From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@gmail.com>,
"Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, hpa@zytor.com,
ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com,
vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com,
peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com,
rientjes@google.com, dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com,
bp@alien8.de, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name,
ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
dgilbert@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v8 27/56] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command
Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2023 08:19:31 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d3cb39e3-439e-7a29-0576-11d83c88b0fb@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230223083839.000014ee@gmail.com>
On 2/23/23 00:38, Zhi Wang wrote:
> On Wed, 22 Feb 2023 16:43:54 -0600
> "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
>
>> On 2/22/2023 6:32 AM, Zhi Wang wrote:
>>> On Mon, 20 Feb 2023 12:38:18 -0600
>>> Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>>
>>>> The SEV-SNP firmware provides the SNP_CONFIG command used to set the
>>>> system-wide configuration value for SNP guests. The information includes
>>>> the TCB version string to be reported in guest attestation reports.
>>>>
>>>> Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds an NAE (SNP extended guest
>>>> request) that a guest can use to query the reports that include additional
>>>> certificates.
>>>>
>>>> In both cases, userspace provided additional data is included in the
>>>> attestation reports. The userspace will use the SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG
>>>> command to give the certificate blob and the reported TCB version string
>>>> at once. Note that the specification defines certificate blob with a
>>>> specific GUID format; the userspace is responsible for building the
>>>> proper certificate blob. The ioctl treats it an opaque blob.
>>>>
>>>> While it is not defined in the spec, but let's add SNP_GET_EXT_CONFIG
>>>> command that can be used to obtain the data programmed through the
>>>> SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst | 27 ++++++
>>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 4 +
>>>> include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h | 17 ++++
>>>> 4 files changed, 171 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
>>>> index 11ea67c944df..6cad4226c348 100644
>>>> --- a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
>>>> +++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
>>>> @@ -145,6 +145,33 @@ The SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command is used to query the SNP platform status. The
>>>> status includes API major, minor version and more. See the SEV-SNP
>>>> specification for further details.
>>>>
>>>> +2.5 SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG
>>>> +----------------------
>>>> +:Technology: sev-snp
>>>> +:Type: hypervisor ioctl cmd
>>>> +:Parameters (in): struct sev_data_snp_ext_config
>>>> +:Returns (out): 0 on success, -negative on error
>>>> +
>>>> +The SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG is used to set the system-wide configuration such as
>>>> +reported TCB version in the attestation report. The command is similar to
>>>> +SNP_CONFIG command defined in the SEV-SNP spec. The main difference is the
>>>> +command also accepts an additional certificate blob defined in the GHCB
>>>> +specification.
>>>> +
>>>> +If the certs_address is zero, then the previous certificate blob will deleted.
>>>> +For more information on the certificate blob layout, see the GHCB spec
>>>> +(extended guest request message).
>>>> +
>>>> +2.6 SNP_GET_EXT_CONFIG
>>>> +----------------------
>>>> +:Technology: sev-snp
>>>> +:Type: hypervisor ioctl cmd
>>>> +:Parameters (in): struct sev_data_snp_ext_config
>>>> +:Returns (out): 0 on success, -negative on error
>>>> +
>>>> +The SNP_GET_EXT_CONFIG is used to query the system-wide configuration set
>>>> +through the SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG.
