From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, ebiederm@xmission.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 23/43] procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:31:35 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <155059389539.12449.17955800242100461744.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <155059366914.12449.4669870128936536848.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c as that's where the other
superblock stuff is.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
fs/proc/inode.c | 51 +--------------------------------------------------
fs/proc/internal.h | 4 +---
fs/proc/root.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index da649ccd6804..17b5261206dd 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
return 0;
}
-static const struct super_operations proc_sops = {
+const struct super_operations proc_sops = {
.alloc_inode = proc_alloc_inode,
.destroy_inode = proc_destroy_inode,
.drop_inode = generic_delete_inode,
@@ -488,51 +487,3 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct proc_dir_entry *de)
pde_put(de);
return inode;
}
-
-int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, int silent)
-{
- struct pid_namespace *ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info);
- struct inode *root_inode;
- int ret;
-
- if (!proc_parse_options(data, ns))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
- s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
- s->s_flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | SB_NOSUID | SB_NOEXEC;
- s->s_blocksize = 1024;
- s->s_blocksize_bits = 10;
- s->s_magic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC;
- s->s_op = &proc_sops;
- s->s_time_gran = 1;
-
- /*
- * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is
- * too much magic going on inside it to permit stacking things on
- * top of it
- */
- s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;
-
- /* procfs dentries and inodes don't require IO to create */
- s->s_shrink.seeks = 0;
-
- pde_get(&proc_root);
- root_inode = proc_get_inode(s, &proc_root);
- if (!root_inode) {
- pr_err("proc_fill_super: get root inode failed\n");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- s->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode);
- if (!s->s_root) {
- pr_err("proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed\n");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- ret = proc_setup_self(s);
- if (ret) {
- return ret;
- }
- return proc_setup_thread_self(s);
-}
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 5185d7f6a51e..97157c0410a2 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -205,13 +205,12 @@ struct pde_opener {
struct completion *c;
} __randomize_layout;
extern const struct inode_operations proc_link_inode_operations;
-
extern const struct inode_operations proc_pid_link_inode_operations;
+extern const struct super_operations proc_sops;
void proc_init_kmemcache(void);
void set_proc_pid_nlink(void);
extern struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct super_block *, struct proc_dir_entry *);
-extern int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *, void *data, int flags);
extern void proc_entry_rundown(struct proc_dir_entry *);
/*
@@ -269,7 +268,6 @@ static inline void proc_tty_init(void) {}
* root.c
*/
extern struct proc_dir_entry proc_root;
-extern int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid);
extern void proc_self_init(void);
extern int proc_remount(struct super_block *, int *, char *);
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index f4b1a9d2eca6..fe4f64b3250b 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
{Opt_err, NULL},
};
-int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
+static int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
{
char *p;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@@ -78,6 +79,54 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
return 1;
}
+static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, int silent)
+{
+ struct pid_namespace *ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info);
+ struct inode *root_inode;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!proc_parse_options(data, ns))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
+ s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
+ s->s_flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | SB_NOSUID | SB_NOEXEC;
+ s->s_blocksize = 1024;
+ s->s_blocksize_bits = 10;
+ s->s_magic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC;
+ s->s_op = &proc_sops;
+ s->s_time_gran = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is
+ * too much magic going on inside it to permit stacking things on
+ * top of it
+ */
+ s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;
+
+ /* procfs dentries and inodes don't require IO to create */
+ s->s_shrink.seeks = 0;
