS+1 bits to indicate
 	 * the corresponding user PCID needs a flush next time we
@@ -357,6 +368,31 @@ static inline bool huge_pmd_needs_flush(pmd_t oldpmd, pmd_t newpmd)
 }
 #define huge_pmd_needs_flush huge_pmd_needs_flush
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+static inline  u64 tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask(void)
+{
+	u64 lam = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.lam);
+
+	return lam << X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline void set_tlbstate_lam_mode(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.lam,
+		       mm->context.lam_cr3_mask >> X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline u64 tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void set_tlbstate_lam_mode(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+}
+#endif
 #endif /* !MODULE */
 
 static inline void __native_tlb_flush_global(unsigned long cr4)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index c1e31e9a85d7..8c330a6d0ece 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -154,26 +154,30 @@ static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static inline unsigned long build_cr3(pgd_t *pgd, u16 asid)
+static inline unsigned long build_cr3(pgd_t *pgd, u16 asid, unsigned long lam)
 {
+	unsigned long cr3 = __sme_pa(pgd) | lam;
+
 	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) {
-		return __sme_pa(pgd) | kern_pcid(asid);
+		VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid > MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE);
+		cr3 |= kern_pcid(asid);
 	} else {
 		VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid != 0);
-		return __sme_pa(pgd);
 	}
+
+	return cr3;
 }
 
-static inline unsigned long build_cr3_noflush(pgd_t *pgd, u16 asid)
+static inline unsigned long build_cr3_noflush(pgd_t *pgd, u16 asid,
+					      unsigned long lam)
 {
-	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid > MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE);
 	/*
 	 * Use boot_cpu_has() instead of this_cpu_has() as this function
 	 * might be called during early boot. This should work even after
 	 * boot because all CPU's the have same capabilities:
 	 */
 	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID));
-	return __sme_pa(pgd) | kern_pcid(asid) | CR3_NOFLUSH;
+	return build_cr3(pgd, asid, lam) | CR3_NOFLUSH;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -274,15 +278,16 @@ static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
 		  (unsigned long *)this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tlbstate.user_pcid_flush_mask));
 }
 
-static void load_new_mm_cr3(pgd_t *pgdir, u16 new_asid, bool need_flush)
+static void load_new_mm_cr3(pgd_t *pgdir, u16 new_asid, unsigned long lam,
+			    bool need_flush)
 {
 	unsigned long new_mm_cr3;
 
 	if (need_flush) {
 		invalidate_user_asid(new_asid);
-		new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3(pgdir, new_asid);
+		new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3(pgdir, new_asid, lam);
 	} else {
-		new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3_noflush(pgdir, new_asid);
+		new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3_noflush(pgdir, new_asid, lam);
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -491,6 +496,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 {
 	struct mm_struct *real_prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
 	u16 prev_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
+	unsigned long new_lam = mm_lam_cr3_mask(next);
 	bool was_lazy = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate_shared.is_lazy);
 	unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id();
 	u64 next_tlb_gen;
@@ -520,7 +526,8 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 	 * isn't free.
 	 */
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(real_prev->pgd, prev_asid))) {
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(real_prev->pgd, prev_asid,
+						   tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask()))) {
 		/*
 		 * If we were to BUG here, we'd be very likely to kill
 		 * the system so hard that we don't see the call trace.
@@ -552,9 +559,15 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 	 * instruction.
 	 */
 	if (real_prev == next) {
+		/* Not actually switching mm's */
 		VM_WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].ctx_id) !=
 			   next->context.ctx_id);
 
+		/*
+		 * If this races with another thread that enables lam, 'new_lam'
+		 * might not match tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask().
+		 */
+
 		/*
 		 * Even in lazy TLB mode, the CPU should stay set in the
 		 * mm_cpumask. The TLB shootdown code can figure out from
@@ -622,15 +635,16 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 		barrier();
 	}
 
+	set_tlbstate_lam_mode(next);
 	if (need_flush) {
 		this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[new_asid].ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id);
 		this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[new_asid].tlb_gen, next_tlb_gen);
-		load_new_mm_cr3(next->pgd, new_asid, true);
+		load_new_mm_cr3(next->pgd, new_asid, new_lam, true);
 
 		trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
 	} else {
 		/* The new ASID is already up to date. */
-		load_new_mm_cr3(next->pgd, new_asid, false);
+		load_new_mm_cr3(next->pgd, new_asid, new_lam, false);
 
 		trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0);
 	}
@@ -691,6 +705,10 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void)
 	/* Assert that CR3 already references the right mm. */
 	WARN_ON((cr3 & CR3_ADDR_MASK) != __pa(mm->pgd));
 
+	/* LAM expected to be disabled */
+	WARN_ON(cr3 & (X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57));
+	WARN_ON(mm_lam_cr3_mask(mm));
+
 	/*
 	 * Assert that CR4.PCIDE is set if needed.  (CR4.PCIDE initialization
 	 * doesn't work like other CR4 bits because it can only be set from
@@ -699,8 +717,8 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void)
 	WARN_ON(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID) &&
 		!(cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_PCIDE));
 
-	/* Force ASID 0 and force a TLB flush. */
-	write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0));
+	/* Disable LAM, force ASID 0 and force a TLB flush. */
+	write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0, 0));
 
 	/* Reinitialize tlbstate. */
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, LAST_USER_MM_INIT);
@@ -708,6 +726,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void)
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1);
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id);
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].tlb_gen, tlb_gen);
+	set_tlbstate_lam_mode(mm);
 
 	for (i = 1; i < TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS; i++)
 		this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[i].ctx_id, 0);
@@ -1071,8 +1090,10 @@ void flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
  */
 unsigned long __get_current_cr3_fast(void)
 {
-	unsigned long cr3 = build_cr3(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm)->pgd,
-		this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid));
+	unsigned long cr3 =
+		build_cr3(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm)->pgd,
+			  this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid),
+			  tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask());
 
 	/* For now, be very restrictive about when this can be called. */
 	VM_WARN_ON(in_nmi() || preemptible());
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 05/17] mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote()
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 04/17] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-02-09 14:08   ` Alexander Potapenko
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (13 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

untagged_addr() removes tags/metadata from the address and brings it to
the canonical form. The helper is implemented on arm64 and sparc. Both of
them do untagging based on global rules.

However, Linear Address Masking (LAM) on x86 introduces per-process
settings for untagging. As a result, untagged_addr() is now only
suitable for untagging addresses for the current proccess.

The new helper untagged_addr_remote() has to be used when the address
targets remote process. It requires the mmap lock for target mm to be
taken.

Export dump_mm() as there's now the first user for it: VFIO can be
compiled as module and untagged_addr_remote() triggers dump_mm() via
mmap_assert_locked().

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |  2 ++
 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c     |  2 +-
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                  |  9 +++++++--
 include/linux/mm.h                  | 11 -----------
 include/linux/uaccess.h             | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/debug.c                          |  1 +
 mm/gup.c                            |  4 ++--
 mm/madvise.c                        |  5 +++--
 mm/migrate.c                        | 11 ++++++-----
 9 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 94266a5c5b04..b825a5dd0210 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
 
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <asm/asi.h>
 #include <asm/spitfire.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
index 23c24fe98c00..daf34f957b7b 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
+++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int vaddr_get_pfns(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr,
 		goto done;
 	}
 
-	vaddr = untagged_addr(vaddr);
+	vaddr = untagged_addr_remote(mm, vaddr);
 
 retry:
 	vma = vma_lookup(mm, vaddr);
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index e35a0398db63..df139a717230 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -1692,8 +1692,13 @@ static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 
 	/* watch out for wraparound */
 	start_vaddr = end_vaddr;
-	if (svpfn <= (ULONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT))
-		start_vaddr = untagged_addr(svpfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+	if (svpfn <= (ULONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
+		ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_free;
+		start_vaddr = untagged_addr_remote(mm, svpfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+		mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+	}
 
 	/* Ensure the address is inside the task */
 	if (start_vaddr > mm->task_size)
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index f3f196e4d66d..6b28eb9c6ea2 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -96,17 +96,6 @@ extern int mmap_rnd_compat_bits __read_mostly;
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 
-/*
- * Architectures that support memory tagging (assigning tags to memory regions,
- * embedding these tags into addresses that point to these memory regions, and
- * checking that the memory and the pointer tags match on memory accesses)
- * redefine this macro to strip tags from pointers.
- * It's defined as noop for architectures that don't support memory tagging.
- */
-#ifndef untagged_addr
-#define untagged_addr(addr) (addr)
-#endif
-
 #ifndef __pa_symbol
 #define __pa_symbol(x)  __pa(RELOC_HIDE((unsigned long)(x), 0))
 #endif
diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
index afb18f198843..bfdadf5f8bbb 100644
--- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
+++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
@@ -10,6 +10,28 @@
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
+/*
+ * Architectures that support memory tagging (assigning tags to memory regions,
+ * embedding these tags into addresses that point to these memory regions, and
+ * checking that the memory and the pointer tags match on memory accesses)
+ * redefine this macro to strip tags from pointers.
+ *
+ * Passing down mm_struct allows to define untagging rules on per-process
+ * basis.
+ *
+ * It's defined as noop for architectures that don't support memory tagging.
+ */
+#ifndef untagged_addr
+#define untagged_addr(addr) (addr)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef untagged_addr_remote
+#define untagged_addr_remote(mm, addr)	({		\
+	mmap_assert_locked(mm);				\
+	untagged_addr(addr);				\
+})
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user())
  * and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and
diff --git a/mm/debug.c b/mm/debug.c
index 7f8e5f744e42..3c1b490c7e2b 100644
--- a/mm/debug.c
+++ b/mm/debug.c
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ void dump_mm(const struct mm_struct *mm)
 		mm->def_flags, &mm->def_flags
 	);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dump_mm);
 
 static bool page_init_poisoning __read_mostly = true;
 
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index f45a3a5be53a..e28d787ba8f8 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ static long __get_user_pages(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	if (!nr_pages)
 		return 0;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr_remote(mm, start);
 
 	VM_BUG_ON(!!pages != !!(gup_flags & (FOLL_GET | FOLL_PIN)));
 
@@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ int fixup_user_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
 
-	address = untagged_addr(address);
+	address = untagged_addr_remote(mm, address);
 
 	if (unlocked)
 		fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE;
diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
index a56a6d17e201..90cd4a442fd2 100644
--- a/mm/madvise.c
+++ b/mm/madvise.c
@@ -1407,8 +1407,6 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len_in, int beh
 	size_t len;
 	struct blk_plug plug;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
-
 	if (!madvise_behavior_valid(behavior))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1440,6 +1438,9 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len_in, int beh
 		mmap_read_lock(mm);
 	}
 
