From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/5] allow unprivileged overlay mounts
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2019 08:42:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87r231rlfj.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191025112917.22518-1-mszeredi@redhat.com> (Miklos Szeredi's message of "Fri, 25 Oct 2019 13:29:12 +0200")
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> writes:
> Hi Eric,
>
> Can you please have a look at this patchset?
>
> The most interesting one is the last oneliner adding FS_USERNS_MOUNT;
> whether I'm correct in stating that this isn't going to introduce any
> holes, or not...
I will take some time and dig through this.
>From a robustness standpoint I worry about the stackable filesystem
side. As that is uniquely an attack vector with overlayfs.
There is definitely demand for this.
> Thanks,
> Miklos
>
> ---
> Miklos Szeredi (5):
> ovl: document permission model
> ovl: ignore failure to copy up unknown xattrs
> vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation
> ovl: user xattr
> ovl: unprivieged mounts
>
> Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt | 44 +++++++++++++
> fs/char_dev.c | 3 +
> fs/namei.c | 17 ++---
> fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 34 +++++++---
> fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 2 +-
> fs/overlayfs/export.c | 2 +-
> fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 39 ++++++------
> fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 56 +++++++++--------
> fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 81 +++++++++++++++---------
> fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 +
> fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 5 +-
> fs/overlayfs/super.c | 53 +++++++++++-----
> fs/overlayfs/util.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++----
> include/linux/device_cgroup.h | 3 +
> 14 files changed, 298 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-25 13:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-25 11:29 [RFC PATCH 0/5] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 1/5] ovl: document permission model Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 2/5] ovl: ignore failure to copy up unknown xattrs Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 3/5] vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 4/5] ovl: user xattr Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-26 13:50 ` Amir Goldstein
2019-10-25 11:29 ` [RFC PATCH 5/5] ovl: unprivieged mounts Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-25 11:35 ` [RFC PATCH 0/5] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Miklos Szeredi
2019-10-29 17:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-02-24 2:45 ` Ian Kent
2019-10-25 13:42 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2019-11-25 15:14 ` Miklos Szeredi
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