From: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
To: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>, Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>,
rajatxjain@gmail.com, dtor@google.com, jsbarnes@google.com
Subject: [PATCH] PCI: ACPI: Allow internal devices to be marked as untrusted
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 16:04:09 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220120000409.2706549-1-rajatja@google.com> (raw)
Today the pci_dev->untrusted is set for any devices sitting downstream
an external facing port (determined via "ExternalFacingPort" property).
This however, disallows any internal devices to be marked as untrusted.
There are use-cases though, where a platform would like to treat an
internal device as untrusted (perhaps because it runs untrusted
firmware, or offers an attack surface by handling untrusted network
data etc).
This patch introduces a new "UntrustedDevice" property that can be used
by the firmware to mark any device as untrusted.
Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
---
drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c b/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c
index a42dbf448860..3d9e5fa49451 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c
@@ -1350,12 +1350,25 @@ static void pci_acpi_set_external_facing(struct pci_dev *dev)
dev->external_facing = 1;
}
+static void pci_acpi_set_untrusted(struct pci_dev *dev)
+{
+ u8 val;
+
+ if (device_property_read_u8(&dev->dev, "UntrustedDevice", &val))
+ return;
+
+ /* These PCI devices are not trustworthy */
+ if (val)
+ dev->untrusted = 1;
+}
+
void pci_acpi_setup(struct device *dev, struct acpi_device *adev)
{
struct pci_dev *pci_dev = to_pci_dev(dev);
pci_acpi_optimize_delay(pci_dev, adev->handle);
pci_acpi_set_external_facing(pci_dev);
+ pci_acpi_set_untrusted(pci_dev);
pci_acpi_add_edr_notifier(pci_dev);
pci_acpi_add_pm_notifier(adev, pci_dev);
--
2.34.1.703.g22d0c6ccf7-goog
next reply other threads:[~2022-01-20 0:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-20 0:04 Rajat Jain [this message]
2022-01-20 2:25 ` [PATCH] PCI: ACPI: Allow internal devices to be marked as untrusted Dmitry Torokhov
2022-01-20 15:08 ` Rajat Jain
2022-01-27 23:02 ` Rajat Jain
2022-01-21 21:41 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2022-01-22 14:46 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-24 6:27 ` Mika Westerberg
2022-01-25 10:58 ` Mika Westerberg
2022-01-25 11:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-25 12:55 ` Mika Westerberg
2022-01-25 14:45 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-01-27 22:26 ` Rajat Jain
2022-01-28 7:48 ` Mika Westerberg
2022-01-28 21:34 ` Rajat Jain
2022-01-30 14:30 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-01-31 6:41 ` Mika Westerberg
2022-01-31 19:57 ` Rajat Jain
2022-02-02 2:05 ` Rajat Jain
2022-01-28 9:55 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2022-01-25 14:40 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
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