+	start = untagged_addr_remote(mm, start);
+	end = start + len;
+
 	blk_start_plug(&plug);
 	error = madvise_walk_vmas(mm, start, end, behavior,
 			madvise_vma_behavior);
diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c
index a4d3fc65085f..dae5022d94b0 100644
--- a/mm/migrate.c
+++ b/mm/migrate.c
@@ -1719,14 +1719,17 @@ static int do_move_pages_to_node(struct mm_struct *mm,
  *         target node
  *     1 - when it has been queued
  */
-static int add_page_for_migration(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
+static int add_page_for_migration(struct mm_struct *mm, const void __user *p,
 		int node, struct list_head *pagelist, bool migrate_all)
 {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	unsigned long addr;
 	struct page *page;
 	int err;
 
 	mmap_read_lock(mm);
+	addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr_remote(mm, p);
+
 	err = -EFAULT;
 	vma = vma_lookup(mm, addr);
 	if (!vma || !vma_migratable(vma))
@@ -1831,7 +1834,6 @@ static int do_pages_move(struct mm_struct *mm, nodemask_t task_nodes,
 
 	for (i = start = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
 		const void __user *p;
-		unsigned long addr;
 		int node;
 
 		err = -EFAULT;
@@ -1839,7 +1841,6 @@ static int do_pages_move(struct mm_struct *mm, nodemask_t task_nodes,
 			goto out_flush;
 		if (get_user(node, nodes + i))
 			goto out_flush;
-		addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(p);
 
 		err = -ENODEV;
 		if (node < 0 || node >= MAX_NUMNODES)
@@ -1867,8 +1868,8 @@ static int do_pages_move(struct mm_struct *mm, nodemask_t task_nodes,
 		 * Errors in the page lookup or isolation are not fatal and we simply
 		 * report them via status
 		 */
-		err = add_page_for_migration(mm, addr, current_node,
-				&pagelist, flags & MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL);
+		err = add_page_for_migration(mm, p, current_node, &pagelist,
+					     flags & MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL);
 
 		if (err > 0) {
 			/* The page is successfully queued for migration */
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 05/17] mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote() Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-02-09 14:10   ` Alexander Potapenko
  2023-02-10 15:18   ` Alexander Potapenko
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 07/17] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead for systems without LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (12 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 2 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

untagged_addr() is a helper used by the core-mm to strip tag bits and
get the address to the canonical shape based on rules of the current
thread. It only handles userspace addresses.

The untagging mask is stored in per-CPU variable and set on context
switching to the task.

The tags must not be included into check whether it's okay to access the
userspace address. Strip tags in access_ok().

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  3 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 11 +++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h    | 10 ++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h     | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |  3 +++
 arch/x86/mm/init.c                 |  5 ++++
 6 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index 22fc9fbf1d0a..9cac8c45a647 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ typedef struct {
 #ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
 	/* Active LAM mode:  X86_CR3_LAM_U48 or X86_CR3_LAM_U57 or 0 (disabled) */
 	unsigned long lam_cr3_mask;
+
+	/* Significant bits of the virtual address. Excludes tag bits. */
+	u64 untag_mask;
 #endif
 
 	struct mutex lock;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index a62e70801ea8..ca2e2ffdd3c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -100,6 +100,12 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	mm->context.lam_cr3_mask = oldmm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
+	mm->context.untag_mask = oldmm->context.untag_mask;
+}
+
+static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
 }
 
 #else
@@ -112,6 +118,10 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 }
+
+static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 #define enter_lazy_tlb enter_lazy_tlb
@@ -138,6 +148,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
 	}
 #endif
+	mm_reset_untag_mask(mm);
 	init_new_context_ldt(mm);
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index e8b47f57bd4a..75bfaa421030 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -54,6 +54,15 @@ static inline void cr4_clear_bits(unsigned long mask)
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, tlbstate_untag_mask);
+
+static inline u64 current_untag_mask(void)
+{
+	return this_cpu_read(tlbstate_untag_mask);
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef MODULE
 /*
  * 6 because 6 should be plenty and struct tlb_state will fit in two cache
@@ -380,6 +389,7 @@ static inline void set_tlbstate_lam_mode(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.lam,
 		       mm->context.lam_cr3_mask >> X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT);
+	this_cpu_write(tlbstate_untag_mask, mm->context.untag_mask);
 }
 
 #else
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 1cc756eafa44..fd9182951084 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -7,11 +7,13 @@
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/instrumented.h>
 #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/smap.h>
 #include <asm/extable.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
 static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
@@ -21,6 +23,39 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
 # define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+/*
+ * Mask out tag bits from the address.
+ *
+ * Magic with the 'sign' allows to untag userspace pointer without any branches
+ * while leaving kernel addresses intact.
+ */
+static inline unsigned long __untagged_addr(unsigned long addr,
+					    unsigned long mask)
+{
+	long sign = addr >> 63;
+
+	addr &= mask | sign;
+	return addr;
+}
+
+#define untagged_addr(addr)	({					\
+	u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr);				\
+	__addr = __untagged_addr(__addr, current_untag_mask());		\
+	(__force __typeof__(addr))__addr;				\
+})
+
+#define untagged_addr_remote(mm, addr)	({				\
+	u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr);				\
+	mmap_assert_locked(mm);						\
+	__addr = __untagged_addr(__addr, (mm)->context.untag_mask);	\
+	(__force __typeof__(addr))__addr;				\
+})
+
+#else
+#define untagged_addr(addr)    (addr)
+#endif
+
 /**
  * access_ok - Checks if a user space pointer is valid
  * @addr: User space pointer to start of block to check
@@ -38,10 +73,10 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  */
-#define access_ok(addr, size)					\
+#define access_ok(addr, size)						\
 ({									\
 	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));				\
+	likely(__access_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size));			\
 })
 
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 40d156a31676..ef6bde1d40d8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 #include <asm/frame.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
 #include <asm/tdx.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 
 #include "process.h"
 
@@ -367,6 +368,8 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
 		task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(current);
 		speculation_ctrl_update(read_thread_flags());
 	}
+
+	mm_reset_untag_mask(current->mm);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index d3987359d441..be5c7d1c0265 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -1044,6 +1044,11 @@ __visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate) = {
 	.cr4 = ~0UL,	/* fail hard if we screw up cr4 shadow initialization */
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, tlbstate_untag_mask);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(tlbstate_untag_mask);
+#endif
+
 void update_cache_mode_entry(unsigned entry, enum page_cache_mode cache)
 {
 	/* entry 0 MUST be WB (hardwired to speed up translations) */
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 07/17] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead for systems without LAM
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 08/17] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (11 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

Use alternatives to reduce untagged_addr() overhead.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  8 ++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h           | 41 +++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index c44b56f7ffba..3f0c31044f02 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -75,6 +75,12 @@
 # define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH & 31))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+# define DISABLE_LAM		0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_LAM		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_LAM & 31))
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM
 # define DISABLE_ENQCMD		0
 #else
@@ -115,7 +121,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK10	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK11	(DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET| \
 			 DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)
-#define DISABLED_MASK12	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK12	(DISABLE_LAM)
 #define DISABLED_MASK13	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK14	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK15	0
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index fd9182951084..6450a2723bcd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mmap_lock.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/smap.h>
@@ -30,26 +31,44 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Magic with the 'sign' allows to untag userspace pointer without any branches
  * while leaving kernel addresses intact.
  */
-static inline unsigned long __untagged_addr(unsigned long addr,
-					    unsigned long mask)
+static inline unsigned long __untagged_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-	long sign = addr >> 63;
+	long sign;
+
+	/*
+	 * Refer tlbstate_untag_mask directly to avoid RIP-relative relocation
+	 * in alternative instructions. The relocation gets wrong when gets
+	 * copied to the target place.
+	 */
+	asm (ALTERNATIVE("",
+			 "sar $63, %[sign]\n\t" /* user_ptr ? 0 : -1UL */
+			 "or %%gs:tlbstate_untag_mask, %[sign]\n\t"
+			 "and %[sign], %[addr]\n\t", X86_FEATURE_LAM)
+	     : [addr] "+r" (addr), [sign] "=r" (sign)
+	     : "m" (tlbstate_untag_mask), "[sign]" (addr));
 
-	addr &= mask | sign;
 	return addr;
 }
 
 #define untagged_addr(addr)	({					\
-	u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr);				\
-	__addr = __untagged_addr(__addr, current_untag_mask());		\
-	(__force __typeof__(addr))__addr;				\
+	unsigned long __addr = (__force unsigned long)(addr);		\
+	(__force __typeof__(addr))__untagged_addr(__addr);		\
 })
 
+static inline unsigned long __untagged_addr_remote(struct mm_struct *mm,
+						   unsigned long addr)
+{
+	long sign = addr >> 63;
+
+	mmap_assert_locked(mm);
+	addr &= (mm)->context.untag_mask | sign;
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
 #define untagged_addr_remote(mm, addr)	({				\
-	u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr);				\
-	mmap_assert_locked(mm);						\
-	__addr = __untagged_addr(__addr, (mm)->context.untag_mask);	\
-	(__force __typeof__(addr))__addr;				\
+	unsigned long __addr = (__force unsigned long)(addr);		\
+	(__force __typeof__(addr))__untagged_addr_remote(mm, __addr);	\
 })
 
 #else
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 08/17] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (6 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 07/17] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead for systems without LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-02-09 14:12   ` Alexander Potapenko
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (10 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

Add a few of arch_prctl() handles:

 - ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR enabled LAM. The argument is required number
   of tag bits. It is rounded up to the nearest LAM mode that can
   provide it. For now only LAM_U57 is supported, with 6 tag bits.

 - ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK returns untag mask. It can indicates where tag
   bits located in the address.

 - ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS returns the maximum tag bits user can request.
   Zero if LAM is not supported.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h        |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h |  4 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c         |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c      | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index 9cac8c45a647..e80762e998ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32		0
 /* vsyscall page is accessible on this MM */
 #define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL		1
+/* Do not allow changing LAM mode */
+#define MM_CONTEXT_LOCK_LAM		2
 
 /*
  * x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
index 500b96e71f18..a31e27b95b19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
@@ -20,4 +20,8 @@
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32		0x2002
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64		0x2003
 
+#define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK		0x4001
+#define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR		0x4002
+#define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS		0x4003
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index ef6bde1d40d8..cc0677f58f42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
 
 	savesegment(es, p->thread.es);
 	savesegment(ds, p->thread.ds);
+
+	if (p->mm && (clone_flags & (CLONE_VM | CLONE_VFORK)) == CLONE_VM)
+		set_bit(MM_CONTEXT_LOCK_LAM, &p->mm->context.flags);
 #else
 	p->thread.sp0 = (unsigned long) (childregs + 1);
 	savesegment(gs, p->thread.gs);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 8b06034e8c70..88aae519c8f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -743,6 +743,48 @@ static long prctl_map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+
+#define LAM_U57_BITS 6
+
+static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	/* PTRACE_ARCH_PRCTL */
+	if (current->mm != mm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+		return -EINTR;
+
+	if (test_bit(MM_CONTEXT_LOCK_LAM, &mm->context.flags)) {
+		mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	if (!nr_bits) {
+		mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (nr_bits <= LAM_U57_BITS) {
+		mm->context.lam_cr3_mask = X86_CR3_LAM_U57;
+		mm->context.untag_mask =  ~GENMASK(62, 57);
+	} else {
+		mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	write_cr3(__read_cr3() | mm->context.lam_cr3_mask);
+	set_tlbstate_lam_mode(mm);
+	set_bit(MM_CONTEXT_LOCK_LAM, &mm->context.flags);
+
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
@@ -830,7 +872,18 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
 	case ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64:
 		return prctl_map_vdso(&vdso_image_64, arg2);
 #endif
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
+	case ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK:
+		return put_user(task->mm->context.untag_mask,
+				(unsigned long __user *)arg2);
+	case ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR:
+		return prctl_enable_tagged_addr(task->mm, arg2);
+	case ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS:
+		if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM))
+			return put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *)arg2);
+		else
+			return put_user(LAM_U57_BITS, (unsigned long __user *)arg2);
+#endif
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		break;
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (7 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 08/17] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-02-09 14:13   ` Alexander Potapenko
  2023-02-10 12:29   ` Alexander Potapenko
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 10/17] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid() Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (9 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 2 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov,
	Catalin Marinas

Add a line in /proc/$PID/status to report untag_mask. It can be
used to find out LAM status of the process from the outside. It is
useful for debuggers.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h    | 6 ++++++
 arch/sparc/include/asm/mmu_context_64.h | 6 ++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h      | 6 ++++++
 fs/proc/array.c                         | 6 ++++++
 include/linux/mmu_context.h             | 7 +++++++
 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 72dbd6400549..56911691bef0 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -288,6 +288,12 @@ void post_ttbr_update_workaround(void);
 unsigned long arm64_mm_context_get(struct mm_struct *mm);
 void arm64_mm_context_put(struct mm_struct *mm);
 
+#define mm_untag_mask mm_untag_mask
+static inline unsigned long mm_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return -1UL >> 8;
+}
+
 #include <asm-generic/mmu_context.h>
 
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mmu_context_64.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mmu_context_64.h
index 7a8380c63aab..799e797c5cdd 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mmu_context_64.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mmu_context_64.h
@@ -185,6 +185,12 @@ static inline void finish_arch_post_lock_switch(void)
 	}
 }
 
+#define mm_untag_mask mm_untag_mask
+static inline unsigned long mm_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+       return -1UL >> adi_nbits();
+}
+
 #include <asm-generic/mmu_context.h>
 
 #endif /* !(__ASSEMBLY__) */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index ca2e2ffdd3c6..43eb6b1357dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -103,6 +103,12 @@ static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 	mm->context.untag_mask = oldmm->context.untag_mask;
 }
 
+#define mm_untag_mask mm_untag_mask
+static inline unsigned long mm_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return mm->context.untag_mask;
+}
+
 static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 49283b8103c7..d2a94eafe9a3 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -428,6 +428,11 @@ static inline void task_thp_status(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm)
 	seq_printf(m, "THP_enabled:\t%d\n", thp_enabled);
 }
 
+static inline void task_untag_mask(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	seq_printf(m, "untag_mask:\t%#lx\n", mm_untag_mask(mm));
+}
+
 int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 			struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
 {
@@ -443,6 +448,7 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 		task_mem(m, mm);
 		task_core_dumping(m, task);
 		task_thp_status(m, mm);
+		task_untag_mask(m, mm);
 		mmput(mm);
 	}
 	task_sig(m, task);
diff --git a/include/linux/mmu_context.h b/include/linux/mmu_context.h
index b9b970f7ab45..14b9c1fa05c4 100644
--- a/include/linux/mmu_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/mmu_context.h
@@ -28,4 +28,11 @@ static inline void leave_mm(int cpu) { }
 # define task_cpu_possible(cpu, p)	cpumask_test_cpu((cpu), task_cpu_possible_mask(p))
 #endif
 
+#ifndef mm_untag_mask
+static inline unsigned long mm_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return -1UL;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 10/17] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid()
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (8 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 11/17] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (8 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

Kernel has few users of pasid_valid() and all but one checks if the
process has PASID allocated. The helper takes ioasid_t as the input.

Replace the helper with mm_valid_pasid() that takes mm_struct as the
argument. The only call that checks PASID that is not tied to mm_struct
is open-codded now.

This is preparatory patch. It helps avoid ifdeffery: no need to
dereference mm->pasid in generic code to check if the process has PASID.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c   | 6 +++---
 drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c | 4 ++--
 include/linux/ioasid.h    | 9 ---------
 include/linux/sched/mm.h  | 8 +++++++-
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index d317dc3d06a3..8b83d8fbce71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -671,15 +671,15 @@ static bool try_fixup_enqcmd_gp(void)
 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD))
 		return false;
 
-	pasid = current->mm->pasid;
-
 	/*
 	 * If the mm has not been allocated a
 	 * PASID, the #GP can not be fixed up.
 	 */
-	if (!pasid_valid(pasid))
+	if (!mm_valid_pasid(current->mm))
 		return false;
 
+	pasid = current->mm->pasid;
+
 	/*
 	 * Did this thread already have its PASID activated?
 	 * If so, the #GP must be from something else.
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c
index 24bf9b2b58aa..4ee2929f0d7a 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c
@@ -34,14 +34,14 @@ int iommu_sva_alloc_pasid(struct mm_struct *mm, ioasid_t min, ioasid_t max)
 
 	mutex_lock(&iommu_sva_lock);
 	/* Is a PASID already associated with this mm? */
-	if (pasid_valid(mm->pasid)) {
+	if (mm_valid_pasid(mm)) {
 		if (mm->pasid < min || mm->pasid >= max)
 			ret = -EOVERFLOW;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	pasid = ioasid_alloc(&iommu_sva_pasid, min, max, mm);
-	if (!pasid_valid(pasid))
+	if (pasid == INVALID_IOASID)
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 	else
 		mm_pasid_set(mm, pasid);
diff --git a/include/linux/ioasid.h b/include/linux/ioasid.h
index af1c9d62e642..836ae09e92c2 100644
--- a/include/linux/ioasid.h
+++ b/include/linux/ioasid.h
@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ void *ioasid_find(struct ioasid_set *set, ioasid_t ioasid,
 int ioasid_register_allocator(struct ioasid_allocator_ops *allocator);
 void ioasid_unregister_allocator(struct ioasid_allocator_ops *allocator);
 int ioasid_set_data(ioasid_t ioasid, void *data);
-static inline bool pasid_valid(ioasid_t ioasid)
-{
-	return ioasid != INVALID_IOASID;
-}
 
 #else /* !CONFIG_IOASID */
 static inline ioasid_t ioasid_alloc(struct ioasid_set *set, ioasid_t min,
@@ -74,10 +70,5 @@ static inline int ioasid_set_data(ioasid_t ioasid, void *data)
 	return -ENOTSUPP;
 }
 
-static inline bool pasid_valid(ioasid_t ioasid)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-
 #endif /* CONFIG_IOASID */
 #endif /* __LINUX_IOASID_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/mm.h b/include/linux/sched/mm.h
index 2a243616f222..b69fe7e8c0ac 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/mm.h
@@ -457,6 +457,11 @@ static inline void mm_pasid_init(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	mm->pasid = INVALID_IOASID;
 }
 
+static inline bool mm_valid_pasid(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return mm->pasid != INVALID_IOASID;
+}
+
 /* Associate a PASID with an mm_struct: */
 static inline void mm_pasid_set(struct mm_struct *mm, u32 pasid)
 {
@@ -465,13 +470,14 @@ static inline void mm_pasid_set(struct mm_struct *mm, u32 pasid)
 
 static inline void mm_pasid_drop(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
-	if (pasid_valid(mm->pasid)) {
+	if (mm_valid_pasid(mm)) {
 		ioasid_free(mm->pasid);
 		mm->pasid = INVALID_IOASID;
 	}
 }
 #else
 static inline void mm_pasid_init(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
+static inline bool mm_valid_pasid(struct mm_struct *mm) { return false; }
 static inline void mm_pasid_set(struct mm_struct *mm, u32 pasid) {}
 static inline void mm_pasid_drop(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
 #endif
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 11/17] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (9 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 10/17] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid() Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 12/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (7 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

IOMMU and SVA-capable devices know nothing about LAM and only expect
canonical addresses. An attempt to pass down tagged pointer will lead
to address translation failure.

By default do not allow to enable both LAM and use SVA in the same
process.

The new ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA arch_prctl() overrides the limitation.
By using the arch_prctl() userspace takes responsibility to never pass
tagged address to the device.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         | 2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 6 ++++++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h  | 1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       | 7 +++++++
 drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c          | 4 ++++
 include/linux/mmu_context.h        | 7 +++++++
 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index e80762e998ce..0da5c227f490 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 #define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL		1
 /* Do not allow changing LAM mode */
 #define MM_CONTEXT_LOCK_LAM		2
+/* Allow LAM and SVA coexisting */
+#define MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA	3
 
 /*
  * x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 43eb6b1357dd..e77a8774cf29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
 }
 
+#define arch_pgtable_dma_compat arch_pgtable_dma_compat
+static inline bool arch_pgtable_dma_compat(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return !mm_lam_cr3_mask(mm) ||
+		test_bit(MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA, &mm->context.flags);
+}
 #else
 
 static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
index a31e27b95b19..eb290d89cb32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
@@ -23,5 +23,6 @@
 #define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK		0x4001
 #define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR		0x4002
 #define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS		0x4003
+#define ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA		0x4004
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 88aae519c8f8..eda826a956df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -756,6 +756,10 @@ static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits)
 	if (current->mm != mm)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (mm_valid_pasid(mm) &&
+	    !test_bit(MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA, &mm->context.flags))
+		return -EINTR;
+
 	if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
 		return -EINTR;
 
@@ -878,6 +882,9 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
 				(unsigned long __user *)arg2);
 	case ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR:
 		return prctl_enable_tagged_addr(task->mm, arg2);
+	case ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA:
+		set_bit(MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA, &task->mm->context.flags);
+		return 0;
 	case ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS:
 		if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM))
 			return put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *)arg2);
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c
index 4ee2929f0d7a..dd76a1a09cf7 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Helpers for IOMMU drivers implementing SVA
  */
+#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 #include <linux/iommu.h>
@@ -32,6 +33,9 @@ int iommu_sva_alloc_pasid(struct mm_struct *mm, ioasid_t min, ioasid_t max)
 	    min == 0 || max < min)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!arch_pgtable_dma_compat(mm))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
 	mutex_lock(&iommu_sva_lock);
 	/* Is a PASID already associated with this mm? */
 	if (mm_valid_pasid(mm)) {
diff --git a/include/linux/mmu_context.h b/include/linux/mmu_context.h
index 14b9c1fa05c4..f2b7a3f04099 100644
--- a/include/linux/mmu_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/mmu_context.h
@@ -35,4 +35,11 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef arch_pgtable_dma_compat
+static inline bool arch_pgtable_dma_compat(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 12/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (10 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 11/17] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 13/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (6 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Weihong Zhang,
	Kirill A . Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>

LAM is supported only in 64-bit mode and applies only addresses used for data
accesses. In 64-bit mode, linear address have 64 bits. LAM is applied to 64-bit
linear address and allow software to use high bits for metadata.
LAM supports configurations that differ regarding which pointer bits are masked
and can be used for metadata.