+
+ pde_get(&proc_root);
+ root_inode = proc_get_inode(s, &proc_root);
+ if (!root_inode) {
+ pr_err("proc_fill_super: get root inode failed\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ s->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode);
+ if (!s->s_root) {
+ pr_err("proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = proc_setup_self(s);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return proc_setup_thread_self(s);
+}
+
int proc_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
{
struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-19 16:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-19 16:27 [PATCH 00/43] VFS: Introduce filesystem context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:28 ` [PATCH 01/43] fix cgroup_do_mount() handling of failure exits David Howells
2019-02-19 16:28 ` [PATCH 02/43] cgroup: saner refcounting for cgroup_root David Howells
2019-02-19 16:28 ` [PATCH 03/43] kill kernfs_pin_sb() David Howells
2019-02-19 16:28 ` [PATCH 04/43] separate copying and locking mount tree on cross-userns copies David Howells
2019-02-20 18:55 ` Alan Jenkins
2019-02-26 15:44 ` David Howells
2019-02-26 17:45 ` Alan Jenkins
2019-02-19 16:29 ` [PATCH 05/43] saner handling of temporary namespaces David Howells
2019-02-19 16:29 ` [PATCH 06/43] vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it David Howells
2019-02-19 16:29 ` [PATCH 07/43] new helpers: vfs_create_mount(), fc_mount() David Howells
2019-02-19 16:29 ` [PATCH 08/43] teach vfs_get_tree() to handle subtype, switch do_new_mount() to it David Howells
2019-02-19 16:29 ` [PATCH 09/43] new helper: do_new_mount_fc() David Howells
2019-02-19 16:29 ` [PATCH 10/43] vfs_get_tree(): evict the call of security_sb_kern_mount() David Howells
2019-02-19 16:29 ` [PATCH 11/43] convert do_remount_sb() to fs_context David Howells
2019-03-22 11:19 ` Andreas Schwab
2019-03-22 11:25 ` David Howells
2019-03-22 13:28 ` Andreas Schwab
2019-03-22 14:00 ` Andreas Schwab
2019-02-19 16:30 ` [PATCH 12/43] fs_context flavour for submounts David Howells
2019-02-19 16:30 ` [PATCH 13/43] introduce fs_context methods David Howells
2019-02-19 16:30 ` [PATCH 14/43] vfs: Introduce logging functions David Howells
2019-02-19 16:30 ` [PATCH 15/43] vfs: Add configuration parser helpers David Howells
2019-03-03 2:53 ` Al Viro
2019-02-19 16:30 ` [PATCH 16/43] vfs: Add LSM hooks for the new mount API David Howells
2019-02-19 16:30 ` [PATCH 17/43] selinux: Implement the new mount API LSM hooks David Howells
2019-02-19 16:30 ` [PATCH 18/43] smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks David Howells
2019-02-19 16:30 ` [PATCH 19/43] vfs: Put security flags into the fs_context struct David Howells
2019-02-19 16:31 ` [PATCH 20/43] vfs: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:31 ` [PATCH 21/43] convenience helpers: vfs_get_super() and sget_fc() David Howells
2019-02-19 16:31 ` [PATCH 22/43] introduce cloning of fs_context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:31 ` David Howells [this message]
2019-02-19 16:31 ` [PATCH 24/43] proc: Add fs_context support to procfs David Howells
2019-02-19 16:31 ` [PATCH 25/43] ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:31 ` [PATCH 26/43] cgroup: start switching " David Howells
2019-02-19 16:32 ` [PATCH 27/43] cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree() David Howells
2019-02-19 16:32 ` [PATCH 28/43] cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic() David Howells
2019-02-19 16:32 ` [PATCH 29/43] cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing David Howells
2019-02-19 16:32 ` [PATCH 30/43] cgroup2: " David Howells
2019-02-19 16:32 ` [PATCH 31/43] cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:32 ` [PATCH 32/43] cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions David Howells
2019-02-19 16:32 ` [PATCH 33/43] cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper David Howells
2019-02-19 16:33 ` [PATCH 34/43] cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:33 ` [PATCH 35/43] kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:33 ` [PATCH 36/43] cpuset: Use fs_context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:33 ` [PATCH 37/43] hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:33 ` [PATCH 38/43] vfs: Remove kern_mount_data() David Howells
2019-02-19 16:33 ` [PATCH 39/43] vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API David Howells
2019-02-19 16:34 ` [PATCH 40/43] vfs: Implement logging through fs_context David Howells
2019-02-19 16:34 ` [PATCH 41/43] vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log David Howells
2019-02-19 16:34 ` [PATCH 42/43] afs: Add fs_context support David Howells
2019-02-19 16:34 ` [PATCH 43/43] afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount David Howells
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