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From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, guoren@kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, will@kernel.org,
	ardb@kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, deller@gmx.de, x86@kernel.org,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	mingo@redhat.com, geert@linux-m68k.org,
	linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	green.hu@gmail.com, shorne@gmail.com, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	nickhu@andestech.com, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	dinguyen@kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, richard@nod.at,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	davem@davemloft.net
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/18] x86: remove __range_not_ok()
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:19 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-6-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The __range_not_ok() helper is an x86 (and sparc64) specific interface
that does roughly the same thing as __access_ok(), but with different
calling conventions.

Change this to use the normal interface in order for consistency as we
clean up all access_ok() implementations.

This changes the limit from TASK_SIZE to TASK_SIZE_MAX, which Al points
out is the right thing do do here anyway.

The callers have to use __access_ok() instead of the normal access_ok()
though, because on x86 that contains a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() check that cannot
be used inside of NMI context while tracing.

Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YgsUKcXGR7r4nINj@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/x86/events/core.c         |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c        |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c
index e686c5e0537b..eef816fc216d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c
@@ -2794,7 +2794,7 @@ perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *re
 static inline int
 valid_user_frame(const void __user *fp, unsigned long size)
 {
-	return (__range_not_ok(fp, size, TASK_SIZE) == 0);
+	return __access_ok(fp, size);
 }
 
 static unsigned long get_segment_base(unsigned int segment)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ac96f9b2d64b..79c4869ccdd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,8 +16,10 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+
 	/*
 	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
 	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
@@ -35,10 +37,10 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un
 	return unlikely(addr > limit);
 }
 
-#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
+#define __access_ok(addr, size)						\
 ({									\
 	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
+	!__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size);	\
 })
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
@@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
 #define access_ok(addr, size)					\
 ({									\
 	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX));		\
+	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));				\
 })
 
 extern int __get_user_1(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index 53de044e5654..da534fb7b5c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static int copy_code(struct pt_regs *regs, u8 *buf, unsigned long src,
 	 * Make sure userspace isn't trying to trick us into dumping kernel
 	 * memory by pointing the userspace instruction pointer at it.
 	 */
-	if (__chk_range_not_ok(src, nbytes, TASK_SIZE_MAX))
+	if (!__access_ok((void __user *)src, nbytes))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c
index 15b058eefc4e..ee117fcf46ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ copy_stack_frame(const struct stack_frame_user __user *fp,
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	if (__range_not_ok(fp, sizeof(*frame), TASK_SIZE))
+	if (!__access_ok(fp, sizeof(*frame)))
 		return 0;
 
 	ret = 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
index c3e8a62ca561..ad0139d25401 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	unsigned long ret;
 
-	if (__range_not_ok(from, n, TASK_SIZE))
+	if (!__access_ok(from, n))
 		return n;
 
 	if (!nmi_uaccess_okay())
-- 
2.29.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-16 13:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-16 13:13 [PATCH v2 00/18] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] uaccess: fix nios2 and microblaze get_user_8() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:35   ` David Laight
2022-02-18  6:25   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-25  4:28   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:25   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann [this message]
2022-02-18  6:28   ` [PATCH v2 05/18] x86: remove __range_not_ok() Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:29     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 15:45     ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:29   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] nios2: drop access_ok() check from __put_user() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:29   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-23 23:30   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-24  7:05     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:30   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  8:55   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] mips: use simpler access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 13:24   ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 14:31     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 15:21       ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36       ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 20:05     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23  7:41   ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  9:26     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] m68k: fix access_ok for coldfire Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:30   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  9:00   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:24     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] arm64: simplify access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] uaccess: fix type mismatch warnings from access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:31   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-25  4:30   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 19:15   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18  7:16     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:30     ` David Laight
2022-02-18 18:07       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18  6:34   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:23     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:04   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-24  8:29   ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:41     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-25  4:31   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] lib/test_lockup: fix kernel pointer check for separate address spaces Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:35   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:15     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 18:34   ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 22:01       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] sh: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:36   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] ia64: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] uaccess: drop maining CONFIG_SET_FS users Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 18:44   ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 22:02     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 22:36   ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-18  6:37   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:10     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 10:18   ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-24  8:45   ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-25  4:33   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-17  7:20 ` [PATCH v2 00/18] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:49   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  2:21     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  9:20       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  1:50   ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 10:01     ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  8:13 ` Arnd Bergmann

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