LAM includes following mode:

 - LAM_U57, pointer bits in positions 62:57 are masked (LAM width 6),
   allows bits 62:57 of a user pointer to be used as metadata.

There are some arch_prctls:
ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR: enable LAM mode, mask high bits of a user pointer.
ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK: get current untagged mask.
ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS: the maximum tag bits user can request. zero if LAM
is not supported.

The LAM mode is for pre-process, a process has only one chance to set LAM mode.
But there is no API to disable LAM mode. So all of test cases are run under
child process.

Functions of this test:

MALLOC

 - LAM_U57 masks bits 57:62 of a user pointer. Process on user space
   can dereference such pointers.

 - Disable LAM, dereference a pointer with metadata above 48 bit or 57 bit
   lead to trigger SIGSEGV.

TAG_BITS

 - Max tag bits of LAM_U57 is 6.

Signed-off-by: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile |   2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c    | 326 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 327 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
index 0388c4d60af0..c1a16a9d4f2f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ TARGETS_C_32BIT_ONLY := entry_from_vm86 test_syscall_vdso unwind_vdso \
 			test_FCMOV test_FCOMI test_FISTTP \
 			vdso_restorer
 TARGETS_C_64BIT_ONLY := fsgsbase sysret_rip syscall_numbering \
-			corrupt_xstate_header amx
+			corrupt_xstate_header amx lam
 # Some selftests require 32bit support enabled also on 64bit systems
 TARGETS_C_32BIT_NEEDED := ldt_gdt ptrace_syscall
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..268c1d2749af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+
+#ifndef __x86_64__
+# error This test is 64-bit only
+#endif
+
+/* LAM modes, these definitions were copied from kernel code */
+#define LAM_NONE                0
+#define LAM_U57_BITS            6
+
+#define LAM_U57_MASK            (0x3fULL << 57)
+/* arch prctl for LAM */
+#define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK     0x4001
+#define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR 0x4002
+#define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS   0x4003
+
+/* Specified test function bits */
+#define FUNC_MALLOC             0x1
+#define FUNC_BITS               0x2
+
+#define TEST_MASK               0x3
+
+#define MALLOC_LEN              32
+
+struct testcases {
+	unsigned int later;
+	int expected; /* 2: SIGSEGV Error; 1: other errors */
+	unsigned long lam;
+	uint64_t addr;
+	int (*test_func)(struct testcases *test);
+	const char *msg;
+};
+
+int tests_cnt;
+jmp_buf segv_env;
+
+static void segv_handler(int sig)
+{
+	ksft_print_msg("Get segmentation fault(%d).", sig);
+	siglongjmp(segv_env, 1);
+}
+
+static inline int cpu_has_lam(void)
+{
+	unsigned int cpuinfo[4];
+
+	__cpuid_count(0x7, 1, cpuinfo[0], cpuinfo[1], cpuinfo[2], cpuinfo[3]);
+
+	return (cpuinfo[0] & (1 << 26));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set tagged address and read back untag mask.
+ * check if the untagged mask is expected.
+ *
+ * @return:
+ * 0: Set LAM mode successfully
+ * others: failed to set LAM
+ */
+static int set_lam(unsigned long lam)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	uint64_t ptr = 0;
+
+	if (lam != LAM_U57_BITS && lam != LAM_NONE)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Skip check return */
+	syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR, lam);
+
+	/* Get untagged mask */
+	syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK, &ptr);
+
+	/* Check mask returned is expected */
+	if (lam == LAM_U57_BITS)
+		ret = (ptr != ~(LAM_U57_MASK));
+	else if (lam == LAM_NONE)
+		ret = (ptr != -1ULL);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static unsigned long get_default_tag_bits(void)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+	int lam = LAM_NONE;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) {
+		perror("Fork failed.");
+	} else if (pid == 0) {
+		/* Set LAM mode in child process */
+		if (set_lam(LAM_U57_BITS) == 0)
+			lam = LAM_U57_BITS;
+		else
+			lam = LAM_NONE;
+		exit(lam);
+	} else {
+		wait(&ret);
+		lam = WEXITSTATUS(ret);
+	}
+
+	return lam;
+}
+
+/* According to LAM mode, set metadata in high bits */
+static uint64_t set_metadata(uint64_t src, unsigned long lam)
+{
+	uint64_t metadata;
+
+	srand(time(NULL));
+
+	switch (lam) {
+	case LAM_U57_BITS: /* Set metadata in bits 62:57 */
+		/* Get a random non-zero value as metadata */
+		metadata = (rand() % ((1UL << LAM_U57_BITS) - 1) + 1) << 57;
+		metadata |= (src & ~(LAM_U57_MASK));
+		break;
+	default:
+		metadata = src;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return metadata;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set metadata in user pointer, compare new pointer with original pointer.
+ * both pointers should point to the same address.
+ *
+ * @return:
+ * 0: value on the pointer with metadate and value on original are same
+ * 1: not same.
+ */
+static int handle_lam_test(void *src, unsigned int lam)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+
+	strcpy((char *)src, "USER POINTER");
+
+	ptr = (char *)set_metadata((uint64_t)src, lam);
+	if (src == ptr)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Copy a string into the pointer with metadata */
+	strcpy((char *)ptr, "METADATA POINTER");
+
+	return (!!strcmp((char *)src, (char *)ptr));
+}
+
+
+int handle_max_bits(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	unsigned long exp_bits = get_default_tag_bits();
+	unsigned long bits = 0;
+
+	if (exp_bits != LAM_NONE)
+		exp_bits = LAM_U57_BITS;
+
+	/* Get LAM max tag bits */
+	if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS, &bits) == -1)
+		return 1;
+
+	return (exp_bits != bits);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test lam feature through dereference pointer get from malloc.
+ * @return 0: Pass test. 1: Get failure during test 2: Get SIGSEGV
+ */
+static int handle_malloc(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	char *ptr = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (test->later == 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) == -1)
+			return 1;
+
+	ptr = (char *)malloc(MALLOC_LEN);
+	if (ptr == NULL) {
+		perror("malloc() failure\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Set signal handler */
+	if (sigsetjmp(segv_env, 1) == 0) {
+		signal(SIGSEGV, segv_handler);
+		ret = handle_lam_test(ptr, test->lam);
+	} else {
+		ret = 2;
+	}
+
+	if (test->later != 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) == -1 && ret == 0)
+			ret = 1;
+
+	free(ptr);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int fork_test(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	int ret, child_ret;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) {
+		perror("Fork failed.");
+		ret = 1;
+	} else if (pid == 0) {
+		ret = test->test_func(test);
+		exit(ret);
+	} else {
+		wait(&child_ret);
+		ret = WEXITSTATUS(child_ret);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void run_test(struct testcases *test, int count)
+{
+	int i, ret = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		struct testcases *t = test + i;
+
+		/* fork a process to run test case */
+		ret = fork_test(t);
+		if (ret != 0)
+			ret = (t->expected == ret);
+		else
+			ret = !(t->expected);
+
+		tests_cnt++;
+		ksft_test_result(ret, t->msg);
+	}
+}
+
+static struct testcases malloc_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.later = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_malloc,
+		.msg = "MALLOC: LAM_U57. Dereferencing pointer with metadata\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.later = 1,
+		.expected = 2,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_malloc,
+		.msg = "MALLOC:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata.\n",
+	},
+};
+
+
+static struct testcases bits_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.test_func = handle_max_bits,
+		.msg = "BITS: Check default tag bits\n",
+	},
+};
+
+static void cmd_help(void)
+{
+	printf("usage: lam [-h] [-t test list]\n");
+	printf("\t-t test list: run tests specified in the test list, default:0x%x\n", TEST_MASK);
+	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits;\n");
+	printf("\t-h: help\n");
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int c = 0;
+	unsigned int tests = TEST_MASK;
+
+	tests_cnt = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_lam()) {
+		ksft_print_msg("Unsupported LAM feature!\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "ht:")) != -1) {
+		switch (c) {
+		case 't':
+			tests = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 16);
+			if (!(tests & TEST_MASK)) {
+				ksft_print_msg("Invalid argument!\n");
+				return -1;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			cmd_help();
+			return 0;
+		default:
+			ksft_print_msg("Invalid argument\n");
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (tests & FUNC_MALLOC)
+		run_test(malloc_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(malloc_cases));
+
+	if (tests & FUNC_BITS)
+		run_test(bits_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(bits_cases));
+
+	ksft_set_plan(tests_cnt);
+
+	return ksft_exit_pass();
+}
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 13/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL test cases for linear-address masking
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (11 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 12/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 14/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Weihong Zhang,
	Kirill A . Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>

Add mmap and SYSCALL test cases.

SYSCALL test cases:

 - LAM supports set metadata in high bits 62:57 (LAM_U57) of a user pointer, pass
   the pointer to SYSCALL, SYSCALL can dereference the pointer and return correct
   result.

 - Disable LAM, pass a pointer with metadata in high bits to SYSCALL,
   SYSCALL returns -1 (EFAULT).

MMAP test cases:

 - Enable LAM_U57, MMAP with low address (below bits 47), set metadata
   in high bits of the address, dereference the address should be
   allowed.

 - Enable LAM_U57, MMAP with high address (above bits 47), set metadata
   in high bits of the address, dereference the address should be
   allowed.

