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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
	SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	paul@paul-moore.com, Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
	Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>,
	Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 13:08:48 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <97603935-9f6b-ccf4-4229-87f26380c3db@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <23f725ca-5b5a-5938-fcc8-5bbbfc9ba9bc@tycho.nsa.gov>

On 2/14/20 1:02 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> It shouldn't fire for non-anon inodes because on a (non-anon) file 
> creation, security_transition_sid() is passed the parent directory SID 
> as the second argument and we only assign task SIDs to /proc/pid 
> directories, which don't support (userspace) file creation anyway.
> 
> However, in the absence of a matching type_transition rule, we'll end up 
> defaulting to the task SID on the anon inode, and without a separate 
> class we won't be able to distinguish it from a /proc/pid inode.  So 
> that might justify a separate anoninode or similar class.
> 
> This however reminded me that for the context_inode case, we not only 
> want to inherit the SID but also the sclass from the context_inode. That 
> is so that anon inodes created via device node ioctls inherit the same 
> SID/class pair as the device node and a single allowx rule can govern 
> all ioctl commands on that device.

At least that's the way our patch worked with the /dev/kvm example. 
However, if we are introducing a separate anoninode class for the 
type_transition case, maybe we should apply that to all anon inodes 
regardless of how they are labeled (based on context_inode or 
transition) and then we'd need to write two allowx rules, one for ioctls 
on the original device node and one for those on anon inodes created 
from it.  Not sure how Android wants to handle that as the original 
developer and primary user of SELinux ioctl whitelisting.

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-14 18:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20200211225547.235083-1-dancol@google.com>
     [not found] ` <9ae20f6e-c5c0-4fd7-5b61-77218d19480b@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-02-11 23:27   ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 16:09     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-21 17:56     ` James Morris
2020-02-12  7:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-12 16:54   ` Jann Horn
2020-02-12 17:14     ` Peter Xu
2020-02-12 19:41       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-02-12 20:04         ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 23:41           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-02-12 17:12   ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14  3:26 ` [PATCH 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14  3:26   ` [PATCH 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14  3:26   ` [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14 16:39     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 17:21       ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14 18:02         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 18:08           ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2020-02-14 20:24             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14  3:26   ` [PATCH 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-03-25 23:02   ` [PATCH v2 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-03-25 23:02   ` [PATCH v2 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 13:53     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-25 23:02   ` [PATCH v2 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 13:58     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 17:59       ` Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 17:37     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-25 23:02   ` [PATCH v2 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-03-25 23:49     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-03-26 18:14   ` [PATCH v3 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 18:14     ` [PATCH v3 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 19:00       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 18:14     ` [PATCH v3 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 19:02       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 18:14     ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 20:06     ` [PATCH v4 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 20:06       ` [PATCH v4 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-03-27 13:40         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 20:06       ` [PATCH v4 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-03-27 13:41         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 20:06       ` [PATCH v4 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-04-01 21:39       ` [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-04-01 21:39         ` [PATCH v5 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-05-07 16:02           ` James Morris
2020-08-04 21:22           ` Eric Biggers
2020-04-01 21:39         ` [PATCH v5 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-04-01 21:39         ` [PATCH v5 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-08-04 21:16           ` Eric Biggers
2020-04-13 13:29         ` [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-04-22 16:55           ` James Morris
2020-04-22 17:12             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-23 22:24               ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-27 16:18                 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-27 16:48                   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-04-27 17:12                     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-29 17:02                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-04-27 17:15             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-27 19:40               ` Stephen Smalley
2020-06-04  3:56         ` James Morris
2020-06-04 18:51           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-06-04 19:24             ` Lokesh Gidra

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