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* [PATCH mm] kfence: make reporting sensitive information configurable
@ 2021-02-09 15:13 Marco Elver
  2021-02-09 18:06 ` Vlastimil Babka
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2021-02-09 15:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: elver, akpm
  Cc: glider, dvyukov, andreyknvl, jannh, linux-kernel, linux-mm, kasan-dev

We cannot rely on CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL to decide if we're running a
"debug kernel" where we can safely show potentially sensitive
information in the kernel log.

Therefore, add the option CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE to decide if we
should add potentially sensitive information to KFENCE reports. The
default behaviour remains unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
 Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst | 6 +++---
 lib/Kconfig.kfence                 | 8 ++++++++
 mm/kfence/core.c                   | 2 +-
 mm/kfence/kfence.h                 | 3 +--
 mm/kfence/report.c                 | 6 +++---
 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
index 58a0a5fa1ddc..5280d644f826 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ A typical out-of-bounds access looks like this::
 The header of the report provides a short summary of the function involved in
 the access. It is followed by more detailed information about the access and
 its origin. Note that, real kernel addresses are only shown for
-``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds.
+``CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE=y`` builds.
 
 Use-after-free accesses are reported as::
 
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ invalidly written bytes (offset from the address) are shown; in this
 representation, '.' denote untouched bytes. In the example above ``0xac`` is
 the value written to the invalid address at offset 0, and the remaining '.'
 denote that no following bytes have been touched. Note that, real values are
-only shown for ``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds; to avoid information
-disclosure for non-debug builds, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
+only shown for ``CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE=y`` builds; to avoid
+information disclosure otherwise, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
 written bytes.
 
 And finally, KFENCE may also report on invalid accesses to any protected page
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
index 78f50ccb3b45..141494a5f530 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kfence
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
@@ -55,6 +55,14 @@ config KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS
 	  pages are required; with one containing the object and two adjacent
 	  ones used as guard pages.
 
+config KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE
+	bool "Show potentially sensitive information in reports"
+	default y if DEBUG_KERNEL
+	help
+	  Show potentially sensitive information such as unhashed pointers,
+	  context bytes on memory corruptions, as well as dump registers in
+	  KFENCE reports.
+
 config KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS
 	int "Stress testing of fault handling and error reporting" if EXPERT
 	default 0
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index cfe3d32ac5b7..5f7e02db5f53 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ void __init kfence_init(void)
 	schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, 0);
 	pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
 		CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS);
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE))
 		pr_cont(" at 0x%px-0x%px\n", (void *)__kfence_pool,
 			(void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
 	else
diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence.h b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
index 1accc840dbbe..48a8196b947b 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/kfence.h
+++ b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
 
 #include "../slab.h" /* for struct kmem_cache */
 
-/* For non-debug builds, avoid leaking kernel pointers into dmesg. */
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE
 #define PTR_FMT "%px"
 #else
 #define PTR_FMT "%p"
diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
index 901bd7ee83d8..5e2dbabbab1d 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/report.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
@@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ static void print_diff_canary(unsigned long address, size_t bytes_to_show,
 	for (cur = (const u8 *)address; cur < end; cur++) {
 		if (*cur == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(cur))
 			pr_cont(" .");
-		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
+		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE))
 			pr_cont(" 0x%02x", *cur);
-		else /* Do not leak kernel memory in non-debug builds. */
+		else /* Do not leak kernel memory. */
 			pr_cont(" !");
 	}
 	pr_cont(" ]");
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
 
 	/* Print report footer. */
 	pr_err("\n");
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL) && regs)
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE) && regs)
 		show_regs(regs);
 	else
 		dump_stack_print_info(KERN_ERR);
-- 
2.30.0.478.g8a0d178c01-goog



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH mm] kfence: make reporting sensitive information configurable
  2021-02-09 15:13 [PATCH mm] kfence: make reporting sensitive information configurable Marco Elver
@ 2021-02-09 18:06 ` Vlastimil Babka
  2021-02-09 21:34   ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Vlastimil Babka @ 2021-02-09 18:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Marco Elver, akpm
  Cc: glider, dvyukov, andreyknvl, jannh, linux-kernel, linux-mm,
	kasan-dev, Timur Tabi, Petr Mladek, Kees Cook, Steven Rostedt

On 2/9/21 4:13 PM, Marco Elver wrote:
> We cannot rely on CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL to decide if we're running a
> "debug kernel" where we can safely show potentially sensitive
> information in the kernel log.
> 
> Therefore, add the option CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE to decide if we
> should add potentially sensitive information to KFENCE reports. The
> default behaviour remains unchanged.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

Hi,

could we drop this kconfig approach in favour of the boot option proposed here?
[1] Just do the prints with %p unconditionally and the boot option takes care of
it? Also Linus mentioned dislike of controlling potential memory leak to be a
config option [2]

Thanks,
Vlastimil

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210202213633.755469-1-timur@kernel.org/
[2]
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAHk-=wgaK4cz=K-JB4p-KPXBV73m9bja2w1W1Lr3iu8+NEPk7A@mail.gmail.com/

