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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com,
	bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com,
	conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com,
	kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com,
	ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com,
	npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com,
	rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com,
	mikko.ylinen@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v39 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations_struct
Date: Sat,  3 Oct 2020 07:50:45 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201003045059.665934-11-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201003045059.665934-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

Background
==========

1. SGX enclave pages are populated with data by copying data to them from
   normal memory via an ioctl() (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES).
2. It is desirable to be able to restrict those normal memory data sources.
   For instance, to ensure that the source data is executable before
   copying data to an executable enclave page.
3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
   can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().
4. The original data source may have long since vanished at the time when
   enclave page permissions are established (mmap() or mprotect()).

The solution (elsewhere in this series) is to force enclaves creators to
declare their paging permission *intent* up front to the ioctl().  This
intent can me immediately compared to the source data’s mapping (and
rejected if necessary).

The intent is also stashed off for later comparison with enclave PTEs.
This ensures that any future mmap()/mprotect() operations performed by the
enclave creator or done on behalf of the enclave can be compared with the
earlier declared permissions.

Problem
=======

There is an existing mmap() hook which allows SGX to perform this
permission comparison at mmap() time.  However, there is no corresponding
->mprotect() hook.

Solution
========

Add a vm_ops->mprotect() hook so that mprotect() operations which are
inconsistent with any page's stashed intent can be rejected by the driver.

Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++
 mm/mprotect.c      | 5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index b2f370f0b420..dca57fe80555 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -551,6 +551,9 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
 	void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
 	int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
 	int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
+	int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start,
+			unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags);
 	vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);
 	vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,
 			enum page_entry_size pe_size);
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index ce8b8a5eacbb..f170f3da8a4f 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -610,7 +610,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 		tmp = vma->vm_end;
 		if (tmp > end)
 			tmp = end;
-		error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
+		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
+			error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
+		else
+			error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 		nstart = tmp;
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-10-03  4:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 117+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-03  4:50 [PATCH v39 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 14:10   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 17:49     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 02/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 03/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 04/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 05/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 14:30   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 17:38     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-19 17:48       ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 17:53         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-19 17:58           ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 06/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 08/24] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19  8:45   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 12:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2020-10-23  9:01       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 13:40     ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-23  9:03       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 09/24] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03 14:39   ` Greg KH
2020-10-04 14:32     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-04 15:01       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-05  9:42       ` Greg KH
2020-10-05 12:42         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07 18:09           ` Haitao Huang
2020-10-07 19:26             ` Greg KH
2020-10-09  6:44               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-14 20:16                 ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-05  8:45     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-10-05 11:42       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-05 11:50         ` Greg KH
2020-10-05 14:23           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-05 15:02             ` Greg KH
2020-10-05 16:40               ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-05 20:02                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-09  7:10     ` Pavel Machek
2020-10-09  7:21       ` Greg KH
2020-10-09  8:21         ` Pavel Machek
2020-10-03 19:54   ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-04 21:50     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-04 22:02       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-04 22:27       ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-04 23:41         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-05  1:30           ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-05  3:06             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 12/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-16 17:07   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-18  4:26     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 20:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 20:48         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-16 21:25   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-18  5:03     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19  7:03       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 20:48       ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 21:15         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-19 21:44           ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-23 10:11             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 14/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 15/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-20 15:48   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-23 10:14     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-20 21:19   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-23 10:17     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-23 14:19       ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-24 11:34         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-24 15:47           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-24 20:23             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-27 10:38               ` Dr. Greg
2020-10-23 14:23       ` Jethro Beekman
2020-10-24 11:40         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 16/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  5:22   ` Haitao Huang
2020-10-03 13:32     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03 18:23       ` Haitao Huang
2020-10-04 22:39         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07 17:25           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 17/24] x86/sgx: Add ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 18/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 20/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06  2:57   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-06  8:30     ` Jethro Beekman
2020-10-06 15:15       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-06 17:28         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06 23:21           ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-07  0:22             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07  1:17               ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-07  3:14                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07  4:34                   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-07  7:39                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07  8:04                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07 15:25                       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-07 17:08                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07 17:13                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06 15:49       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06 15:36     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06 21:39     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07  0:23       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-17  1:48   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-17 21:02     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 22/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-12 16:50   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-16 21:04   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-18  4:27     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03 14:32 ` [PATCH v39 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Greg KH
2020-10-03 14:53   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-15 19:06 ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-17 20:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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