Signed-off-by: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 144 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 140 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
index 268c1d2749af..39ebfc511685 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <setjmp.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <inttypes.h>
 
@@ -29,11 +30,18 @@
 /* Specified test function bits */
 #define FUNC_MALLOC             0x1
 #define FUNC_BITS               0x2
+#define FUNC_MMAP               0x4
+#define FUNC_SYSCALL            0x8
 
-#define TEST_MASK               0x3
+#define TEST_MASK               0xf
+
+#define LOW_ADDR                (0x1UL << 30)
+#define HIGH_ADDR               (0x3UL << 48)
 
 #define MALLOC_LEN              32
 
+#define PAGE_SIZE               (4 << 10)
+
 struct testcases {
 	unsigned int later;
 	int expected; /* 2: SIGSEGV Error; 1: other errors */
@@ -49,6 +57,7 @@ jmp_buf segv_env;
 static void segv_handler(int sig)
 {
 	ksft_print_msg("Get segmentation fault(%d).", sig);
+
 	siglongjmp(segv_env, 1);
 }
 
@@ -61,6 +70,16 @@ static inline int cpu_has_lam(void)
 	return (cpuinfo[0] & (1 << 26));
 }
 
+/* Check 5-level page table feature in CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=00H):ECX.[bit 16] */
+static inline int cpu_has_la57(void)
+{
+	unsigned int cpuinfo[4];
+
+	__cpuid_count(0x7, 0, cpuinfo[0], cpuinfo[1], cpuinfo[2], cpuinfo[3]);
+
+	return (cpuinfo[2] & (1 << 16));
+}
+
 /*
  * Set tagged address and read back untag mask.
  * check if the untagged mask is expected.
@@ -213,6 +232,68 @@ static int handle_malloc(struct testcases *test)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int handle_mmap(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	void *ptr;
+	unsigned int flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (test->later == 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+
+	ptr = mmap((void *)test->addr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+		   flags, -1, 0);
+	if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
+		if (test->addr == HIGH_ADDR)
+			if (!cpu_has_la57())
+				return 3; /* unsupport LA57 */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (test->later != 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+			ret = 1;
+
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		if (sigsetjmp(segv_env, 1) == 0) {
+			signal(SIGSEGV, segv_handler);
+			ret = handle_lam_test(ptr, test->lam);
+		} else {
+			ret = 2;
+		}
+	}
+
+	munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	struct utsname unme, *pu;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (test->later == 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+
+	if (sigsetjmp(segv_env, 1) == 0) {
+		signal(SIGSEGV, segv_handler);
+		pu = (struct utsname *)set_metadata((uint64_t)&unme, test->lam);
+		ret = uname(pu);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			ret = 1;
+	} else {
+		ret = 2;
+	}
+
+	if (test->later != 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != -1 && ret == 0)
+			ret = 1;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int fork_test(struct testcases *test)
 {
 	int ret, child_ret;
@@ -241,13 +322,20 @@ static void run_test(struct testcases *test, int count)
 		struct testcases *t = test + i;
 
 		/* fork a process to run test case */
+		tests_cnt++;
 		ret = fork_test(t);
+
+		/* return 3 is not support LA57, the case should be skipped */
+		if (ret == 3) {
+			ksft_test_result_skip(t->msg);
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		if (ret != 0)
 			ret = (t->expected == ret);
 		else
 			ret = !(t->expected);
 
-		tests_cnt++;
 		ksft_test_result(ret, t->msg);
 	}
 }
@@ -268,7 +356,6 @@ static struct testcases malloc_cases[] = {
 	},
 };
 
-
 static struct testcases bits_cases[] = {
 	{
 		.test_func = handle_max_bits,
@@ -276,11 +363,54 @@ static struct testcases bits_cases[] = {
 	},
 };
 
+static struct testcases syscall_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.later = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_syscall,
+		.msg = "SYSCALL: LAM_U57. syscall with metadata\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.later = 1,
+		.expected = 1,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_syscall,
+		.msg = "SYSCALL:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata.\n",
+	},
+};
+
+static struct testcases mmap_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.later = 1,
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.addr = HIGH_ADDR,
+		.test_func = handle_mmap,
+		.msg = "MMAP: First mmap high address, then set LAM_U57.\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.later = 0,
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.addr = HIGH_ADDR,
+		.test_func = handle_mmap,
+		.msg = "MMAP: First LAM_U57, then High address.\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.later = 0,
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.addr = LOW_ADDR,
+		.test_func = handle_mmap,
+		.msg = "MMAP: First LAM_U57, then Low address.\n",
+	},
+};
+
 static void cmd_help(void)
 {
 	printf("usage: lam [-h] [-t test list]\n");
 	printf("\t-t test list: run tests specified in the test list, default:0x%x\n", TEST_MASK);
-	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits;\n");
+	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall.\n");
 	printf("\t-h: help\n");
 }
 
@@ -320,6 +450,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (tests & FUNC_BITS)
 		run_test(bits_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(bits_cases));
 
+	if (tests & FUNC_MMAP)
+		run_test(mmap_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(mmap_cases));
+
+	if (tests & FUNC_SYSCALL)
+		run_test(syscall_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(syscall_cases));
+
 	ksft_set_plan(tests_cnt);
 
 	return ksft_exit_pass();
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 14/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring test cases for linear-address masking
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (12 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 13/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 15/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Weihong Zhang,
	Kirill A . Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>

LAM should be supported in kernel thread, using io_uring to verify LAM feature.
The test cases implement read a file through io_uring, the test cases choose an
iovec array as receiving buffer, which used to receive data, according to LAM
mode, set metadata in high bits of these buffer.

io_uring can deal with these buffers that pointed to pointers with the metadata
in high bits.

Signed-off-by: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 341 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 339 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
index 39ebfc511685..52750ebd0887 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
@@ -9,8 +9,12 @@
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <inttypes.h>
 
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
 #include "../kselftest.h"
 
 #ifndef __x86_64__
@@ -32,8 +36,9 @@
 #define FUNC_BITS               0x2
 #define FUNC_MMAP               0x4
 #define FUNC_SYSCALL            0x8
+#define FUNC_URING              0x10
 
-#define TEST_MASK               0xf
+#define TEST_MASK               0x1f
 
 #define LOW_ADDR                (0x1UL << 30)
 #define HIGH_ADDR               (0x3UL << 48)
@@ -42,6 +47,13 @@
 
 #define PAGE_SIZE               (4 << 10)
 
+#define barrier() ({						\
+		   __asm__ __volatile__("" : : : "memory");	\
+})
+
+#define URING_QUEUE_SZ 1
+#define URING_BLOCK_SZ 2048
+
 struct testcases {
 	unsigned int later;
 	int expected; /* 2: SIGSEGV Error; 1: other errors */
@@ -51,6 +63,33 @@ struct testcases {
 	const char *msg;
 };
 
+/* Used by CQ of uring, source file handler and file's size */
+struct file_io {
+	int file_fd;
+	off_t file_sz;
+	struct iovec iovecs[];
+};
+
+struct io_uring_queue {
+	unsigned int *head;
+	unsigned int *tail;
+	unsigned int *ring_mask;
+	unsigned int *ring_entries;
+	unsigned int *flags;
+	unsigned int *array;
+	union {
+		struct io_uring_cqe *cqes;
+		struct io_uring_sqe *sqes;
+	} queue;
+	size_t ring_sz;
+};
+
+struct io_ring {
+	int ring_fd;
+	struct io_uring_queue sq_ring;
+	struct io_uring_queue cq_ring;
+};
+
 int tests_cnt;
 jmp_buf segv_env;
 
@@ -294,6 +333,285 @@ static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+int sys_uring_setup(unsigned int entries, struct io_uring_params *p)
+{
+	return (int)syscall(__NR_io_uring_setup, entries, p);
+}
+
+int sys_uring_enter(int fd, unsigned int to, unsigned int min, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return (int)syscall(__NR_io_uring_enter, fd, to, min, flags, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/* Init submission queue and completion queue */
+int mmap_io_uring(struct io_uring_params p, struct io_ring *s)
+{
+	struct io_uring_queue *sring = &s->sq_ring;
+	struct io_uring_queue *cring = &s->cq_ring;
+
+	sring->ring_sz = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned int);
+	cring->ring_sz = p.cq_off.cqes + p.cq_entries * sizeof(struct io_uring_cqe);
+
+	if (p.features & IORING_FEAT_SINGLE_MMAP) {
+		if (cring->ring_sz > sring->ring_sz)
+			sring->ring_sz = cring->ring_sz;
+
+		cring->ring_sz = sring->ring_sz;
+	}
+
+	void *sq_ptr = mmap(0, sring->ring_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+			    MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE, s->ring_fd,
+			    IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
+
+	if (sq_ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
+		perror("sub-queue!");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	void *cq_ptr = sq_ptr;
+
+	if (!(p.features & IORING_FEAT_SINGLE_MMAP)) {
+		cq_ptr = mmap(0, cring->ring_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+			      MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE, s->ring_fd,
+			      IORING_OFF_CQ_RING);
+		if (cq_ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
+			perror("cpl-queue!");
+			munmap(sq_ptr, sring->ring_sz);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sring->head = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.head;
+	sring->tail = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.tail;
+	sring->ring_mask = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.ring_mask;
+	sring->ring_entries = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.ring_entries;
+	sring->flags = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.flags;
+	sring->array = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.array;
+
+	/* Map a queue as mem map */
+	s->sq_ring.queue.sqes = mmap(0, p.sq_entries * sizeof(struct io_uring_sqe),
+				     PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE,
+				     s->ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQES);
+	if (s->sq_ring.queue.sqes == MAP_FAILED) {
+		munmap(sq_ptr, sring->ring_sz);
+		if (sq_ptr != cq_ptr) {
+			ksft_print_msg("failed to mmap uring queue!");
+			munmap(cq_ptr, cring->ring_sz);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	cring->head = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.head;
+	cring->tail = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.tail;
+	cring->ring_mask = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.ring_mask;
+	cring->ring_entries = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.ring_entries;
+	cring->queue.cqes = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.cqes;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Init io_uring queues */
+int setup_io_uring(struct io_ring *s)
+{
+	struct io_uring_params para;
+
+	memset(&para, 0, sizeof(para));
+	s->ring_fd = sys_uring_setup(URING_QUEUE_SZ, &para);
+	if (s->ring_fd < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return mmap_io_uring(para, s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get data from completion queue. the data buffer saved the file data
+ * return 0: success; others: error;
+ */
+int handle_uring_cq(struct io_ring *s)
+{
+	struct file_io *fi = NULL;
+	struct io_uring_queue *cring = &s->cq_ring;
+	struct io_uring_cqe *cqe;
+	unsigned int head;
+	off_t len = 0;
+
+	head = *cring->head;
+
+	do {
+		barrier();
+		if (head == *cring->tail)
+			break;
+		/* Get the entry */
+		cqe = &cring->queue.cqes[head & *s->cq_ring.ring_mask];
+		fi = (struct file_io *)cqe->user_data;
+		if (cqe->res < 0)
+			break;
+
+		int blocks = (int)(fi->file_sz + URING_BLOCK_SZ - 1) / URING_BLOCK_SZ;
+
+		for (int i = 0; i < blocks; i++)
+			len += fi->iovecs[i].iov_len;
+
+		head++;
+	} while (1);
+
+	*cring->head = head;
+	barrier();
+
+	return (len != fi->file_sz);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Submit squeue. specify via IORING_OP_READV.
+ * the buffer need to be set metadata according to LAM mode
+ */
+int handle_uring_sq(struct io_ring *ring, struct file_io *fi, unsigned long lam)
+{
+	int file_fd = fi->file_fd;
+	struct io_uring_queue *sring = &ring->sq_ring;
+	unsigned int index = 0, cur_block = 0, tail = 0, next_tail = 0;
+	struct io_uring_sqe *sqe;
+
+	off_t remain = fi->file_sz;
+	int blocks = (int)(remain + URING_BLOCK_SZ - 1) / URING_BLOCK_SZ;
+
+	while (remain) {
+		off_t bytes = remain;
+		void *buf;
+
+		if (bytes > URING_BLOCK_SZ)
+			bytes = URING_BLOCK_SZ;
+
+		fi->iovecs[cur_block].iov_len = bytes;
+
+		if (posix_memalign(&buf, URING_BLOCK_SZ, URING_BLOCK_SZ))
+			return 1;
+
+		fi->iovecs[cur_block].iov_base = (void *)set_metadata((uint64_t)buf, lam);
+		remain -= bytes;
+		cur_block++;
+	}
+
+	next_tail = *sring->tail;
+	tail = next_tail;
+	next_tail++;
+
+	barrier();
+
+	index = tail & *ring->sq_ring.ring_mask;
+
+	sqe = &ring->sq_ring.queue.sqes[index];
+	sqe->fd = file_fd;
+	sqe->flags = 0;
+	sqe->opcode = IORING_OP_READV;
+	sqe->addr = (unsigned long)fi->iovecs;
+	sqe->len = blocks;
+	sqe->off = 0;
+	sqe->user_data = (uint64_t)fi;
+
+	sring->array[index] = index;
+	tail = next_tail;
+
+	if (*sring->tail != tail) {
+		*sring->tail = tail;
+		barrier();
+	}
+
+	if (sys_uring_enter(ring->ring_fd, 1, 1, IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS) < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test LAM in async I/O and io_uring, read current binery through io_uring
+ * Set metadata in pointers to iovecs buffer.
+ */
+int do_uring(unsigned long lam)
+{
+	struct io_ring *ring;
+	struct file_io *fi;
+	struct stat st;
+	int ret = 1;
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+	/* get current process path */
+	if (readlink("/proc/self/exe", path, PATH_MAX) <= 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	int file_fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+
+	if (file_fd < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (fstat(file_fd, &st) < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	off_t file_sz = st.st_size;
+
+	int blocks = (int)(file_sz + URING_BLOCK_SZ - 1) / URING_BLOCK_SZ;
+
+	fi = malloc(sizeof(*fi) + sizeof(struct iovec) * blocks);
+	if (!fi)
+		return 1;
+
+	fi->file_sz = file_sz;
+	fi->file_fd = file_fd;
+
+	ring = malloc(sizeof(*ring));
+	if (!ring)
+		return 1;
+
+	memset(ring, 0, sizeof(struct io_ring));
+
+	if (setup_io_uring(ring))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (handle_uring_sq(ring, fi, lam))
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = handle_uring_cq(ring);
+
+out:
+	free(ring);
+
+	for (int i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+		if (fi->iovecs[i].iov_base) {
+			uint64_t addr = ((uint64_t)fi->iovecs[i].iov_base);
+
+			switch (lam) {
+			case LAM_U57_BITS: /* Clear bits 62:57 */
+				addr = (addr & ~(0x3fULL << 57));
+				break;
+			}
+			free((void *)addr);
+			fi->iovecs[i].iov_base = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	free(fi);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int handle_uring(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (test->later == 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+
+	if (sigsetjmp(segv_env, 1) == 0) {
+		signal(SIGSEGV, segv_handler);
+		ret = do_uring(test->lam);
+	} else {
+		ret = 2;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int fork_test(struct testcases *test)
 {
 	int ret, child_ret;
@@ -340,6 +658,22 @@ static void run_test(struct testcases *test, int count)
 	}
 }
 
