KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in vsscanf (2)

KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in vsscanf (2)

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    f932d58a Merge tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pu..
git tree:       upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=10337320900000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e944500a36bc4d55
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a22c6092d003d6fe1122
compiler:       clang version 10.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/ c2443155a0fb245c8f17f2c1c72b6ea391e86e81)
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=15ce6d7d100000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1207c827100000

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf+0x2666/0x2ef0 lib/vsprintf.c:3321
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888097d682b8 by task syz-executor980/6804

CPU: 0 PID: 6804 Comm: syz-executor980 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1f0/0x31e lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description+0x66/0x5a0 mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x132/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 vsscanf+0x2666/0x2ef0 lib/vsprintf.c:3321
 sscanf+0x6c/0x90 lib/vsprintf.c:3527
 smk_set_cipso+0x374/0x6c0 security/smack/smackfs.c:908
 vfs_write+0x2dd/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:576
 ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
 do_syscall_64+0x73/0xe0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x4402d9
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007ffe89010db8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004402d9
RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401ae0
R13: 0000000000401b70 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Allocated by task 6804:
 save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x103/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:494
 __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3656 [inline]
 __kmalloc_track_caller+0x249/0x320 mm/slab.c:3671
 memdup_user_nul+0x26/0xf0 mm/util.c:259
 smk_set_cipso+0xff/0x6c0 security/smack/smackfs.c:859
 vfs_write+0x2dd/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:576
 ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
 do_syscall_64+0x73/0xe0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Freed by task 4906:
 save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:316 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x170 mm/kasan/common.c:455
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
 kfree+0x10a/0x220 mm/slab.c:3757
 tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x525/0x690 security/tomoyo/file.c:736
 tomoyo_path_mknod+0x128/0x150 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:240
 security_path_mknod+0xdc/0x160 security/security.c:1077
 may_o_create fs/namei.c:2919 [inline]
 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3060 [inline]
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3169 [inline]
 path_openat+0xbe8/0x37f0 fs/namei.c:3357
 do_filp_open+0x191/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:3387
 do_sys_openat2+0x463/0x770 fs/open.c:1179
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1195 [inline]
 ksys_open include/linux/syscalls.h:1388 [inline]
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1201 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1199 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x1af/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1199
 do_syscall_64+0x73/0xe0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888097d68280
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
 64-byte region [ffff888097d68280, ffff888097d682c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00025f5a00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888097d68c80
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea000288fe08 ffffea00026f38c8 ffff8880aa400380
raw: ffff888097d68c80 ffff888097d68000 000000010000001e 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888097d68180: 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff888097d68200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888097d68280: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                        ^
 ffff888097d68300: 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff888097d68380: 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================


---
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[PATCH 1/2] Smack: fix another vsscanf out of bounds

[Dan Carpenter]

This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8d1 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in
vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule".

Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f7112e6c9abf ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
---
This check is very straight forward and should fix the bug.  But if you
look at the fixes tag we used to rely on the check:

	if (count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN))

and now that has been changed to:

	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
	    count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN))
                goto out;

so it doesn't apply for every format.

 security/smack/smackfs.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index c21b656b3263..81c6ceeaa4f9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -905,6 +905,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < catlen; i++) {
 		rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
+		if (rule > data + count) {
+			rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		ret = sscanf(rule, "%u", &cat);
 		if (ret != 1 || cat > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
 			goto out;
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 2/2] Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()

[Dan Carpenter]

We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative
values.

Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
---
 security/smack/smackfs.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 81c6ceeaa4f9..7675305511ef 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	}
 
 	ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
-	if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
+	if (ret != 1 || maplevel < 0 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
 		goto out;
 
 	rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
-- 
2.27.0

Re: [PATCH 1/2] Smack: fix another vsscanf out of bounds

[Casey Schaufler]

On 7/23/2020 8:22 AM, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8d1 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in
> vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule".
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: f7112e6c9abf ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4")
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

Thanks. I'll be testing these and take them assuming they pass.

> ---
> This check is very straight forward and should fix the bug.  But if you
> look at the fixes tag we used to rely on the check:
>
> 	if (count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN))
>
> and now that has been changed to:
>
> 	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
> 	    count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN))
>                 goto out;
>
> so it doesn't apply for every format.
>
>  security/smack/smackfs.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index c21b656b3263..81c6ceeaa4f9 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -905,6 +905,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>  
>  	for (i = 0; i < catlen; i++) {
>  		rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
> +		if (rule > data + count) {
> +			rc = -EOVERFLOW;
> +			goto out;
> +		}
>  		ret = sscanf(rule, "%u", &cat);
>  		if (ret != 1 || cat > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
>  			goto out;