From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2019 10:00:38 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1903090959210.12052@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190306235913.6631-4-matthewgarrett@google.com>
On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>
> If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
> signatures that we can verify.
Perhaps note that this won't cover the case where folk are using DM-Verity
with a signed root hash for verifying kernel modules.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-08 23:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-06 23:58 [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2 Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-03-07 0:09 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-03-07 0:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-08 23:00 ` James Morris [this message]
2019-03-08 23:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-09 4:45 ` James Morris
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 05/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 08/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 09/27] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-07 14:55 ` Alan Cox
2019-03-07 17:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-18 18:55 ` Alan Cox
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 10/27] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 11/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 13/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 18/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 19/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 20/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 21/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 23/27] Lock down kprobes Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 24/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down perf Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-04-25 10:49 ` Vasily Gorbik
2019-04-25 21:44 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:59 ` [PATCH 27/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-03-07 3:56 ` [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2 Mimi Zohar
2019-03-07 4:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-12 0:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-12 1:52 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-07 15:59 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-02-28 21:28 [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2017-10-19 14:50 [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris
2017-10-27 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 17:00 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 17:52 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar
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