+static struct testcases uring_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.later = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_uring,
+		.msg = "URING: LAM_U57. Dereferencing pointer with metadata\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.later = 1,
+		.expected = 1,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_uring,
+		.msg = "URING:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata.\n",
+	},
+};
+
 static struct testcases malloc_cases[] = {
 	{
 		.later = 0,
@@ -410,7 +744,7 @@ static void cmd_help(void)
 {
 	printf("usage: lam [-h] [-t test list]\n");
 	printf("\t-t test list: run tests specified in the test list, default:0x%x\n", TEST_MASK);
-	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall.\n");
+	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall; 0x10:io_uring.\n");
 	printf("\t-h: help\n");
 }
 
@@ -456,6 +790,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (tests & FUNC_SYSCALL)
 		run_test(syscall_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(syscall_cases));
 
+	if (tests & FUNC_URING)
+		run_test(uring_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(uring_cases));
+
 	ksft_set_plan(tests_cnt);
 
 	return ksft_exit_pass();
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 15/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit test cases for linear-address masking
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (13 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 14/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 16/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA " Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Weihong Zhang,
	Kirill A . Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>

LAM is enabled per-thread and gets inherited on fork(2)/clone(2). exec()
reverts LAM status to the default disabled state.

There are two test scenarios:

 - Fork test cases:

   These cases were used to test the inheritance of LAM for per-thread,
   Child process generated by fork() should inherit LAM feature from
   parent process, Child process can get the LAM mode same as parent
   process.

 - Execve test cases:

   Processes generated by execve() are different from processes
   generated by fork(), these processes revert LAM status to disabled
   status.

Signed-off-by: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 121 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
index 52750ebd0887..ebabd4333b7d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@
 #define FUNC_MMAP               0x4
 #define FUNC_SYSCALL            0x8
 #define FUNC_URING              0x10
+#define FUNC_INHERITE           0x20
 
-#define TEST_MASK               0x1f
+#define TEST_MASK               0x3f
 
 #define LOW_ADDR                (0x1UL << 30)
 #define HIGH_ADDR               (0x3UL << 48)
@@ -174,6 +175,28 @@ static unsigned long get_default_tag_bits(void)
 	return lam;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Set tagged address and read back untag mask.
+ * check if the untag mask is expected.
+ */
+static int get_lam(void)
+{
+	uint64_t ptr = 0;
+	int ret = -1;
+	/* Get untagged mask */
+	if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK, &ptr) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Check mask returned is expected */
+	if (ptr == ~(LAM_U57_MASK))
+		ret = LAM_U57_BITS;
+	else if (ptr == -1ULL)
+		ret = LAM_NONE;
+
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /* According to LAM mode, set metadata in high bits */
 static uint64_t set_metadata(uint64_t src, unsigned long lam)
 {
@@ -581,7 +604,7 @@ int do_uring(unsigned long lam)
 
 			switch (lam) {
 			case LAM_U57_BITS: /* Clear bits 62:57 */
-				addr = (addr & ~(0x3fULL << 57));
+				addr = (addr & ~(LAM_U57_MASK));
 				break;
 			}
 			free((void *)addr);
@@ -632,6 +655,72 @@ static int fork_test(struct testcases *test)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int handle_execve(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	int ret, child_ret;
+	int lam = test->lam;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) {
+		perror("Fork failed.");
+		ret = 1;
+	} else if (pid == 0) {
+		char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+		/* Set LAM mode in parent process */
+		if (set_lam(lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* Get current binary's path and the binary was run by execve */
+		if (readlink("/proc/self/exe", path, PATH_MAX) <= 0)
+			exit(-1);
+
+		/* run binary to get LAM mode and return to parent process */
+		if (execlp(path, path, "-t 0x0", NULL) < 0) {
+			perror("error on exec");
+			exit(-1);
+		}
+	} else {
+		wait(&child_ret);
+		ret = WEXITSTATUS(child_ret);
+		if (ret != LAM_NONE)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_inheritance(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	int ret, child_ret;
+	int lam = test->lam;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	/* Set LAM mode in parent process */
+	if (set_lam(lam) != 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) {
+		perror("Fork failed.");
+		return 1;
+	} else if (pid == 0) {
+		/* Set LAM mode in parent process */
+		int child_lam = get_lam();
+
+		exit(child_lam);
+	} else {
+		wait(&child_ret);
+		ret = WEXITSTATUS(child_ret);
+
+		if (lam != ret)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void run_test(struct testcases *test, int count)
 {
 	int i, ret = 0;
@@ -740,11 +829,26 @@ static struct testcases mmap_cases[] = {
 	},
 };
 
+static struct testcases inheritance_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_inheritance,
+		.msg = "FORK: LAM_U57, child process should get LAM mode same as parent\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_execve,
+		.msg = "EXECVE: LAM_U57, child process should get disabled LAM mode\n",
+	},
+};
+
 static void cmd_help(void)
 {
 	printf("usage: lam [-h] [-t test list]\n");
 	printf("\t-t test list: run tests specified in the test list, default:0x%x\n", TEST_MASK);
-	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall; 0x10:io_uring.\n");
+	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall; 0x10:io_uring; 0x20:inherit;\n");
 	printf("\t-h: help\n");
 }
 
@@ -764,7 +868,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		switch (c) {
 		case 't':
 			tests = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 16);
-			if (!(tests & TEST_MASK)) {
+			if (tests && !(tests & TEST_MASK)) {
 				ksft_print_msg("Invalid argument!\n");
 				return -1;
 			}
@@ -778,6 +882,16 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		}
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * When tests is 0, it is not a real test case;
+	 * the option used by test case(execve) to check the lam mode in
+	 * process generated by execve, the process read back lam mode and
+	 * check with lam mode in parent process.
+	 */
+	if (!tests)
+		return (get_lam());
+
+	/* Run test cases */
 	if (tests & FUNC_MALLOC)
 		run_test(malloc_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(malloc_cases));
 
@@ -793,6 +907,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (tests & FUNC_URING)
 		run_test(uring_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(uring_cases));
 
+	if (tests & FUNC_INHERITE)
+		run_test(inheritance_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(inheritance_cases));
+
 	ksft_set_plan(tests_cnt);
 
 	return ksft_exit_pass();
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 16/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA test cases for linear-address masking
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (14 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 15/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-23 22:05 ` [PATCHv15 17/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add test cases for LAM vs thread creation Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Weihong Zhang,
	Kirill A . Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>

By default do not allow to enable both LAM and use SVA in the same
process.
The new ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA arch_prctl() overrides the limitation.

Add new test cases for the new arch_prctl:
Before using ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA, should not allow to enable LAM/SVA
coexisting. the test cases should be negative.

The test depands on idxd driver and iommu. before test, need add
"intel_iommu=on,sm_on" in kernel command line and insmod idxd driver.

