messages from 2019-06-22 00:06:00 to 2019-06-26 20:39:18 UTC [more...]
[RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
2019-06-26 20:39 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH v8 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options
2019-06-26 20:23 UTC (9+ messages)
` [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 "
` [PATCH v8 2/2] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time
[PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
2019-06-26 20:22 UTC
[PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-26 19:22 UTC (24+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
` [PATCH v4 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
` [PATCH v4 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
` [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure
` [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
` [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
` [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
` [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
` [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
` [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
` [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
` [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
` [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
` [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
` [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
` [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
` [PATCH v4 17/23] "
` [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
` [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
` [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
` [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
` [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
` [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
linux-next: Tree for Jun 26 (security/integrity/ima/)
2019-06-26 18:35 UTC
[RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
2019-06-26 12:49 UTC (17+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
` [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
[PATCH v4 00/14] ima: introduce IMA Digest Lists extension
2019-06-26 11:38 UTC (5+ messages)
[PATCH v4 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk
2019-06-26 8:15 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH bpf-next v9 00/10] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing
2019-06-26 7:33 UTC (14+ messages)
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 01/10] fs,security: Add a new file access type: MAY_CHROOT
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 02/10] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 03/10] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 04/10] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 05/10] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 06/10] landlock: Handle filesystem access control
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 07/10] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 08/10] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 09/10] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock
` [PATCH bpf-next v9 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation "
[RFC PATCH v5 0/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation
2019-06-26 5:48 UTC (4+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] "
[PATCH v6 1/3] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
2019-06-25 15:42 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH v3 00/24] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-25 15:30 UTC (81+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 01/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
` [PATCH v3 02/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
` [PATCH v3 03/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
` [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure
` [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
` [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
` [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
` [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
` [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
` [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
` [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
` [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
` [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
` [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
` [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
` [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
` [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
` [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
` [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
` [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
` [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
` [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization
` [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
` [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
[PATCH] structleak: disable BYREF_ALL in combination with KASAN_STACK
2019-06-25 15:01 UTC (8+ messages)
[PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM
2019-06-25 15:00 UTC (71+ messages)
` [PATCH V34 01/29] security: Support early LSMs
` [PATCH V34 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook
` [PATCH V34 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM
` [PATCH V34 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V34 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when "
` [PATCH V34 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH V34 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
` [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when "
` [PATCH V34 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH V34 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH V34 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH V34 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH V34 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH V34 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH V34 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when "
` [PATCH V34 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
` [PATCH V34 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
` [PATCH V34 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
` [PATCH V34 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore
` [PATCH V34 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
` [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is "
` [PATCH V34 24/29] Lock down perf when "
` [PATCH V34 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V34 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs "
` [PATCH V34 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load "
` [PATCH V34 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
possible deadlock in console_trylock_spinning
2019-06-25 8:55 UTC
[PATCH V31 00/25] Add support for kernel lockdown
2019-06-25 2:51 UTC (10+ messages)
` [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
[PATCH V10 0/3] Add support for measuring the boot command line during kexec_file_load
2019-06-24 22:03 UTC (6+ messages)
` [PATCH V10 1/3] IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
` [PATCH V10 2/3] IMA: Define a new template field buf
` [PATCH V10 3/3] KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
[PATCH v11 00/13] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
2019-06-24 19:56 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v11 01/13] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
` [PATCH v11 02/13] PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
Stacked LSMs (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor)
2019-06-22 14:15 UTC (2+ messages)
KASAN: use-after-free Read in tomoyo_realpath_from_path
2019-06-22 4:45 UTC (6+ messages)
` [PATCH] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets
` [PATCH v2] "
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