>>>> +
>>>> 3. SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
>>>> ============================
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>>>> index 65e13a562f3b..b56b00ca2cd4 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>>>> @@ -1481,6 +1481,10 @@ static int __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(int *error)
>>>> data.length = sizeof(data);
>>>> data.iommu_snp_shutdown = 1;
>>>>
>>>> + /* Free the memory used for caching the certificate data */
>>>> + kfree(sev->snp_certs_data);
>>>> + sev->snp_certs_data = NULL;
>>>> +
>>>> wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
>>>>
>>>> retry:
>>>> @@ -1793,6 +1797,118 @@ static int sev_ioctl_snp_platform_status(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
>>>> return ret;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +static int sev_ioctl_snp_get_config(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
>>>> + struct sev_user_data_ext_snp_config input;
>>>> + int ret;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!sev->snp_initialized || !argp->data)
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> + memset(&input, 0, sizeof(input));
>>>> +
>>>> + if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Copy the TCB version programmed through the SET_CONFIG to userspace */
>>>> + if (input.config_address) {
>>>> + if (copy_to_user((void * __user)input.config_address,
>>>> + &sev->snp_config, sizeof(struct sev_user_data_snp_config)))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Copy the extended certs programmed through the SNP_SET_CONFIG */
>>>> + if (input.certs_address && sev->snp_certs_data) {
>>>> + if (input.certs_len < sev->snp_certs_len) {
>>>> + /* Return the certs length to userspace */
>>>> + input.certs_len = sev->snp_certs_len;
>>>> +
>>>> + ret = -ENOSR;
>>>> + goto e_done;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>
>>> What about if input.certs_len > sev->snp_certs_len? Is it possbile for the
>>> userspace to know the length of data in the buffer? (I guess it might be able
>>> to know the certs len through the blob data, but a comment here would be nice)
>>>
>>
>> If userspace provides an input buffer/length smaller then snp_certs_len,
>> then the above returns the "required" certs length back to userspace.
>>
>> And what is the issue if input.certs_len > sev->snp_certs_len, the
>> buffer returned back to userspace is sev->snp_certs_len as below.
>>
>
> My point is: How can the userspace know the length of return data is shorter
> than input.certs_len when input.certs_len > sev->snp_serts_len? as the length
> is only returned when input.certs_len < sev->snp_certs_len.
The returned data has a defined format that can be used to calculate the
overall length.
Thanks,
Tom
>
>> Thanks,
>> Ashish
>>
>>>> + if (copy_to_user((void * __user)input.certs_address,
>>>> + sev->snp_certs_data, sev->snp_certs_len))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + ret = 0;
>>>> +
>>>> +e_done:
>>>> + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &input, sizeof(input)))
>>>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + return ret;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int sev_ioctl_snp_set_config(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
>>>> + struct sev_user_data_ext_snp_config input;
>>>> + struct sev_user_data_snp_config config;
>>>> + void *certs = NULL;
>>>> + int ret = 0;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!sev->snp_initialized || !argp->data)
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!writable)
>>>> + return -EPERM;
>>>> +
>>>> + memset(&input, 0, sizeof(input));
>>>> +
>>>> + if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Copy the certs from userspace */
>>>> + if (input.certs_address) {
>>>> + if (!input.certs_len || !IS_ALIGNED(input.certs_len, PAGE_SIZE))
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> + certs = psp_copy_user_blob(input.certs_address, input.certs_len);
>>>> + if (IS_ERR(certs))
>>>> + return PTR_ERR(certs);
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Issue the PSP command to update the TCB version using the SNP_CONFIG. */
>>>> + if (input.config_address) {
>>>> + memset(&config, 0, sizeof(config));
>>>> + if (copy_from_user(&config,
>>>> + (void __user *)input.config_address, sizeof(config))) {
>>>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_CONFIG, &config, &argp->error);
>>>> + if (ret)
>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>> +
>>>> + memcpy(&sev->snp_config, &config, sizeof(config));
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * If the new certs are passed then cache it else free the old certs.
