linux-pci.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
To: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>, Hari Vyas <hari.vyas@broadcom.com>
Cc: bhelgaas@google.com, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, ray.jui@broadcom.com
Subject: PCIe enable device races (Was: [PATCH v3] PCI: Data corruption happening due to race condition)
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 13:35:16 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ecaed7664b46d73888d2494065905f8e108fc0f4.camel@kernel.crashing.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180731163727.GK45322@bhelgaas-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com>

On Tue, 2018-07-31 at 11:37 -0500, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 03, 2018 at 02:35:40PM +0530, Hari Vyas wrote:
> > Changes in v3:
> > 	As per review comments from Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>,
> > 	squashed 3 commits to single commit. Without this build breaks.
> > 	Also clubbed set and clear function for is_added bits to a
> > 	single assign function. This optimizes code and reduce LoC.
> > 	Removed one wrongly added blank line in pci.c
> > 	 
> > Changes in v2:
> >         To avoid race condition while updating is_added and is_busmaster
> >         bits, is_added is moved to a private flag variable.
> >         is_added updation is handled in atomic manner also.
> > 
> > Hari Vyas (1):
> >   PCI: Data corruption happening due to race condition

Sooo .... I was chasing a different problem which makes me think we
have a deeper problem here.

In my case, I have a system with >70 nvme devices behind layers of
switches.

What I think is happening is all the nvme devices are probed in
parallel (the machine has about 40 CPU cores).

They all call pci_enable_device() around the same time.

This will walk up the bridge/switch chain and try to enable every
switch along the way. However there is *no* locking at the switch level
at all that I can see. Or am I missing something subtle ?

So here's an example simplified scenario:

	Bridge
	/    \
     dev A   dev B

Both dev A and B hit pci_enable_device() simultaneously, thus both
call pci_enable_bridge() at the same time: This does (simplified):

	if (pci_is_enabled(dev)) {
		if (!dev->is_busmaster)
			pci_set_master(dev);
		return;
	}

	retval = pci_enable_device(dev);
	if (retval)
		pci_err(dev, "Error enabling bridge (%d), continuing\n",
			retval);
	pci_set_master(dev);

Now the pci_is_enabled() just checks dev->enable_cnt and pci_enable_device()
increments it *before* enabling the device.

So it's possible that pci_is_enabled() returns true for the bridge for dev B
because dev A just did the atomic_inc_return(), but hasn't actually enabled
the bridge yet (hasnt yet hit the config space).

At that point, driver for dev B hits an MMIO and gets an UR response from
the bridge.

I need to setup a rig to verify my theory but I think this is racy. The same
race is also present with dev->is_busmaster. Using bitmaps won't help.

What's really needed is a per device mutex covering all those operations
on a given device. (This would also allow to get rid of those games with
atomics).

Any comments ?

Cheers,
Ben.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-08-15  3:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-03  9:05 [PATCH v3] PCI: Data corruption happening due to race condition Hari Vyas
2018-07-03  9:05 ` Hari Vyas
2018-07-03  9:13   ` Lukas Wunner
2018-07-18 23:29   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2018-07-19  4:18     ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-07-19 14:04       ` Hari Vyas
2018-07-19 18:55         ` Lukas Wunner
2018-07-20  4:27           ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-07-27 22:25       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2018-07-28  0:45         ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-07-31 11:21         ` Michael Ellerman
2018-07-19 17:41   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2018-07-20  9:16     ` Hari Vyas
2018-07-20 12:20       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2018-07-31 16:37 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2018-08-15  3:35   ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt [this message]
2018-08-15  4:16     ` PCIe enable device races (Was: [PATCH v3] PCI: Data corruption happening due to race condition) Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-15  4:44       ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-15  5:21         ` [RFC PATCH] pci: Proof of concept at fixing pci_enable_device/bridge races Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-15 19:09         ` PCIe enable device races (Was: [PATCH v3] PCI: Data corruption happening due to race condition) Bjorn Helgaas
2018-08-15 21:50         ` [RFC PATCH] pci: Proof of concept at fixing pci_enable_device/bridge races Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-15 22:40           ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 23:38             ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-20  1:31               ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-17  3:07           ` Bjorn Helgaas
2018-08-17  3:42             ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-15 18:50     ` PCIe enable device races (Was: [PATCH v3] PCI: Data corruption happening due to race condition) Bjorn Helgaas
2018-08-15 21:52       ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-15 23:23         ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-16  7:58         ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2018-08-16  8:02           ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-16  9:22             ` Hari Vyas
2018-08-16 10:10               ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-16 10:11                 ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-16 10:26                 ` Lukas Wunner
2018-08-16 10:47                   ` Hari Vyas
2018-08-16 23:20                     ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-16 23:17                   ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-17  0:43                     ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-16 19:43             ` Jens Axboe
2018-08-16 21:37               ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-16 21:56                 ` Jens Axboe
2018-08-16 23:09                   ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-17  0:14                     ` Jens Axboe
2018-08-16 12:28         ` Lukas Wunner
2018-08-16 23:25           ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-17  1:12             ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-17 16:39               ` Lukas Wunner
2018-08-18  3:37                 ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2018-08-18  9:22                   ` Lukas Wunner
2018-08-18 13:11                     ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ecaed7664b46d73888d2494065905f8e108fc0f4.camel@kernel.crashing.org \
    --to=benh@kernel.crashing.org \
    --cc=bhelgaas@google.com \
    --cc=hari.vyas@broadcom.com \
    --cc=helgaas@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=ray.jui@broadcom.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).