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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"Lu Baolu" <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Benjamin Herrenschmidt" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
	"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 11:47:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <facf3ac6-ebda-57a7-f961-6029b3ac7be7@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170726042840.GB30702@nazgul.tnic>

On 7/25/2017 11:28 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:43PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>
>> Provide support for Secure Encyrpted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
> 
> Your subject misses a verb and patch subjects should have an active verb
> denoting what the patch does. The sentence above is a good example.

Yup, will update.

> 
>> support defines a flag that is used by the kernel to determine if it is
>> running with SEV active.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 ++
>>   arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          | 3 +++
>>   include/linux/mem_encrypt.h        | 8 +++++++-
>>   3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> ...
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> index 0fbd092..1e4643e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> @@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
>>   unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
>>   
>> +unsigned int sev_enabled __section(.data) = 0;
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enabled);
> 
> So sev_enabled is a pure bool used only in bool context, not like
> sme_me_mask whose value is read too. Which means, you can make the
> former static and query it only through accessor functions.

If it's made static then the sme_active()/sev_active() inline functions
would need to be turned into functions within the mem_encrypt.c file. So
there's a trade-off to do that, which is the better one?

> 
>>   /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
>>   static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>>   
>> diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
>> index 1255f09..ea0831a 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
>> @@ -22,12 +22,18 @@
>>   #else	/* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>>   
>>   #define sme_me_mask	0UL
>> +#define sev_enabled	0
>>   
>>   #endif	/* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>>   
>>   static inline bool sme_active(void)
>>   {
>> -	return !!sme_me_mask;
>> +	return (sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled);
> 
> You don't need the brackets. Below too.

Ok.

> 
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline bool sev_active(void)
>> +{
>> +	return (sme_me_mask && sev_enabled);
>>   }
> 
> So this is confusing, TBH. SME and SEV are not mutually exclusive and
> yet the logic here says so. Why?
> 
> I mean, in the hypervisor context, sme_active() is still true.
> 
> /me is confused.

The kernel needs to distinguish between running under SME and running
under SEV. SME and SEV are similar but not the same. The trampoline code
is a good example.  Before paging is activated, SME will access all
memory as decrypted, but SEV will access all memory as encrypted.  So
when APs are being brought up under SME the trampoline area cannot be
encrypted, whereas under SEV the trampoline area must be encrypted.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-07-26 16:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  5:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26  4:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-07-27 13:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47     ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02  4:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26         ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45             ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27                         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03  2:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov

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