From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
jani.nikula@linux.intel.com, joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com,
rodrigo.vivi@intel.com, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
serge@hallyn.com, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, bgregg@netflix.com,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 09:04:04 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <81603537-023c-9b6b-06ac-384de60dbb1d@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9066ae10-63d6-67a1-d472-1f22826c9ae8@linux.intel.com>
On 12/16/19 2:14 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf
> and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
>
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
> system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing
> attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
>
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to
> system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount
> of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following with the recommendations provided
> in the capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability
> is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
>
> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++-
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
> 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> index 240fdb9a60f6..7d1f8606c3e6 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> @@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
>
> #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
>
> +/*
> + * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
> + * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
> + */
> +
> +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
>
> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON
>
> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
> "audit_control", "setfcap"
>
> #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
> - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
> + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
>
> -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
> +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
> #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
> #endif
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-16 14:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-16 7:00 [PATCH v2 0/7] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:14 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 14:04 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-12-16 7:15 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 16:12 ` Lubashev, Igor
2019-12-16 16:33 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 17:12 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:16 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:17 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:17 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:18 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 7:19 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
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