>>>> + */
>>>> + mutex_lock(&sev->snp_certs_lock);
>>>> + if (certs) {
>>>> + kfree(sev->snp_certs_data);
>>>> + sev->snp_certs_data = certs;
>>>> + sev->snp_certs_len = input.certs_len;
>>>> + } else {
>>>> + kfree(sev->snp_certs_data);
>>>> + sev->snp_certs_data = NULL;
>>>> + sev->snp_certs_len = 0;
>>>> + }
>>>> + mutex_unlock(&sev->snp_certs_lock);
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> +e_free:
>>>> + kfree(certs);
>>>> + return ret;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
>>>> {
>>>> void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
>>>> @@ -1847,6 +1963,12 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
>>>> case SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS:
>>>> ret = sev_ioctl_snp_platform_status(&input);
>>>> break;
>>>> + case SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG:
>>>> + ret = sev_ioctl_snp_set_config(&input, writable);
>>>> + break;
>>>> + case SNP_GET_EXT_CONFIG:
>>>> + ret = sev_ioctl_snp_get_config(&input);
>>>> + break;
>>>> default:
>>>> ret = -EINVAL;
>>>> goto out;
>>>> @@ -1962,6 +2084,7 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
>>>> goto e_sev;
>>>>
>>>> sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE;
>>>> + mutex_init(&sev->snp_certs_lock);
>>>>
>>>> psp->sev_data = sev;
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
>>>> index 19d79f9d4212..41d5353d5bab 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
>>>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
>>>> @@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ struct sev_device {
>>>>
>>>> bool snp_initialized;
>>>> struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS];
>>>> + void *snp_certs_data;
>>>> + u32 snp_certs_len;
>>>> + struct mutex snp_certs_lock;
>>>> + struct sev_user_data_snp_config snp_config;
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp);
>>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
>>>> index 5adfaea7df97..c20d37586d21 100644
>>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
>>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
>>>> @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ enum {
>>>> SEV_GET_ID, /* This command is deprecated, use SEV_GET_ID2 */
>>>> SEV_GET_ID2,
>>>> SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS,
>>>> + SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG,
>>>> + SNP_GET_EXT_CONFIG,
>>>>
>>>> SEV_MAX,
>>>> };
>>>> @@ -192,6 +194,21 @@ struct sev_user_data_snp_config {
>>>> __u8 rsvd1[52];
>>>> } __packed;
>>>>
>>>> +/**
>>>> + * struct sev_data_snp_ext_config - system wide configuration value for SNP.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * @config_address: address of the struct sev_user_data_snp_config or 0 when
>>>> + * reported_tcb does not need to be updated.
>>>> + * @certs_address: address of extended guest request certificate chain or
>>>> + * 0 when previous certificate should be removed on SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG.
>>>> + * @certs_len: length of the certs
>>>> + */
>>>> +struct sev_user_data_ext_snp_config {
>>>> + __u64 config_address; /* In */
>>>> + __u64 certs_address; /* In */
>>>> + __u32 certs_len; /* In */
>>>> +};
>>>> +
>>>> /**
>>>> * struct sev_issue_cmd - SEV ioctl parameters
>>>> *
>>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-23 14:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 147+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-20 18:37 [PATCH RFC v8 00/56] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 01/56] KVM: x86: Add 'fault_is_private' x86 op Michael Roth
2023-03-01 10:25 ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-18 4:51 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-20 17:46 ` Michael Roth
2023-03-18 4:53 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 02/56] KVM: x86: Add 'update_mem_attr' " Michael Roth
2023-03-18 4:56 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-20 18:05 ` Michael Roth
2023-03-21 11:21 ` Zhi Wang
[not found] ` <20230322015838.z3bwcrvi4gqag3q6@amd.com>
2023-03-23 18:17 ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-28 4:36 ` Michael Roth
2023-03-28 23:00 ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-29 23:50 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 03/56] KVM: x86: Add platform hooks for private memory invalidations Michael Roth
2023-03-18 5:13 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-20 18:09 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 04/56] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-02-20 21:37 ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-27 0:34 ` Michael Roth
2023-04-04 14:40 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 05/56] KVM: SEV: Require KVM_PROTECTED_VM when AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 06/56] KVM: Split out memory attribute xarray updates to helper function Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 07/56] KVM: SEV: Populate private memory fd during LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 08/56] KVM: SEV: Rename sev_{pin,unpin}_memory Michael Roth
2023-03-03 14:00 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-03-06 11:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 09/56] KVM: SEV: Handle memory backed by restricted memfd Michael Roth
2023-03-03 14:05 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-03-06 11:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 10/56] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-02-21 21:21 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-02-22 23:27 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 11/56] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-02-20 20:12 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 12/56] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-03-03 15:28 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-03-29 22:59 ` Michael Roth
2023-04-20 16:31 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 13/56] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 14/56] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 15/56] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-03-01 12:07 ` Tom Dohrmann
2023-03-01 16:15 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-28 22:12 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 16/56] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 17/56] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address Michael Roth
