* [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down [not found] <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> @ 2019-08-20 0:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 19:45 ` Bjorn Helgaas 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 0:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: jmorris Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-api, Matthew Garrett, David Howells, Matthew Garrett, Bjorn Helgaas, Kees Cook, linux-pci From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> --- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 4 +++- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 6d27475e39b2..ec103a7e13fc 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -903,6 +903,11 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, unsigned int size = count; loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; + int ret; + + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); + if (ret) + return ret; if (off > dev->cfg_size) return 0; @@ -1164,6 +1169,11 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, int bar = (unsigned long)attr->private; enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type; struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar]; + int ret; + + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); + if (ret) + return ret; if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1240,6 +1250,12 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { + int ret; + + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); + if (ret) + return ret; + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c index 445b51db75b0..e29b0d5ced62 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/byteorder.h> #include "pci.h" @@ -115,7 +116,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, struct pci_dev *dev = PDE_DATA(ino); int pos = *ppos; int size = dev->cfg_size; - int cnt; + int cnt, ret; + + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); + if (ret) + return ret; if (pos >= size) return 0; @@ -196,6 +201,10 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); + if (ret) + return ret; + switch (cmd) { case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); @@ -238,7 +247,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS)) return -EPERM; if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) { diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c index d96626c614f5..31e39558d49d 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/pci.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include "pci.h" @@ -90,7 +91,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, u32 dword; int err = 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS)) return -EPERM; dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 80ac7fb27aa9..2b763f0ee352 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM, LOCKDOWN_KEXEC, LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION, + LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, }; diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index 3462f7edcaac..410e90eda848 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", + [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", }; -- 2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 19:45 ` Bjorn Helgaas 2019-08-20 21:04 ` Matthew Garrett 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Bjorn Helgaas @ 2019-08-20 19:45 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Matthew Garrett Cc: jmorris, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-api, Matthew Garrett, David Howells, Matthew Garrett, Kees Cook, linux-pci On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 05:17:47PM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> > > Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in > order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, > allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. > Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for > sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. > > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Since I've acked this and it's 11/29, I've been assuming you intend to merge the whole series together. But the fact that it's up to V40 makes me wonder if you're waiting for me to merge this one. Just let me know either way. > --- > drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > drivers/pci/proc.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- > drivers/pci/syscall.c | 4 +++- > include/linux/security.h | 1 + > security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + > 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c > index 6d27475e39b2..ec103a7e13fc 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c > +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c > @@ -903,6 +903,11 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, > unsigned int size = count; > loff_t init_off = off; > u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; > + int ret; > + > + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > > if (off > dev->cfg_size) > return 0; > @@ -1164,6 +1169,11 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, > int bar = (unsigned long)attr->private; > enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type; > struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar]; > + int ret; > + > + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > > if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start)) > return -EINVAL; > @@ -1240,6 +1250,12 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, > struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, > loff_t off, size_t count) > { > + int ret; > + > + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); > } > > diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c > index 445b51db75b0..e29b0d5ced62 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c > +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c > @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ > #include <linux/seq_file.h> > #include <linux/capability.h> > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > #include <asm/byteorder.h> > #include "pci.h" > > @@ -115,7 +116,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > struct pci_dev *dev = PDE_DATA(ino); > int pos = *ppos; > int size = dev->cfg_size; > - int cnt; > + int cnt, ret; > + > + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > > if (pos >= size) > return 0; > @@ -196,6 +201,10 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ > int ret = 0; > > + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > switch (cmd) { > case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: > ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); > @@ -238,7 +247,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) > struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; > int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM; > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || > + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS)) > return -EPERM; > > if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) { > diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c > index d96626c614f5..31e39558d49d 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c > +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c > @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ > > #include <linux/errno.h> > #include <linux/pci.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/syscalls.h> > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > #include "pci.h" > @@ -90,7 +91,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, > u32 dword; > int err = 0; > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || > + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS)) > return -EPERM; > > dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn); > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 80ac7fb27aa9..2b763f0ee352 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { > LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM, > LOCKDOWN_KEXEC, > LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION, > + LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS, > LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, > LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, > }; > diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > index 3462f7edcaac..410e90eda848 100644 > --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { > [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", > [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", > [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", > + [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", > [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", > [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", > }; > -- > 2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down 2019-08-20 19:45 ` Bjorn Helgaas @ 2019-08-20 21:04 ` Matthew Garrett 0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 21:04 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bjorn Helgaas Cc: James Morris, LSM List, Linux Kernel Mailing List, Linux API, Matthew Garrett, David Howells, Kees Cook, linux-pci On Tue, Aug 20, 2019 at 12:45 PM Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org> wrote: > Since I've acked this and it's 11/29, I've been assuming you intend > to merge the whole series together. But the fact that it's up to V40 > makes me wonder if you're waiting for me to merge this one. Just let > me know either way. James has merged the series. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-08-20 21:04 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
[not found] <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 19:45 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2019-08-20 21:04 ` Matthew Garrett
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox; as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).