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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"David Laight" <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
	"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Radim Krcmár" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Ard.Biesheuvel@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2017 14:24:30 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170915122430.pnroy6vsg53warel@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170822165248.rkbluikdgduu7ucy@pd.tnic>

On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 06:52:48PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> As always, the devil is in the detail.

Ok, actually we can make this much simpler by using a static key. A
conceptual patch below - I only need to fix that crazy include hell I'm
stepping into with this.

In any case, we were talking about having a static branch already so
this fits the whole strategy.

---
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index d174b1c4a99e..e45369158632 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
 unsigned int sev_enabled __section(.data) = 0;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enabled);
 
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__sev);
+
 /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
 static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 
@@ -790,6 +792,7 @@ void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 		/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
 		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
 		sev_enabled = 1;
+		static_branch_enable(&__sev);
 		return;
 	}
 
diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
index ea0831a8dbe2..f3ab965a3d6a 100644
--- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #ifndef __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
 #define __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
 
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
@@ -26,6 +28,8 @@
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
+extern struct static_key_false __sev;
+
 static inline bool sme_active(void)
 {
 	return (sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled);
@@ -33,7 +37,7 @@ static inline bool sme_active(void)
 
 static inline bool sev_active(void)
 {
-	return (sme_me_mask && sev_enabled);
+	return static_branch_unlikely(&__sev);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-09-15 12:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  5:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26  4:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47     ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02  4:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26         ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45             ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24               ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-09-15 14:13                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27                         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03  2:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov

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