From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <simon.guinot@sequanux.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
<brijesh.singh@amd.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<rkrcmar@redhat.com>, <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
<linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>, <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
<gary.hook@amd.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <cl@linux.com>,
<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <aarcange@redhat.com>,
<sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
<herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <bhe@redhat.com>,
<xemul@parallels.com>, <joro@8bytes.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <piotr.luc@intel.com>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<msalter@redhat.com>, <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>,
<bp@suse.de>, <dyoung@redhat.com>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<jroedel@suse.de>, <keescook@chromium.org>, <arnd@arndb.de>,
<toshi.kani@hpe.com>, <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
<luto@kernel.org>, <devel@linuxdriverproject.org>,
<bhelgaas@google.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>, <mchehab@kernel.org>,
<iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
<tony.luck@intel.com>, <alexandre.bounine@idt.com>,
<kuleshovmail@gmail.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<mcgrof@kernel.org>, <mst@redhat.com>,
<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <tj@kernel.org>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
<davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 10:17:47 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <148846786714.2349.17724971671841396908.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148846752022.2349.13667498174822419498.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the VM
encryption key (VEK) created from LAUNCH_START.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 150 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index b5fa8c0..62c2b22 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -502,6 +504,7 @@ static void sev_deactivate_handle(struct kvm *kvm);
static void sev_decommission_handle(struct kvm *kvm);
static int sev_asid_new(void);
static void sev_asid_free(int asid);
+#define __sev_page_pa(x) ((page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT) | sme_me_mask)
static bool kvm_sev_enabled(void)
{
@@ -5775,6 +5778,149 @@ static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return ret;
}
+static struct page **sev_pin_memory(unsigned long uaddr, unsigned long ulen,
+ unsigned long *n)
+{
+ struct page **pages;
+ int first, last;
+ unsigned long npages, pinned;
+
+ /* Get number of pages */
+ first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ npages = (last - first + 1);
+
+ pages = kzalloc(npages * sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pages)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* pin the user virtual address */
+ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ pinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, 1, pages);
+ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ if (pinned != npages) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: failed to pin %ld pages (got %ld)\n",
+ npages, pinned);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *n = npages;
+ return pages;
+err:
+ if (pinned > 0)
+ release_pages(pages, pinned, 0);
+ kfree(pages);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void sev_unpin_memory(struct page **pages, unsigned long npages)
+{
+ release_pages(pages, npages, 0);
+ kfree(pages);
+}
+
+static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], int num_pages)
+{
+ unsigned long i;
+ uint8_t *page_virtual;
+
+ if (num_pages == 0 || pages == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_pages; i++) {
+ page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
+ clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
+ kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
+ }
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct page **inpages;
+ unsigned long uaddr, ulen;
+ int i, len, ret, offset;
+ unsigned long nr_pages;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
+ struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Get the parameters from the user */
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void *)argp->data,
+ sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data)))
+ goto err_1;
+
+ uaddr = params.address;
+ ulen = params.length;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_1;
+ }
+
+ /* pin user pages */
+ inpages = sev_pin_memory(params.address, params.length, &nr_pages);
+ if (!inpages) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_2;
+ }
+
+ /* invalidate the cache line for these pages to ensure that DRAM
+ * has recent content before calling the SEV commands to perform
+ * the encryption.
+ */
+ sev_clflush_pages(inpages, nr_pages);
+
+ /* the array of pages returned by get_user_pages() is a page-aligned
+ * memory. Since the user buffer is probably not page-aligned, we need
+ * to calculate the offset within a page for first update entry.
+ */
+ offset = uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+ len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - offset), ulen);
+ ulen -= len;
+
+ /* update first page -
+ * special care need to be taken for the first page because we might
+ * be dealing with offset within the page
+ */
+ data->handle = sev_get_handle(kvm);
+ data->length = len;
+ data->address = __sev_page_pa(inpages[0]) + offset;
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA,
+ data, &argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_3;
+
+ /* update remaining pages */
+ for (i = 1; i < nr_pages; i++) {
+
+ len = min_t(size_t, PAGE_SIZE, ulen);
+ ulen -= len;
+ data->length = len;
+ data->address = __sev_page_pa(inpages[i]);
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA,
+ data, &argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_3;
+ }
+
+ /* mark pages dirty */
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
+ set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
+ mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
+ }
+err_3:
+ sev_unpin_memory(inpages, nr_pages);
+err_2:
+ kfree(data);
+err_1:
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int amd_memory_encryption_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
int r = -ENOTTY;
@@ -5790,6 +5936,10 @@ static int amd_memory_encryption_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
break;
}
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: {
+ r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ }
default:
break;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-02 15:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 0:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 0:03 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 8:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 19:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 22:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-18 16:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 14:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 17:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 18:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 14:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 12:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39 ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55 ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-03-16 10:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Brijesh Singh
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=148846786714.2349.17724971671841396908.stgit@brijesh-build-machine \
--to=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=alexandre.bounine@idt.com \
--cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bhe@redhat.com \
--cc=bhelgaas@google.com \
--cc=bp@suse.de \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=devel@linuxdriverproject.org \
--cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
--cc=gary.hook@amd.com \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=jroedel@suse.de \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kuleshovmail@gmail.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=labbott@fedoraproject.org \
--cc=linus.walleij@linaro.org \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
--cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
--cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
--cc=mchehab@kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=msalter@redhat.com \
--cc=mst@redhat.com \
--cc=paul.gortmaker@windriver.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=piotr.luc@intel.com \
--cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
--cc=ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com \
--cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
--cc=simon.guinot@sequanux.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=tj@kernel.org \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=xemul@parallels.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).