linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
	penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 13:49:56 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6b717a13-3586-5854-0eee-617798f92d34@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <22585291-b7e0-5a22-6682-168611d902fa@tycho.nsa.gov>

On 1/24/2020 1:04 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 1/23/20 7:22 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>>
>> v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
>>       Incorporate feedback from v13
>>       - Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
>>       - Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
>>       - Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
>>       - Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
>>       - Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
>>       - Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
>
> I don't know for sure if this is your bug, but it happens every time I boot with your patches applied and not at all on stock v5.5-rc5 so here it is.  Will try to bisect as time permits but not until next week. Trigger seems to be loading the tun driver.

Thanks. I will have a look as well.

>
> [   67.726834] tun: Universal TUN/TAP device driver, 1.6
> [   67.736657] ==================================================================
> [   67.741335] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0
> [   67.745037] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88870afe8928 by task libvirtd/1238
>
> [   67.751861] CPU: 4 PID: 1238 Comm: libvirtd Tainted: G T 5.5.0-rc5+ #54
> [   67.756250] Call Trace:
> [   67.759510]  dump_stack+0xb8/0x110
> [   67.761604]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x280
> [   67.763768]  __kasan_report.cold+0x75/0x8f
> [   67.765895]  ? sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0
> [   67.768282]  kasan_report+0xe/0x20
> [   67.770397]  sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0
> [   67.772511]  tun_chr_open+0x1de/0x280 [tun]
> [   67.774644]  misc_open+0x1cb/0x210
> [   67.776820]  chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350
> [   67.778917]  ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30
> [   67.781030]  do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800
> [   67.783135]  ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30
> [   67.785225]  ? devcgroup_check_permission+0x11a/0x260
> [   67.787321]  ? __x64_sys_fchdir+0xf0/0xf0
> [   67.789418]  ? security_inode_permission+0x5b/0x70
> [   67.791513]  path_openat+0x858/0x14a0
> [   67.793589]  ? path_mountpoint+0x5e0/0x5e0
> [   67.795719]  ? mark_lock+0xb8/0xb00
> [   67.797786]  do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0
> [   67.799840]  ? may_open_dev+0x60/0x60
> [   67.801871]  ? match_held_lock+0x1b/0x240
> [   67.803968]  ? lock_downgrade+0x360/0x360
> [   67.805997]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x119/0x1d0
> [   67.808041]  ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x60/0x60
> [   67.810099]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa3/0x130
> [   67.812244]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
> [   67.814287]  ? __alloc_fd+0x143/0x2f0
> [   67.816324]  do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0
> [   67.818358]  ? filp_open+0x50/0x50
> [   67.820404]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
> [   67.822447]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xbe/0x100
> [   67.824473]  ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
> [   67.826484]  do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
> [   67.828480]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> [   67.830478] RIP: 0033:0x7f1a2cce6074
> [   67.832495] Code: 24 20 eb 8f 66 90 44 89 54 24 0c e8 86 f4 ff ff 44 8b 54 24 0c 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 41 89 c0 bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 32 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 b8 f4 ff ff 8b 44
> [   67.834760] RSP: 002b:00007f19e4af46d0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
> [   67.837032] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1a2cce6074
> [   67.839318] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f1a2d0bfb67 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
> [   67.841598] RBP: 00007f1a2d0bfb67 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f19e4af4914
> [   67.843941] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002
> [   67.846283] R13: 000000000000000d R14: 00007f19e4af4920 R15: 00007f1a2d0bfb67
>
> [   67.850936] Allocated by task 1238:
> [   67.853241]  save_stack+0x1b/0x80
> [   67.855533]  __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0
> [   67.857935]  sk_prot_alloc+0x115/0x170
> [   67.860235]  sk_alloc+0x2f/0xa10
> [   67.862541]  tun_chr_open+0x4d/0x280 [tun]
> [   67.864894]  misc_open+0x1cb/0x210
> [   67.867164]  chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350
> [   67.869448]  do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800
> [   67.871768]  path_openat+0x858/0x14a0
> [   67.874041]  do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0
> [   67.876328]  do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0
> [   67.878592]  do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
> [   67.880899]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>
> [   67.885431] Freed by task 726:
> [   67.887689]  save_stack+0x1b/0x80
> [   67.889967]  __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170
> [   67.892197]  kfree+0xff/0x430
> [   67.894444]  uevent_show+0x176/0x1b0
> [   67.896709]  dev_attr_show+0x37/0x70
> [   67.898940]  sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x119/0x210
> [   67.901159]  seq_read+0x29d/0x720
> [   67.903367]  vfs_read+0xf9/0x1f0
> [   67.905538]  ksys_read+0xc9/0x160
> [   67.907736]  do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
> [   67.909889]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>
> [   67.914100] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88870afe8000
>                 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
> [   67.918357] The buggy address is located 2344 bytes inside of
>                 4096-byte region [ffff88870afe8000, ffff88870afe9000)
> [   67.922562] The buggy address belongs to the page:
> [   67.924725] page:ffffea001c2bfa00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88881f00de00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
> [   67.926926] raw: 0017ffe000010200 ffffea001c167a00 0000000200000002 ffff88881f00de00
> [   67.929144] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> [   67.931362] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>
> [   67.936192] Memory state around the buggy address:
> [   67.938438]  ffff88870afe8800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> [   67.941078]  ffff88870afe8880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> [   67.943393] >ffff88870afe8900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> [   67.945709]                                   ^
> [   67.948000]  ffff88870afe8980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> [   67.950311]  ffff88870afe8a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> [   67.952629] ==================================================================

  reply	other threads:[~2020-01-24 21:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20200124002306.3552-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-01-24  0:22 ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:21     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:29     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:22   ` [PATCH v14 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:36     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:42     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 16:20       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 19:28         ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 20:16           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 20:05             ` Simon McVittie
2020-02-03 20:54               ` John Johansen
2020-01-27 22:49             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-31 22:10             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-03 18:54               ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-03 19:37                 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-03 21:39                   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-04 13:37                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-04 17:14                       ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-10 11:56                 ` Simon McVittie
2020-02-10 13:25                   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-10 14:55                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-10 18:32                       ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-10 19:00                         ` John Johansen
2020-02-11 15:59                           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-11 17:58                             ` John Johansen
2020-02-11 18:35                               ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-11 19:11                                 ` John Johansen
2020-02-10 18:56                       ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 21:02             ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 21:43               ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-03 22:49                 ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 20:59           ` John Johansen
2020-01-24  0:23   ` [PATCH v14 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 15:05   ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 21:04   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 21:49     ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-01-27 16:14       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 16:56         ` KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in tun_chr_open/sock_init_data (Was: Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor) Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 17:34           ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-27 17:16         ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=6b717a13-3586-5854-0eee-617798f92d34@schaufler-ca.com \
    --to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body. 
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).