Re: [PATCH v10 2/7] KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material

[Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>]

Hello Jason,

On 17.05.22 19:27, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 04:57:00PM +0200, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
>> +	trusted.rng=	[KEYS]
>> +			Format: <string>
>> +			The RNG used to generate key material for trusted keys.
>> +			Can be one of:
>> +			- "kernel"
>> +			- the same value as trusted.source: "tpm" or "tee"
>> +			- "default"
>> +			If not specified, "default" is used. In this case,
>> +			the RNG's choice is left to each individual trust source.
>> +
> 
> As a general mechanism, I object to this. The kernel's RNG must be
> trusted in the first place for key material. That's the whole point of
> it.
> 
> However, it sounds like you're not proposing a general mechanism, but
> just something particular to this "trusted keys" business.

The two currently upstream trust sources (trusted key backends) each provide
their own RNG callback. This series adds a third backend that uses kernel RNG
and additionally provides users of the two existing trust sources the option
to benefit from kernel RNG as well.

> this should be a module flag, and thus not documented here, but rather
> some place namespaced to your trusted keys stuff. "trusted_keys.preferred_rng={whatever}"

The trusted keys module is trusted.ko and directly before my added lines is
the trusted.source=  documentation, so I think this is already at the correct place.

Thanks,
Ahmad

> 
> Jason
> 


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