From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] tracefs: Fix potential null dereference in default_file_open()
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 12:21:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190813192126.122370-2-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190813192126.122370-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The "open" operation in struct file_operations is optional, and
ftrace_event_id_fops does not set it. In default_file_open(), after
all other checks have passed, return 0 if the underlying struct
file_operations does not implement open.
Fixes: 757ff7244358 ("tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is …")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/934304
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/tracefs/inode.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c
index 34da48036e08..761af8ce4015 100644
--- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ static int default_open_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
return ret;
real_fops = dentry->d_fsdata;
+ if (!real_fops->open)
+ return 0;
return real_fops->open(inode, filp);
}
--
2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-13 19:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-13 19:21 [PATCH 0/6] lockdown fixups Matthew Garrett
2019-08-13 19:21 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-08-13 19:21 ` [PATCH 2/6] early_security_init() needs a stub got !CONFIG_SECURITY Matthew Garrett
2019-08-13 19:21 ` [PATCH 3/6] Avoid build warning when !CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG Matthew Garrett
2019-08-14 5:23 ` Dave Young
2019-08-14 17:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-13 19:21 ` [PATCH 4/6] security: fix ptr_ret.cocci warnings Matthew Garrett
2019-08-13 19:21 ` [PATCH 5/6] kexec: s/KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG/KEXEC_SIG/ for consistency Matthew Garrett
2019-08-13 19:21 ` [PATCH 6/6] Document locked_down LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-08-13 22:59 ` [PATCH 0/6] lockdown fixups James Morris
2019-08-14 5:06 ` James Morris
2019-08-14 17:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-14 18:24 ` James Morris
2019-08-14 18:26 ` Matthew Garrett
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