linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	roman.fietze@magna.com, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>,
	akinobu.mita@gmail.com, glider@google.com,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 12:03:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9c6ed37a-aeae-7816-d204-ff752a05efdd@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210210051814.845713-4-timur@kernel.org>

On 2/10/21 6:18 AM, Timur Tabi wrote:
> If the make-printk-non-secret command line parameter is set, then
> printk("%p") will print pointers as unhashed.  This is useful for
> debugging purposes.
> 
> A large warning message is displayed if this option is enabled.
> Unhashed pointers, while useful for debugging, expose kernel
> addresses which can be a security risk.
> 
> Also update test_printf to skip the hashed pointer tests if the
> command-line option is set.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
> Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
> Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>

Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>

Thanks!

> ---
>  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 15 ++++++++
>  lib/test_printf.c                             |  8 ++++
>  lib/vsprintf.c                                | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index a10b545c2070..6962379469e4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2613,6 +2613,21 @@
>  			different yeeloong laptops.
>  			Example: machtype=lemote-yeeloong-2f-7inch
>  
> +        make-printk-non-secret
> +			Force pointers printed to the console to be unhashed.
> +			By default, when a pointer is printed to the kernel
> +			console (via %p format string), that pointer is
> +			"hashed", i.e. obscured by hashing the pointer value.
> +			This is a security feature that hides actual kernel
> +			addresses from unprivileged users, but it also makes
> +			debugging the kernel more difficult since unequal
> +			pointers can no longer be compared.  If this option is
> +			specified, then all normal pointers will have their
> +			true value printed.  Pointers printed via %pK may
> +			still be hashed.  This option should only be specified
> +			when debugging the kernel.  Please do not use on
> +			production kernels.
> +
>  	max_addr=nn[KMG]	[KNL,BOOT,ia64] All physical memory greater
>  			than or equal to this physical address is ignored.
>  
> diff --git a/lib/test_printf.c b/lib/test_printf.c
> index ad2bcfa8caa1..b0b62d76e598 100644
> --- a/lib/test_printf.c
> +++ b/lib/test_printf.c
> @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ KSTM_MODULE_GLOBALS();
>  static char *test_buffer __initdata;
>  static char *alloced_buffer __initdata;
>  
> +extern bool debug_never_hash_pointers;
> +
>  static int __printf(4, 0) __init
>  do_test(int bufsize, const char *expect, int elen,
>  	const char *fmt, va_list ap)
> @@ -301,6 +303,12 @@ plain(void)
>  {
>  	int err;
>  
> +	if (debug_never_hash_pointers) {
> +		pr_warn("skipping plain 'p' tests");
> +		skipped_tests += 2;
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
>  	err = plain_hash();
>  	if (err) {
>  		pr_warn("plain 'p' does not appear to be hashed\n");
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> index 3b53c73580c5..1296d9b0b328 100644
> --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> @@ -2090,6 +2090,34 @@ char *fwnode_string(char *buf, char *end, struct fwnode_handle *fwnode,
>  	return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
>  }
>  
> +/* Disable pointer hashing if requested */
> +bool debug_never_hash_pointers __ro_after_init;
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(debug_never_hash_pointers);
> +
> +static int __init debug_never_hash_pointers_enable(char *str)
> +{
> +	debug_never_hash_pointers = true;
> +
> +	pr_warn("**********************************************************\n");
> +	pr_warn("**   NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE   **\n");
> +	pr_warn("**                                                      **\n");
> +	pr_warn("** All pointers that are printed to the console will    **\n");
> +	pr_warn("** be printed as unhashed.                              **\n");
> +	pr_warn("**                                                      **\n");
> +	pr_warn("** Kernel memory addresses are exposed, which may       **\n");
> +	pr_warn("** reduce the security of your system.                  **\n");
> +	pr_warn("**                                                      **\n");
> +	pr_warn("** If you see this message and you are not debugging    **\n");
> +	pr_warn("** the kernel, report this immediately to your system   **\n");
> +	pr_warn("** administrator!                                       **\n");
> +	pr_warn("**                                                      **\n");
> +	pr_warn("**   NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE NOTICE   **\n");
> +	pr_warn("**********************************************************\n");
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +early_param("make-printk-non-secret", debug_never_hash_pointers_enable);
> +
>  /*
>   * Show a '%p' thing.  A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed
>   * by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format
> @@ -2297,8 +2325,14 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> -	/* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */
> -	return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
> +	/*
> +	 * default is to _not_ leak addresses, so hash before printing unless
> +	 * make-printk-non-secret is specified on the command line.
> +	 */
> +	if (unlikely(debug_never_hash_pointers))
> +		return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
> +	else
> +		return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> 



  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-10 11:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-10  5:18 [PATCH 0/3][RESEND] add support for never printing hashed addresses Timur Tabi
2021-02-10  5:18 ` [PATCH 1/3] lib/test_printf: use KSTM_MODULE_GLOBALS macro Timur Tabi
2021-02-10  5:21   ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-10 13:14   ` Petr Mladek
2021-02-10  5:18 ` [PATCH 2/3] kselftest: add support for skipped tests Timur Tabi
2021-02-10  5:18 ` [PATCH 3/3] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed Timur Tabi
2021-02-10 11:03   ` Vlastimil Babka [this message]
2021-02-10 13:41   ` Petr Mladek
2021-02-10 17:27     ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-12 11:52       ` Petr Mladek
2021-02-10 11:11 ` [PATCH 0/3][RESEND] add support for never printing hashed addresses Marco Elver
2021-02-10 19:03   ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-10 11:47 ` Andy Shevchenko
2021-02-10 16:57   ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-10 15:46 ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-02-10 16:18   ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-10 16:39     ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-02-10 16:46       ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-10 17:07         ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-02-10 17:29           ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-10 17:21         ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-10 16:54       ` Andy Shevchenko
2021-02-10 17:41         ` Tetsuo Handa

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=9c6ed37a-aeae-7816-d204-ff752a05efdd@suse.cz \
    --to=vbabka@suse.cz \
    --cc=akinobu.mita@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=andreyknvl@google.com \
    --cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=elver@google.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=john.ogness@linutronix.de \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk \
    --cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
    --cc=pmladek@suse.com \
    --cc=roman.fietze@magna.com \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com \
    --cc=timur@kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=willy@infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).