From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de,
mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com,
cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com,
mark.shanahan@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/25] x86/sgx: Introduce runtime protection bits
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2021 01:57:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YawAWmodeNaUbzV8@iki.fi> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <db9b7bc9-fdca-4dd2-2c3f-3b7354c165bb@kernel.org>
On Fri, Dec 03, 2021 at 11:28:04AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On 12/1/21 11:23, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> > Enclave creators declare their paging permission intent at the time
> > the pages are added to the enclave. These paging permissions are
> > vetted when pages are added to the enclave and stashed off
> > (in sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits) for later comparison with
> > enclave PTEs.
> >
>
> I'm a bit confused here. ENCLU[EMODPE] allows the enclave to change the EPCM
> permission bits however it likes with no oversight from the kernel. So we
> end up with a whole bunch of permission masks:
>
> The PTE: controlled by complex kernel policy
>
> The VMA: with your series, this is entirely controlled by userspace. I
> think I'm fine with that.
>
> vm_max_prot_bits: populated from secinfo at setup time, unless I missed
> something that changes it later. Maybe I'm confused or missed something in
> one of the patches,
>
> vm_run_prot_bits: populated from some combination of ioctls. I'm entirely
> lost as to what this is for.
>
> EPCM bits: controlled by the guest. basically useless for any host purpose
> on SGX2 hardware (with or without kernel support -- the enclave can do
> ENCLU[EMODPE] whether we like it or not, even on old kernels)
>
> So I guess I don't understand the purpose of this patch or of the rules in
> the later patches, and I feel like this is getting more complicated than
> makes sense.
>
>
> Could we perhaps make vm_max_prot_bits dynamic or at least controllable in
> some useful way? My initial proposal (years ago) was for vm_max_prot_bits
> to be *separately* configured at initial load time instead of being inferred
> from secinfo with the intent being that the user untrusted runtime would set
> it appropriately. I have no problem with allowing runtime changes as long
> as the security policy makes sense and it's kept consistent with PTEs.
This is a valid question. Since EMODPE exists why not just make things for
EMODPE, and ignore EMODPR altogether?
> Also, I think we need a changelog message or, even better, actual docs in
> kernel, explaining the actual final set of rules and invariants for all
> these masks.
>
> --Andy
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-04 23:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 155+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-01 19:22 [PATCH 00/25] x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2 Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:22 ` [PATCH 01/25] x86/sgx: Add shortlog descriptions to ENCLS wrappers Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 18:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:13 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 5:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:06 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 02/25] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:15 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 03/25] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions exceeding enclave permissions Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-04 22:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:16 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 5:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:08 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 04/25] x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:18 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:09 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 05/25] x86/sgx: Introduce runtime protection bits Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 19:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-03 22:12 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 0:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-04 1:14 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 17:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-04 23:55 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-13 22:34 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-12-06 21:20 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:10 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-06 17:46 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-07 12:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-07 16:14 ` Haitao Huang
2022-01-08 15:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-08 15:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-08 16:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-10 22:05 ` Haitao Huang
2022-01-11 1:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 1:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 2:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 2:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 3:48 ` Haitao Huang
2022-01-12 23:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-13 2:41 ` Haitao Huang
2022-01-14 21:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 17:13 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-12 23:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-12 23:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-13 20:09 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2022-01-13 21:42 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-14 21:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 21:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 22:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 22:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 22:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 22:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 23:05 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-14 23:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 0:01 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-15 0:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 0:41 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-15 1:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 11:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 11:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-17 13:13 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2022-01-18 1:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-18 2:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-18 3:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-18 20:59 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-20 12:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-20 16:52 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-26 14:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 16:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-18 21:18 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-17 13:27 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2022-01-18 21:11 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:28 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 06/25] x86/sgx: Use more generic name for enclave cpumask function Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:29 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 07/25] x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to separate function Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:30 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:11 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-06 17:46 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-07 12:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 08/25] x86/sgx: Make SGX IPI callback available internally Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:36 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 09/25] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 10/25] x86/sgx: Support enclave page permission changes Reinette Chatre
2021-12-02 23:48 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-03 18:18 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 0:32 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-03 18:18 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 18:14 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-03 18:49 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 19:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-03 22:34 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 0:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-04 1:35 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 20:19 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-11 5:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:42 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:12 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 11/25] selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM " Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 12/25] selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page " Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 13/25] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to initialized enclave Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 0:38 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-03 18:47 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:44 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 8:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:12 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-01 15:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-01 17:08 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 14/25] x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:45 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 8:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 15/25] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 16/25] x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:48 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 8:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 17:43 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-21 8:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 17/25] x86/sgx: Support complete page removal Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:49 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 18/25] selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 19/25] selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 20/25] selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 21/25] selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 22/25] selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 23/25] selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 24/25] x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 22:07 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 25/25] selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test Reinette Chatre
2021-12-02 18:30 ` [PATCH 00/25] x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2 Dave Hansen
2021-12-02 20:38 ` Nathaniel McCallum
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=YawAWmodeNaUbzV8@iki.fi \
--to=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=cathy.zhang@intel.com \
--cc=cedric.xing@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=haitao.huang@intel.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mark.shanahan@intel.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=reinette.chatre@intel.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).