2023-03-01 16:21 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-28 23:31 ` Michael Roth
2023-04-11 18:27 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-03 15:31 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 18/56] x86/fault: fix handle_split_page_fault() to work with memfd backed pages Michael Roth
2023-02-20 19:57 ` Hugh Dickins
2023-02-20 20:31 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 19/56] x86/fault: Return pfn from dump_pagetable() for SEV-specific fault handling Michael Roth
2023-02-20 21:13 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-28 10:53 ` Wu Zongyong
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 20/56] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-04-17 14:54 ` Sabin Rapan
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 21/56] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 22/56] crypto:ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 23/56] crypto: ccp: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-03-03 15:54 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 24/56] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-02-21 9:28 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-21 15:31 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-21 21:15 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-21 22:06 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 25/56] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 26/56] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 27/56] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-02-22 12:32 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-22 16:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-22 22:43 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-23 6:38 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-23 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 28/56] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended attestation report Michael Roth
2023-02-22 20:24 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-22 22:35 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-23 8:14 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 29/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 30/56] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 31/56] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-02-22 20:42 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 32/56] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-02-23 17:46 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 33/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 34/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-02-23 21:41 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-24 16:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-04-26 17:06 ` Sabin Rapan
2023-04-26 18:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 35/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-02-24 11:55 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 36/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-03-24 14:40 ` Alexander Graf
2023-04-17 13:42 ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 37/56] KVM: X86: Keep the NPT and RMP page level in sync Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 38/56] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 39/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 40/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 41/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-24 15:06 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 42/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 43/56] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 44/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault Michael Roth
2023-02-28 19:11 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 45/56] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-02-24 11:01 ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-28 19:34 ` Zhi Wang
2023-04-17 13:05 ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 46/56] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 47/56] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-02-24 12:37 ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-28 20:47 ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-01 21:14 ` Alexander Graf
2023-04-05 0:54 ` Michael Roth
2023-04-04 22:48 ` Michael Roth
2023-04-05 15:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 48/56] KVM: SVM: Add SNP-specific handling for memory attribute updates Michael Roth
2023-03-01 23:37 ` Dave Hansen
2023-04-05 23:48 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 49/56] KVM: SVM: Implement .fault_is_private callback for SNP Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 50/56] KVM: SEV: Handle restricted memory invalidations " Michael Roth
2023-03-01 10:41 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 51/56] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-03-01 10:45 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 52/56] ccp: Add support to decrypt the page Michael Roth
2023-03-01 21:20 ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-02 5:59 ` Dov Murik
2023-03-02 14:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-03-02 21:11 ` Dov Murik
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 53/56] KVM: SVM: Make VMSAVE target area memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-03-01 21:23 ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 54/56] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for instance certs Michael Roth
2023-02-21 12:40 ` Dov Murik
2023-03-02 0:02 ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-02 1:41 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-03-02 11:27 ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-02 11:34 ` Dov Murik
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 55/56] x86/sev: Document KVM_SEV_SNP_{G,S}ET_CERTS Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 56/56] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-03-01 16:56 ` [PATCH RFC v8 00/56] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Dave Hansen
2023-03-01 22:59 ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-01 23:39 ` Dave Hansen
2023-08-03 18:27 ` Schander, Johanna 'Mimoja' Amelie
2023-08-04 1:01 ` Kalra, Ashish
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