Signed-off-by: Weihong Zhang <weihong.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 235 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
index ebabd4333b7d..a8c91829b616 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK     0x4001
 #define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR 0x4002
 #define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS   0x4003
+#define ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA	0x4004
 
 /* Specified test function bits */
 #define FUNC_MALLOC             0x1
@@ -38,8 +39,9 @@
 #define FUNC_SYSCALL            0x8
 #define FUNC_URING              0x10
 #define FUNC_INHERITE           0x20
+#define FUNC_PASID              0x40
 
-#define TEST_MASK               0x3f
+#define TEST_MASK               0x7f
 
 #define LOW_ADDR                (0x1UL << 30)
 #define HIGH_ADDR               (0x3UL << 48)
@@ -55,11 +57,19 @@
 #define URING_QUEUE_SZ 1
 #define URING_BLOCK_SZ 2048
 
+/* Pasid test define */
+#define LAM_CMD_BIT 0x1
+#define PAS_CMD_BIT 0x2
+#define SVA_CMD_BIT 0x4
+
+#define PAS_CMD(cmd1, cmd2, cmd3) (((cmd3) << 8) | ((cmd2) << 4) | ((cmd1) << 0))
+
 struct testcases {
 	unsigned int later;
 	int expected; /* 2: SIGSEGV Error; 1: other errors */
 	unsigned long lam;
 	uint64_t addr;
+	uint64_t cmd;
 	int (*test_func)(struct testcases *test);
 	const char *msg;
 };
@@ -556,7 +566,7 @@ int do_uring(unsigned long lam)
 	struct file_io *fi;
 	struct stat st;
 	int ret = 1;
-	char path[PATH_MAX];
+	char path[PATH_MAX] = {0};
 
 	/* get current process path */
 	if (readlink("/proc/self/exe", path, PATH_MAX) <= 0)
@@ -852,6 +862,226 @@ static void cmd_help(void)
 	printf("\t-h: help\n");
 }
 
+/* Check for file existence */
+uint8_t file_Exists(const char *fileName)
+{
+	struct stat buffer;
+
+	uint8_t ret = (stat(fileName, &buffer) == 0);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Sysfs idxd files */
+const char *dsa_configs[] = {
+	"echo 1 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/group_id",
+	"echo shared > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/mode",
+	"echo 10 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/priority",
+	"echo 16 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/size",
+	"echo 15 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/threshold",
+	"echo user > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/type",
+	"echo MyApp1 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/name",
+	"echo 1 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/engine0.1/group_id",
+	"echo dsa0 > /sys/bus/dsa/drivers/idxd/bind",
+	/* bind files and devices, generated a device file in /dev */
+	"echo wq0.1 > /sys/bus/dsa/drivers/user/bind",
+};
+
+/* DSA device file */
+const char *dsaDeviceFile = "/dev/dsa/wq0.1";
+/* file for io*/
+const char *dsaPasidEnable = "/sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/pasid_enabled";
+
+/*
+ * DSA depends on kernel cmdline "intel_iommu=on,sm_on"
+ * return pasid_enabled (0: disable 1:enable)
+ */
+int Check_DSA_Kernel_Setting(void)
+{
+	char command[256] = "";
+	char buf[256] = "";
+	char *ptr;
+	int rv = -1;
+
+	snprintf(command, sizeof(command) - 1, "cat %s", dsaPasidEnable);
+
+	FILE *cmd = popen(command, "r");
+
+	if (cmd) {
+		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, cmd) != NULL);
+
+		pclose(cmd);
+		rv = strtol(buf, &ptr, 16);
+	}
+
+	return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Config DSA's sysfs files as shared DSA's WQ.
+ * Generated a device file /dev/dsa/wq0.1
+ * Return:  0 OK; 1 Failed; 3 Skip(SVA disabled).
+ */
+int Dsa_Init_Sysfs(void)
+{
+	uint len = ARRAY_SIZE(dsa_configs);
+	const char **p = dsa_configs;
+
+	if (file_Exists(dsaDeviceFile) == 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* check the idxd driver */
+	if (file_Exists(dsaPasidEnable) != 1) {
+		printf("Please make sure idxd driver was loaded\n");
+		return 3;
+	}
+
+	/* Check SVA feature */
+	if (Check_DSA_Kernel_Setting() != 1) {
+		printf("Please enable SVA.(Add intel_iommu=on,sm_on in kernel cmdline)\n");
+		return 3;
+	}
+
+	/* Check the idxd device file on /dev/dsa/ */
+	for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (system(p[i]))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* After config, /dev/dsa/wq0.1 should be generated */
+	return (file_Exists(dsaDeviceFile) != 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Open DSA device file, triger API: iommu_sva_alloc_pasid
+ */
+void *allocate_dsa_pasid(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	void *wq;
+
+	fd = open(dsaDeviceFile, O_RDWR);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		perror("open");
+		return MAP_FAILED;
+	}
+
+	wq = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_WRITE,
+			   MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE, fd, 0);
+	if (wq == MAP_FAILED)
+		perror("mmap");
+
+	return wq;
+}
+
+int set_force_svm(void)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	ret = syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int handle_pasid(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	uint tmp = test->cmd;
+	uint runed = 0x0;
+	int ret = 0;
+	void *wq = NULL;
+
+	ret = Dsa_Init_Sysfs();
+	if (ret != 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		int err = 0;
+
+		if (tmp & 0x1) {
+			/* run set lam mode*/
+			if ((runed & 0x1) == 0)	{
+				err = set_lam(LAM_U57_BITS);
+				runed = runed | 0x1;
+			} else
+				err = 1;
+		} else if (tmp & 0x4) {
+			/* run force svm */
+			if ((runed & 0x4) == 0)	{
+				err = set_force_svm();
+				runed = runed | 0x4;
+			} else
+				err = 1;
+		} else if (tmp & 0x2) {
+			/* run allocate pasid */
+			if ((runed & 0x2) == 0) {
+				runed = runed | 0x2;
+				wq = allocate_dsa_pasid();
+				if (wq == MAP_FAILED)
+					err = 1;
+			} else
+				err = 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = ret + err;
+		if (ret > 0)
+			break;
+
+		tmp = tmp >> 4;
+	}
+
+	if (wq != MAP_FAILED && wq != NULL)
+		if (munmap(wq, 0x1000))
+			printf("munmap failed %d\n", errno);
+
+	if (runed != 0x7)
+		ret = 1;
+
+	return (ret != 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pasid test depends on idxd and SVA, kernel should enable iommu and sm.
+ * command line(intel_iommu=on,sm_on)
+ */
+static struct testcases pasid_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.expected = 1,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(LAM_CMD_BIT, PAS_CMD_BIT, SVA_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: [Negative] Execute LAM, PASID, SVA in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(LAM_CMD_BIT, SVA_CMD_BIT, PAS_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: Execute LAM, SVA, PASID in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 1,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(PAS_CMD_BIT, LAM_CMD_BIT, SVA_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: [Negative] Execute PASID, LAM, SVA in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(PAS_CMD_BIT, SVA_CMD_BIT, LAM_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: Execute PASID, SVA, LAM in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(SVA_CMD_BIT, LAM_CMD_BIT, PAS_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: Execute SVA, LAM, PASID in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(SVA_CMD_BIT, PAS_CMD_BIT, LAM_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: Execute SVA, PASID, LAM in sequence\n",
+	},
+};
+
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	int c = 0;
@@ -910,6 +1140,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (tests & FUNC_INHERITE)
 		run_test(inheritance_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(inheritance_cases));
 
+	if (tests & FUNC_PASID)
+		run_test(pasid_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(pasid_cases));
+
 	ksft_set_plan(tests_cnt);
 
 	return ksft_exit_pass();
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [PATCHv15 17/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add test cases for LAM vs thread creation
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (15 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 16/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA " Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-23 22:05 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-24  2:07 ` [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Linus Torvalds
  2023-03-13  3:23 ` Binbin Wu
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-23 22:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov

LAM enabling is only allowed when the process has single thread.
LAM mode is inherited into child thread.

Trying to enable LAM after spawning a thread has to fail.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
index a8c91829b616..eb0e46905bf9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <inttypes.h>
+#include <sched.h>
 
 #include <sys/uio.h>
 #include <linux/io_uring.h>
@@ -50,6 +52,8 @@
 
 #define PAGE_SIZE               (4 << 10)
 
+#define STACK_SIZE		65536
+
 #define barrier() ({						\
 		   __asm__ __volatile__("" : : : "memory");	\
 })
@@ -731,6 +735,75 @@ static int handle_inheritance(struct testcases *test)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int thread_fn_get_lam(void *arg)
+{
+	return get_lam();
+}
+
+static int thread_fn_set_lam(void *arg)
+{
+	struct testcases *test = arg;
+
+	return set_lam(test->lam);
+}
+
+static int handle_thread(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	char stack[STACK_SIZE];
+	int ret, child_ret;
+	int lam = 0;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	/* Set LAM mode in parent process */
+	if (!test->later) {
+		lam = test->lam;
+		if (set_lam(lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	pid = clone(thread_fn_get_lam, stack + STACK_SIZE,
+		    SIGCHLD | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_FS | CLONE_VM, NULL);
+	if (pid < 0) {
+		perror("Clone failed.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	waitpid(pid, &child_ret, 0);
+	ret = WEXITSTATUS(child_ret);
+
+	if (lam != ret)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (test->later) {
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_thread_enable(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	char stack[STACK_SIZE];
+	int ret, child_ret;
+	int lam = test->lam;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	pid = clone(thread_fn_set_lam, stack + STACK_SIZE,
+		    SIGCHLD | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_FS | CLONE_VM, test);
+	if (pid < 0) {
+		perror("Clone failed.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	waitpid(pid, &child_ret, 0);
+	ret = WEXITSTATUS(child_ret);
+
+	if (lam != ret)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
 static void run_test(struct testcases *test, int count)
 {
 	int i, ret = 0;
@@ -846,6 +919,25 @@ static struct testcases inheritance_cases[] = {
 		.test_func = handle_inheritance,
 		.msg = "FORK: LAM_U57, child process should get LAM mode same as parent\n",
 	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_thread,
+		.msg = "THREAD: LAM_U57, child thread should get LAM mode same as parent\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 1,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_thread_enable,
+		.msg = "THREAD: [NEGATIVE] Enable LAM in child.\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 1,
+		.later = 1,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_thread,
+		.msg = "THREAD: [NEGATIVE] Enable LAM in parent after thread created.\n",
+	},
 	{
 		.expected = 0,
 		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
-- 
2.39.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (16 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-23 22:05 ` [PATCHv15 17/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add test cases for LAM vs thread creation Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-24  2:07 ` Linus Torvalds
  2023-01-24 11:01   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-03-13  3:23 ` Binbin Wu
  18 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Linus Torvalds @ 2023-01-24  2:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov
  Cc: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra, x86,
	Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 2:05 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> Linear Address Masking[1] (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied to
> 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the untranslated
> address bits for metadata.
>
> The capability can be used for efficient address sanitizers (ASAN)
> implementation and for optimizations in JITs and virtual machines.
>
> The patchset brings support for LAM for userspace addresses. Only LAM_U57 at
> this time.

I didn't react to anything objectionable in the series.

My only reaction was actually to ask "when / what CPU cores are
expected to support this feature"?

Maybe it was mentioned somewhere, and I'm just blind and not finding
it.  But even the "Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features"
paper seems to just be talking about the CPUID bits, not about any
actual "this is when we expect it".

(But again, I only scanned it, so maybe it's there and I just missed it).

