From: Matt Parnell <mparnell@gmail.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
matthew.garrett@nebula.com, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Kernel Lockdown: Add an option to allow raw MSR access even, in confidentiality mode.
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 14:39:41 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <38d18a24-c580-d56b-f0cd-91e8184e1f0d@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJus-CQPKgL8cW1TAH3u_SSWHBk608tJsx8Uc-dMDPHyRqg@mail.gmail.com>
Agreed.
That said, if we don't mind working with what already exists, this
whitelist addition (I have trouble calling it a module) exists. I wonder
if it could be reshaped into something that ties in with the lockdown
functionality?
It looks like a mixture of commits from Intel engineers and Lawrence
Livermore engineers (GPLv3) :
https://github.com/LLNL/msr-safe
On 12/2/19 1:43 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 10:50 PM Matt Parnell <mparnell@gmail.com> wrote:
>> For Intel CPUs, some of the MDS mitigations utilize the new "flush" MSR, and
>> while this isn't something normally used in userspace, it does cause false
>> positives for the "Forshadow" vulnerability.
> The msr interface is pretty terrible - it exposes a consistent
> interface over very inconsistent CPUs. Where there's CPU functionality
> that's implemented via MSRs it makes sense to expose that over a
> separate kernel interface.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-02 20:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-30 6:49 [PATCH] Kernel Lockdown: Add an option to allow raw MSR access even, in confidentiality mode Matt Parnell
2019-11-30 18:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-30 19:09 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-01 20:53 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 18:29 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 22:55 ` Jordan Glover
2019-12-02 23:13 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 23:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-02 23:31 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03 2:13 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03 2:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-03 2:24 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03 2:50 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03 3:57 ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 19:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-02 20:39 ` Matt Parnell [this message]
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