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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <simon.guinot@sequanux.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<brijesh.singh@amd.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<rkrcmar@redhat.com>, <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	<linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>, <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
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	<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <tj@kernel.org>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	<davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 10:15:01 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <148846770159.2349.16863375000963463500.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148846752022.2349.13667498174822419498.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Modify the SVM cpuid update function to indicate if Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) is active in the guest by setting the SEV KVM CPU
features bit. SEV is active if Secure Memory Encryption is enabled in
the host and the SEV_ENABLE bit of the VMCB is set.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c |    4 +++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c   |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 1639de8..e0c40a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 		entry->edx = 0;
 		break;
 	case 0x80000000:
-		entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x8000001a);
+		entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x8000001f);
 		break;
 	case 0x80000001:
 		entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0001_edx_x86_features;
@@ -634,6 +634,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 		break;
 	case 0x8000001d:
 		break;
+	case 0x8000001f:
+		break;
 	/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/
 	case 0xC0000000:
 		/*Just support up to 0xC0000004 now*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 75b0645..36d61ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 
 #include <asm/virtext.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include "trace.h"
 
 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
@@ -5005,10 +5006,27 @@ static void svm_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+	struct vmcb_control_area *ca = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *features, *sev_info;
 
 	/* Update nrips enabled cache */
 	svm->nrips_enabled = !!guest_cpuid_has_nrips(&svm->vcpu);
 
+	/* Check for Secure Encrypted Virtualization support */
+	features = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0);
+	if (!features)
+		return;
+
+	sev_info = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x8000001f, 0);
+	if (!sev_info)
+		return;
+
+	if (ca->nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE) {
+		features->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV);
+		cpuid(0x8000001f, &sev_info->eax, &sev_info->ebx,
+		      &sev_info->ecx, &sev_info->edx);
+	}
+
 	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
 		return;
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-03-02 15:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07  0:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07  0:03       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08  8:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-03-09 19:29   ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 22:25         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:47             ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:56               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:03                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 14:45                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-18 16:37                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 14:05             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 17:25               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 18:37                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 11:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 14:50                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 12:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39   ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15   ` Brijesh Singh

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