From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
To: Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Gregory Farnum <gfarnum@redhat.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
stgraber@ubuntu.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/14] ceph: support idmapped mounts
Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 09:08:46 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0a42c5d0-0479-e60e-ac84-be3b915c62d9@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEivzxeQGkemxVwJ148b_+OmntUAWkdL==yMiTMN+GPyaLkFPg@mail.gmail.com>
Sorry, not sure, why my last reply wasn't sent out.
Do it again.
On 6/26/23 19:23, Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 26, 2023 at 4:12 AM Xiubo Li<xiubli@redhat.com> wrote:
>> On 6/24/23 15:11, Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn wrote:
>>> On Sat, Jun 24, 2023 at 3:37 AM Xiubo Li<xiubli@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>> > > >
>>>> > > > I thought about this too and came to the same conclusion, that
>>>> UID/GID
>>>> > > > based
>>>> > > > restriction can be applied dynamically, so detecting it on mount-time
>>>> > > > helps not so much.
>>>> > > >
>>>> > > For this you please raise one PR to ceph first to support this, and in
>>>> > > the PR we can discuss more for the MDS auth caps. And after the PR
>>>> > > getting merged then in this patch series you need to check the
>>>> > > corresponding option or flag to determine whether could the idmap
>>>> > > mounting succeed.
>>>> >
>>>> > I'm sorry but I don't understand what we want to support here. Do we
>>>> want to
>>>> > add some new ceph request that allows to check if UID/GID-based
>>>> > permissions are applied for
>>>> > a particular ceph client user?
>>>>
>>>> IMO we should prevent user to set UID/GID-based permisions caps from
>>>> ceph side.
>>>>
>>>> As I know currently there is no way to prevent users to set MDS auth
>>>> caps, IMO in ceph side at least we need one flag or option to disable
>>>> this once users want this fs cluster sever for idmap mounts use case.
>>> How this should be visible from the user side? We introducing a new
>>> kernel client mount option,
>>> like "nomdscaps", then pass flag to the MDS and MDS should check that
>>> MDS auth permissions
>>> are not applied (on the mount time) and prevent them from being
>>> applied later while session is active. Like that?
>>>
>>> At the same time I'm thinking about protocol extension that adds 2
>>> additional fields for UID/GID. This will allow to correctly
>>> handle everything. I wanted to avoid any changes to the protocol or
>>> server-side things. But if we want to change MDS side,
>>> maybe it's better then to go this way?
> Hi Xiubo,
>
>> There is another way:
>>
>> For each client it will have a dedicated client auth caps, something like:
>>
>> client.foo
>> key: *key*
>> caps: [mds] allow r, allow rw path=/bar
>> caps: [mon] allow r
>> caps: [osd] allow rw tag cephfs data=cephfs_a
> Do we have any infrastructure to get this caps list on the client side
> right now?
> (I've taken a quick look through the code and can't find anything
> related to this.)
I am afraid there is no.
But just after the following ceph PR gets merged it will be easy to do this:
https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/48027
This is still under testing.
>> When mounting this client with idmap enabled, then we can just check the
>> above [mds] caps, if there has any UID/GID based permissions set, then
>> fail the mounting.
> understood
>
>> That means this kind client couldn't be mounted with idmap enabled.
>>
>> Also we need to make sure that once there is a mount with idmap enabled,
>> the corresponding client caps couldn't be append the UID/GID based
>> permissions. This need a patch in ceph anyway IMO.
> So, yeah we will need to effectively block cephx permission changes if
> there is a client mounted with
> an active idmapped mount. Sounds as something that require massive
> changes on the server side.
Maybe no need much, it should be simple IMO. But I am not 100% sure.
> At the same time this will just block users from using idmapped mounts
> along with UID/GID restrictions.
>
> If you want me to change server-side anyways, isn't it better just to
> extend cephfs protocol to properly
> handle UID/GIDs with idmapped mounts? (It was originally proposed by Christian.)
> What we need to do here is to add a separate UID/GID fields for ceph
> requests those are creating a new inodes
> (like mknod, symlink, etc).
BTW, could you explain it more ? How could this resolve the issue we are
discussing here ?
Thanks
- Xiubo
>
> Kind regards,
> Alex
>
>> Thanks
>>
>> - Xiubo
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Alex
>>>
>>>> Thanks
>>>>
>>>> - Xiubo
>>>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-04 1:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-08 15:42 [PATCH v5 00/14] ceph: support idmapped mounts Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 01/14] fs: export mnt_idmap_get/mnt_idmap_put Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 02/14] ceph: stash idmapping in mdsc request Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 03/14] ceph: handle idmapped mounts in create_request_message() Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 04/14] ceph: pass an idmapping to mknod/symlink/mkdir/rename Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 05/14] ceph: allow idmapped getattr inode op Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 06/14] ceph: allow idmapped permission " Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 07/14] ceph: pass idmap to __ceph_setattr Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 08/14] ceph: allow idmapped setattr inode op Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 09/14] ceph/acl: allow idmapped set_acl " Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 10/14] ceph/file: allow idmapped atomic_open " Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 11/14] ceph: pass idmap to ceph_do_getattr Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 12/14] ceph: pass idmap to __ceph_setxattr Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 13/14] ceph: pass idmap to ceph_open/ioctl_set_layout Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 14/14] ceph: allow idmapped mounts Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-09 1:57 ` [PATCH v5 00/14] ceph: support " Xiubo Li
2023-06-09 8:59 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-09 9:59 ` Christian Brauner
2023-06-09 10:12 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-13 1:43 ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-13 12:46 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-14 9:45 ` Christian Brauner
2023-06-13 14:53 ` Gregory Farnum
2023-06-13 16:27 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-14 1:52 ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-14 12:39 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
[not found] ` <CAEivzxcr99sERxZX17rZ5jW9YSzAWYvAjOOhBH+FqRoso2=yng@mail.gmail.com>
2023-06-15 5:08 ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-15 11:05 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-15 12:29 ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-15 12:54 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-21 16:55 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-26 1:04 ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-24 1:36 ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-24 7:11 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-26 2:12 ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-26 11:23 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-26 11:49 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-04 1:10 ` Xiubo Li
2023-07-04 1:08 ` Xiubo Li [this message]
2023-07-14 12:57 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-18 1:44 ` Xiubo Li
2023-07-18 14:49 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-19 11:57 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-20 6:36 ` Xiubo Li
2023-07-20 6:41 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-21 15:43 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-24 1:02 ` Xiubo Li
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