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From: Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
To: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Cc: Gregory Farnum <gfarnum@redhat.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	stgraber@ubuntu.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/14] ceph: support idmapped mounts
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2023 13:49:27 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEivzxeBNOeufOraU27Y+qVApVjAoLhzwPnw0HSkqSt6P3MV9w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEivzxeQGkemxVwJ148b_+OmntUAWkdL==yMiTMN+GPyaLkFPg@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Jun 26, 2023 at 1:23 PM Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
<aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 26, 2023 at 4:12 AM Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 6/24/23 15:11, Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> > > On Sat, Jun 24, 2023 at 3:37 AM Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> wrote:
> > >> [...]
> > >>
> > >>   > > >
> > >>   > > > I thought about this too and came to the same conclusion, that
> > >> UID/GID
> > >>   > > > based
> > >>   > > > restriction can be applied dynamically, so detecting it on mount-time
> > >>   > > > helps not so much.
> > >>   > > >
> > >>   > > For this you please raise one PR to ceph first to support this, and in
> > >>   > > the PR we can discuss more for the MDS auth caps. And after the PR
> > >>   > > getting merged then in this patch series you need to check the
> > >>   > > corresponding option or flag to determine whether could the idmap
> > >>   > > mounting succeed.
> > >>   >
> > >>   > I'm sorry but I don't understand what we want to support here. Do we
> > >> want to
> > >>   > add some new ceph request that allows to check if UID/GID-based
> > >>   > permissions are applied for
> > >>   > a particular ceph client user?
> > >>
> > >> IMO we should prevent user to set UID/GID-based permisions caps from
> > >> ceph side.
> > >>
> > >> As I know currently there is no way to prevent users to set MDS auth
> > >> caps, IMO in ceph side at least we need one flag or option to disable
> > >> this once users want this fs cluster sever for idmap mounts use case.
> > > How this should be visible from the user side? We introducing a new
> > > kernel client mount option,
> > > like "nomdscaps", then pass flag to the MDS and MDS should check that
> > > MDS auth permissions
> > > are not applied (on the mount time) and prevent them from being
> > > applied later while session is active. Like that?
> > >
> > > At the same time I'm thinking about protocol extension that adds 2
> > > additional fields for UID/GID. This will allow to correctly
> > > handle everything. I wanted to avoid any changes to the protocol or
> > > server-side things. But if we want to change MDS side,
> > > maybe it's better then to go this way?
>
> Hi Xiubo,
>
> >
> > There is another way:
> >
> > For each client it will have a dedicated client auth caps, something like:
> >
> > client.foo
> >    key: *key*
> >    caps: [mds] allow r, allow rw path=/bar
> >    caps: [mon] allow r
> >    caps: [osd] allow rw tag cephfs data=cephfs_a
>
> Do we have any infrastructure to get this caps list on the client side
> right now?
> (I've taken a quick look through the code and can't find anything
> related to this.)

I've found your PR that looks related https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/48027

>
> >
> > When mounting this client with idmap enabled, then we can just check the
> > above [mds] caps, if there has any UID/GID based permissions set, then
> > fail the mounting.
>
> understood
>
> >
> > That means this kind client couldn't be mounted with idmap enabled.
> >
> > Also we need to make sure that once there is a mount with idmap enabled,
> > the corresponding client caps couldn't be append the UID/GID based
> > permissions. This need a patch in ceph anyway IMO.
>
> So, yeah we will need to effectively block cephx permission changes if
> there is a client mounted with
> an active idmapped mount. Sounds as something that require massive
> changes on the server side.
>
> At the same time this will just block users from using idmapped mounts
> along with UID/GID restrictions.
>
> If you want me to change server-side anyways, isn't it better just to
> extend cephfs protocol to properly
> handle UID/GIDs with idmapped mounts? (It was originally proposed by Christian.)
> What we need to do here is to add a separate UID/GID fields for ceph
> requests those are creating a new inodes
> (like mknod, symlink, etc).
>
> Kind regards,
> Alex
>
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > - Xiubo
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Alex
> > >
> > >> Thanks
> > >>
> > >> - Xiubo
> > >>
> >

  reply	other threads:[~2023-06-26 11:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-08 15:42 [PATCH v5 00/14] ceph: support idmapped mounts Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 01/14] fs: export mnt_idmap_get/mnt_idmap_put Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 02/14] ceph: stash idmapping in mdsc request Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 03/14] ceph: handle idmapped mounts in create_request_message() Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 04/14] ceph: pass an idmapping to mknod/symlink/mkdir/rename Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 05/14] ceph: allow idmapped getattr inode op Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 06/14] ceph: allow idmapped permission " Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 07/14] ceph: pass idmap to __ceph_setattr Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 08/14] ceph: allow idmapped setattr inode op Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 09/14] ceph/acl: allow idmapped set_acl " Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 10/14] ceph/file: allow idmapped atomic_open " Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 11/14] ceph: pass idmap to ceph_do_getattr Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 12/14] ceph: pass idmap to __ceph_setxattr Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 13/14] ceph: pass idmap to ceph_open/ioctl_set_layout Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-08 15:42 ` [PATCH v5 14/14] ceph: allow idmapped mounts Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-09  1:57 ` [PATCH v5 00/14] ceph: support " Xiubo Li
2023-06-09  8:59   ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-09  9:59     ` Christian Brauner
2023-06-09 10:12       ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-13  1:43         ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-13 12:46           ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-14  9:45             ` Christian Brauner
2023-06-13 14:53           ` Gregory Farnum
2023-06-13 16:27             ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-14  1:52             ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-14 12:39               ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
     [not found]               ` <CAEivzxcr99sERxZX17rZ5jW9YSzAWYvAjOOhBH+FqRoso2=yng@mail.gmail.com>
2023-06-15  5:08                 ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-15 11:05                   ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-15 12:29                   ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-15 12:54                     ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-21 16:55                       ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-26  1:04                       ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-24  1:36                   ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-24  7:11                     ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-26  2:12                       ` Xiubo Li
2023-06-26 11:23                         ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-06-26 11:49                           ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn [this message]
2023-07-04  1:10                             ` Xiubo Li
2023-07-04  1:08                           ` Xiubo Li
2023-07-14 12:57                             ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-18  1:44                               ` Xiubo Li
2023-07-18 14:49                                 ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-19 11:57                                   ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-20  6:36                                     ` Xiubo Li
2023-07-20  6:41                                       ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-21 15:43                                       ` Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
2023-07-24  1:02                                         ` Xiubo Li

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