> ---
>  Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst | 6 +++---
>  lib/Kconfig.kfence                 | 8 ++++++++
>  mm/kfence/core.c                   | 2 +-
>  mm/kfence/kfence.h                 | 3 +--
>  mm/kfence/report.c                 | 6 +++---
>  5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
> index 58a0a5fa1ddc..5280d644f826 100644
> --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
> @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ A typical out-of-bounds access looks like this::
>  The header of the report provides a short summary of the function involved in
>  the access. It is followed by more detailed information about the access and
>  its origin. Note that, real kernel addresses are only shown for
> -``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds.
> +``CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE=y`` builds.
>  
>  Use-after-free accesses are reported as::
>  
> @@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ invalidly written bytes (offset from the address) are shown; in this
>  representation, '.' denote untouched bytes. In the example above ``0xac`` is
>  the value written to the invalid address at offset 0, and the remaining '.'
>  denote that no following bytes have been touched. Note that, real values are
> -only shown for ``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds; to avoid information
> -disclosure for non-debug builds, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
> +only shown for ``CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE=y`` builds; to avoid
> +information disclosure otherwise, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
>  written bytes.
>  
>  And finally, KFENCE may also report on invalid accesses to any protected page
> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
> index 78f50ccb3b45..141494a5f530 100644
> --- a/lib/Kconfig.kfence
> +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
> @@ -55,6 +55,14 @@ config KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS
>  	  pages are required; with one containing the object and two adjacent
>  	  ones used as guard pages.
>  
> +config KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE
> +	bool "Show potentially sensitive information in reports"
> +	default y if DEBUG_KERNEL
> +	help
> +	  Show potentially sensitive information such as unhashed pointers,
> +	  context bytes on memory corruptions, as well as dump registers in
> +	  KFENCE reports.
> +
>  config KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS
>  	int "Stress testing of fault handling and error reporting" if EXPERT
>  	default 0
> diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
> index cfe3d32ac5b7..5f7e02db5f53 100644
> --- a/mm/kfence/core.c
> +++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
> @@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ void __init kfence_init(void)
>  	schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, 0);
>  	pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
>  		CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS);
> -	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE))
>  		pr_cont(" at 0x%px-0x%px\n", (void *)__kfence_pool,
>  			(void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
>  	else
> diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence.h b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
> index 1accc840dbbe..48a8196b947b 100644
> --- a/mm/kfence/kfence.h
> +++ b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
> @@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
>  
>  #include "../slab.h" /* for struct kmem_cache */
>  
> -/* For non-debug builds, avoid leaking kernel pointers into dmesg. */
> -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE
>  #define PTR_FMT "%px"
>  #else
>  #define PTR_FMT "%p"
> diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
> index 901bd7ee83d8..5e2dbabbab1d 100644
> --- a/mm/kfence/report.c
> +++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
> @@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ static void print_diff_canary(unsigned long address, size_t bytes_to_show,
>  	for (cur = (const u8 *)address; cur < end; cur++) {
>  		if (*cur == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(cur))
>  			pr_cont(" .");
> -		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
> +		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE))
>  			pr_cont(" 0x%02x", *cur);
> -		else /* Do not leak kernel memory in non-debug builds. */
> +		else /* Do not leak kernel memory. */
>  			pr_cont(" !");
>  	}
>  	pr_cont(" ]");
> @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
>  
>  	/* Print report footer. */
>  	pr_err("\n");
> -	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL) && regs)
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE) && regs)
>  		show_regs(regs);
>  	else
>  		dump_stack_print_info(KERN_ERR);
> 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH mm] kfence: make reporting sensitive information configurable
  2021-02-09 18:06 ` Vlastimil Babka
@ 2021-02-09 21:34   ` Marco Elver
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Marco Elver @ 2021-02-09 21:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Vlastimil Babka
  Cc: Andrew Morton, Alexander Potapenko, Dmitry Vyukov,
	Andrey Konovalov, Jann Horn, LKML, Linux Memory Management List,
	kasan-dev, Timur Tabi, Petr Mladek, Kees Cook, Steven Rostedt

On Tue, 9 Feb 2021 at 19:06, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> wrote:
> On 2/9/21 4:13 PM, Marco Elver wrote:
> > We cannot rely on CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL to decide if we're running a
> > "debug kernel" where we can safely show potentially sensitive
> > information in the kernel log.
> >
> > Therefore, add the option CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE to decide if we
> > should add potentially sensitive information to KFENCE reports. The
> > default behaviour remains unchanged.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
>
> Hi,
>
> could we drop this kconfig approach in favour of the boot option proposed here?
> [1] Just do the prints with %p unconditionally and the boot option takes care of
> it? Also Linus mentioned dislike of controlling potential memory leak to be a
> config option [2]
>
> Thanks,
> Vlastimil
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210202213633.755469-1-timur@kernel.org/
> [2]
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAHk-=wgaK4cz=K-JB4p-KPXBV73m9bja2w1W1Lr3iu8+NEPk7A@mail.gmail.com/

Is the patch at [1] already in -next? If not I'll wait until it is,
because otherwise KFENCE reports will be pretty useless.

I think it is reasonable to switch to '%p' once we have the boot
option, but doing so while we do not yet have the option doesn't work
for us. We can potentially drop this patch if the boot option patch
will make it into mainline soon. Otherwise my preference would be to
take this patch and revert it with the switch to '%p' when the boot
option has landed.

Thanks,
-- Marco


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

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