                  Linus


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling
  2023-01-24  2:07 ` [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Linus Torvalds
@ 2023-01-24 11:01   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-26 14:42     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-24 11:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Linus Torvalds
  Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov, Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra,
	x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 06:07:20PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 2:05 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
> <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > Linear Address Masking[1] (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied to
> > 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the untranslated
> > address bits for metadata.
> >
> > The capability can be used for efficient address sanitizers (ASAN)
> > implementation and for optimizations in JITs and virtual machines.
> >
> > The patchset brings support for LAM for userspace addresses. Only LAM_U57 at
> > this time.
> 
> I didn't react to anything objectionable in the series.
> 
> My only reaction was actually to ask "when / what CPU cores are
> expected to support this feature"?
> 
> Maybe it was mentioned somewhere, and I'm just blind and not finding
> it.  But even the "Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features"
> paper seems to just be talking about the CPUID bits, not about any
> actual "this is when we expect it".

There's no announced CPUs that have the feature. And it is above my pay
grade to disclose anything beyond that.

But there's QEMU patch[1] if you want to play with the feature. The patch
is not upstreamable, but it works.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20220407010107.34734-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com/

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling
  2023-01-24 11:01   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-26 14:42     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-01-26 18:31       ` Linus Torvalds
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-01-26 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Linus Torvalds
  Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov, Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra,
	x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel

On Tue, Jan 24, 2023 at 02:01:58PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 06:07:20PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 2:05 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
> > <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Linear Address Masking[1] (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied to
> > > 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the untranslated
> > > address bits for metadata.
> > >
> > > The capability can be used for efficient address sanitizers (ASAN)
> > > implementation and for optimizations in JITs and virtual machines.
> > >
> > > The patchset brings support for LAM for userspace addresses. Only LAM_U57 at
> > > this time.
> > 
> > I didn't react to anything objectionable in the series.
> > 
> > My only reaction was actually to ask "when / what CPU cores are
> > expected to support this feature"?
> > 
> > Maybe it was mentioned somewhere, and I'm just blind and not finding
> > it.  But even the "Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features"
> > paper seems to just be talking about the CPUID bits, not about any
> > actual "this is when we expect it".
> 
> There's no announced CPUs that have the feature. And it is above my pay
> grade to disclose anything beyond that.

I've asked around and if everything goes well it will be available early
2024.

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling
  2023-01-26 14:42     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-01-26 18:31       ` Linus Torvalds
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Linus Torvalds @ 2023-01-26 18:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov
  Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov, Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra,
	x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel

On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 6:42 AM Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> wrote:
>
> I've asked around and if everything goes well it will be available early
> 2024.

Thanks. Good to have some kind of timeframe for it, even if tentative,

              Linus


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 02/17] x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 02/17] x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-02-09 14:06   ` Alexander Potapenko
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Potapenko @ 2023-02-09 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov
  Cc: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra, x86,
	Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu, Andi Kleen,
	Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 11:05 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> So far there's no need in atomic setting of MM context flags in
> mm_context_t::flags. The flags set early in exec and never change
> after that.
>
> LAM enabling requires atomic flag setting. The upcoming flag
> MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA can be set much later in the process
> lifetime where multiple threads exist.
>
> Convert the field to unsigned long and do MM_CONTEXT_* accesses with
> __set_bit() and test_bit().
>
> No functional changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 05/17] mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote()
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 05/17] mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote() Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-02-09 14:08   ` Alexander Potapenko
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Potapenko @ 2023-02-09 14:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov
  Cc: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra, x86,
	Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu, Andi Kleen,
	Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 11:05 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> untagged_addr() removes tags/metadata from the address and brings it to
> the canonical form. The helper is implemented on arm64 and sparc. Both of
> them do untagging based on global rules.
>
> However, Linear Address Masking (LAM) on x86 introduces per-process
> settings for untagging. As a result, untagged_addr() is now only
> suitable for untagging addresses for the current proccess.
>
> The new helper untagged_addr_remote() has to be used when the address
> targets remote process. It requires the mmap lock for target mm to be
> taken.
>
> Export dump_mm() as there's now the first user for it: VFIO can be
> compiled as module and untagged_addr_remote() triggers dump_mm() via
> mmap_assert_locked().
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-02-09 14:10   ` Alexander Potapenko
  2023-02-10 15:18   ` Alexander Potapenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Potapenko @ 2023-02-09 14:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov
  Cc: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra, x86,
	Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu, Andi Kleen,
	Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 11:05 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> untagged_addr() is a helper used by the core-mm to strip tag bits and
> get the address to the canonical shape based on rules of the current
> thread. It only handles userspace addresses.
>
> The untagging mask is stored in per-CPU variable and set on context
> switching to the task.
>
> The tags must not be included into check whether it's okay to access the
> userspace address. Strip tags in access_ok().
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 08/17] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 08/17] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-02-09 14:12   ` Alexander Potapenko
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Potapenko @ 2023-02-09 14:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov
  Cc: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra, x86,
	Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu, Andi Kleen,
	Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 11:05 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> Add a few of arch_prctl() handles:
>
>  - ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR enabled LAM. The argument is required number
>    of tag bits. It is rounded up to the nearest LAM mode that can
>    provide it. For now only LAM_U57 is supported, with 6 tag bits.
>
>  - ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK returns untag mask. It can indicates where tag
>    bits located in the address.
>
>  - ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS returns the maximum tag bits user can request.
>    Zero if LAM is not supported.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-02-09 14:13   ` Alexander Potapenko
  2023-02-10 12:29   ` Alexander Potapenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Potapenko @ 2023-02-09 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov
  Cc: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra, x86,
	Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu, Andi Kleen,
	Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Catalin Marinas

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 11:05 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> Add a line in /proc/$PID/status to report untag_mask. It can be
> used to find out LAM status of the process from the outside. It is
> useful for debuggers.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-02-09 14:13   ` Alexander Potapenko
@ 2023-02-10 12:29   ` Alexander Potapenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Potapenko @ 2023-02-10 12:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov
  Cc: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra, x86,
	Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu, Andi Kleen,
	Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel, Catalin Marinas

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 11:05 PM Kirill A. Shutemov
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> Add a line in /proc/$PID/status to report untag_mask. It can be
> used to find out LAM status of the process from the outside. It is
> useful for debuggers.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>


>         mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
> diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
> index 49283b8103c7..d2a94eafe9a3 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/array.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/array.c

Right now mm_untag_mask() is visible from array.c thanks to inclusion
of <linux/cpuset.h>, which happens to include <linux/mmu_context.h>.
But maybe it would be better to directly include mmu_context.h here?


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check
  2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
  2023-02-09 14:10   ` Alexander Potapenko
@ 2023-02-10 15:18   ` Alexander Potapenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Potapenko @ 2023-02-10 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov
  Cc: Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra, x86,
	Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu, Andi Kleen,
	Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel

> +#define untagged_addr_remote(mm, addr) ({                              \
> +       u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr);                               \
> +       mmap_assert_locked(mm);                                         \
> +       __addr = __untagged_addr(__addr, (mm)->context.untag_mask);     \
> +       (__force __typeof__(addr))__addr;                               \
> +})
> +
> +#else
> +#define untagged_addr(addr)    (addr)
Could you please use tabs for indentation here?


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling
  2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
                   ` (17 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-01-24  2:07 ` [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Linus Torvalds
@ 2023-03-13  3:23 ` Binbin Wu
  18 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Binbin Wu @ 2023-03-13  3:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kirill A. Shutemov, Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: x86, Kostya Serebryany, Andrey Ryabinin, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Taras Madan, Dmitry Vyukov, H . J . Lu,
	Andi Kleen, Rick Edgecombe, Bharata B Rao, Jacob Pan, Ashok Raj,
	Linus Torvalds, linux-mm, linux-kernel


On 1/24/2023 6:04 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Linear Address Masking[1] (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied to
> 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the untranslated
> address bits for metadata.
>
> The capability can be used for efficient address sanitizers (ASAN)
> implementation and for optimizations in JITs and virtual machines.
>
> The patchset brings support for LAM for userspace addresses. Only LAM_U57 at
> this time.
>
> Please review and consider applying.
>
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kas/linux.git lam
>
...
>
> [1] ISE, Chapter 10. https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368

It is Chapter 7. Or maybe use the name of the chapter instead.


> Kirill A. Shutemov (12):
>    x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()
>    x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting
>    x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking
>    x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch
>    mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote()
>    x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address
>      check
>    x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead for systems without LAM
>    x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM
>    mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status
>    iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid()
>    x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive
>    selftests/x86/lam: Add test cases for LAM vs thread creation
>
> Weihong Zhang (5):
>    selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for
>      linear-address masking
>    selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL test cases for linear-address
>      masking
>    selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring test cases for linear-address masking
>    selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit test cases for linear-address masking
>    selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA test cases for
>      linear-address masking
>
>   arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h        |    6 +
>   arch/sparc/include/asm/mmu_context_64.h     |    6 +
>   arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h         |    2 +
>   arch/x86/Kconfig                            |   11 +
>   arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c       |    2 +-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h          |    1 +
>   arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h    |    8 +-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h                  |   18 +-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h          |   49 +-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h      |    2 +
>   arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h             |   48 +-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h              |   58 +-
>   arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h           |    5 +
>   arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |    6 +
>   arch/x86/kernel/process.c                   |    6 +
>   arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                |   66 +-
>   arch/x86/kernel/traps.c                     |    6 +-
>   arch/x86/lib/getuser.S                      |   83 +-
>   arch/x86/lib/putuser.S                      |   54 +-
>   arch/x86/mm/init.c                          |    5 +
>   arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                           |   53 +-
>   drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c                   |    8 +-
>   drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c             |    2 +-
>   fs/proc/array.c                             |    6 +
>   fs/proc/task_mmu.c                          |    9 +-
>   include/linux/ioasid.h                      |    9 -
>   include/linux/mm.h                          |   11 -
>   include/linux/mmu_context.h                 |   14 +
>   include/linux/sched/mm.h                    |    8 +-
>   include/linux/uaccess.h                     |   22 +
>   mm/debug.c                                  |    1 +
>   mm/gup.c                                    |    4 +-
>   mm/madvise.c                                |    5 +-
>   mm/migrate.c                                |   11 +-
>   tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile        |    2 +-
>   tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c           | 1241 +++++++++++++++++++
>   36 files changed, 1699 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-)
>   create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
>
> --
> 2.39.1
>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2023-03-13  3:24 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2023-01-23 22:04 [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 01/17] x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 02/17] x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-02-09 14:06   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 03/17] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 04/17] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 05/17] mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-02-09 14:08   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-02-09 14:10   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-02-10 15:18   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 07/17] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead for systems without LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 08/17] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-02-09 14:12   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-02-09 14:13   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-02-10 12:29   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 10/17] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 11/17] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 12/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 13/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 14/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 15/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:04 ` [PATCHv15 16/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-23 22:05 ` [PATCHv15 17/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add test cases for LAM vs thread creation Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-24  2:07 ` [PATCHv15 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Linus Torvalds
2023-01-24 11:01   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-26 14:42     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-26 18:31       ` Linus Torvalds
2023-03-13  3:23 ` Binbin Wu

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