From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: "Lubashev, Igor" <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 19:33:48 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3f2ac76c-6108-7769-4b99-a7a2da31af3d@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9316a1ab21f6441eb2b421acb818a2a1@ustx2ex-dag1mb6.msg.corp.akamai.com>
On 16.12.2019 19:12, Lubashev, Igor wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 2:15 AM, Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> Open access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged
>> processes.
>> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
>> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage
>> for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
>> CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++---
>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h index
>> 34c7c6910026..52313d2cc343 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
>> @@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
>>
>> static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) {
>> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 &&
>> + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
>> return -EACCES;
>>
>> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); @@
>> -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct
>> perf_event_attr *attr)
>>
>> static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) {
>> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 &&
>> + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
>> return -EACCES;
>>
>> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); @@ -
>> 1301,7 +1303,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr
>> *attr)
>>
>> static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr) {
>> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 &&
>> + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
>> return -EPERM;
>>
>> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
>> --
>> 2.20.1
>
> Thanks. I like the idea of CAP_SYS_PERFMON that does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. It makes granting users ability to run perf a bit safer.
>
> I see a lot of "(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)" constructs now. Maybe wrapping it in an " inline bool perfmon_capable()" defined somewhere (like in /include/linux/capability.h)?
Yes, it makes sense.
Thanks,
Alexey
>
> - Igor
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-16 17:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-16 7:00 [PATCH v2 0/7] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:14 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 14:04 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 7:15 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 16:12 ` Lubashev, Igor
2019-12-16 16:33 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2019-12-16 17:12 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:16 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:17 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:17 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:18 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:19 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
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