* [PATCH -next] x86/xen: Fix read buffer overflow
@ 2018-12-18 8:19 YueHaibing
2018-12-18 8:31 ` Juergen Gross
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: YueHaibing @ 2018-12-18 8:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: boris.ostrovsky, jgross, sstabellini, tglx, mingo, bp, hpa
Cc: linux-kernel, xen-devel, x86, YueHaibing
Fix smatch warning:
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:649 get_trap_addr() error:
buffer overflow 'early_idt_handler_array' 32 <= 32
Fixes: 42b3a4cb5609 ("x86/xen: Support early interrupts in xen pv guests")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
---
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 2f6787f..81f200d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
if (nr == ARRAY_SIZE(trap_array) &&
*addr >= (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0] &&
- *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]) {
+ *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS - 1]) {
nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) /
EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE;
*addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr];
--
2.7.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH -next] x86/xen: Fix read buffer overflow
2018-12-18 8:19 [PATCH -next] x86/xen: Fix read buffer overflow YueHaibing
@ 2018-12-18 8:31 ` Juergen Gross
2018-12-18 10:42 ` YueHaibing
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2018-12-18 8:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: YueHaibing, boris.ostrovsky, sstabellini, tglx, mingo, bp, hpa
Cc: linux-kernel, xen-devel, x86
On 18/12/2018 09:19, YueHaibing wrote:
> Fix smatch warning:
>
> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:649 get_trap_addr() error:
> buffer overflow 'early_idt_handler_array' 32 <= 32
>
> Fixes: 42b3a4cb5609 ("x86/xen: Support early interrupts in xen pv guests")
> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
> index 2f6787f..81f200d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
>
> if (nr == ARRAY_SIZE(trap_array) &&
> *addr >= (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0] &&
> - *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]) {
> + *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS - 1]) {
> nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) /
> EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE;
> *addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr];
>
No, this patch is wrong.
early_idt_handler_array is a 2-dimensional array:
const char
early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS][EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE];
So above code doesn't do an out of bounds array access, but checks for
*addr being in the array or outside of it (note the "<" used for the
test).
Juergen
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH -next] x86/xen: Fix read buffer overflow
2018-12-18 8:31 ` Juergen Gross
@ 2018-12-18 10:42 ` YueHaibing
2018-12-18 11:28 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: YueHaibing @ 2018-12-18 10:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross, boris.ostrovsky, sstabellini, tglx, mingo, bp, hpa
Cc: linux-kernel, xen-devel, x86
On 2018/12/18 16:31, Juergen Gross wrote:
> On 18/12/2018 09:19, YueHaibing wrote:
>> Fix smatch warning:
>>
>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:649 get_trap_addr() error:
>> buffer overflow 'early_idt_handler_array' 32 <= 32
>>
>> Fixes: 42b3a4cb5609 ("x86/xen: Support early interrupts in xen pv guests")
>> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>> index 2f6787f..81f200d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
>>
>> if (nr == ARRAY_SIZE(trap_array) &&
>> *addr >= (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0] &&
>> - *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]) {
>> + *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS - 1]) {
>> nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) /
>> EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE;
>> *addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr];
>>
>
> No, this patch is wrong.
>
> early_idt_handler_array is a 2-dimensional array:
>
> const char
> early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS][EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE];
>
> So above code doesn't do an out of bounds array access, but checks for
> *addr being in the array or outside of it (note the "<" used for the
> test).
Thank you for your explanation.
>
>
> Juergen
>
> .
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH -next] x86/xen: Fix read buffer overflow
2018-12-18 10:42 ` YueHaibing
@ 2018-12-18 11:28 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-12-18 17:35 ` Boris Ostrovsky
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Cooper @ 2018-12-18 11:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: YueHaibing, Juergen Gross, boris.ostrovsky, sstabellini, tglx,
mingo, bp, hpa
Cc: xen-devel, x86, linux-kernel
On 18/12/2018 10:42, YueHaibing wrote:
> On 2018/12/18 16:31, Juergen Gross wrote:
>> On 18/12/2018 09:19, YueHaibing wrote:
>>> Fix smatch warning:
>>>
>>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:649 get_trap_addr() error:
>>> buffer overflow 'early_idt_handler_array' 32 <= 32
>>>
>>> Fixes: 42b3a4cb5609 ("x86/xen: Support early interrupts in xen pv guests")
>>> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>> index 2f6787f..81f200d 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
>>>
>>> if (nr == ARRAY_SIZE(trap_array) &&
>>> *addr >= (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0] &&
>>> - *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]) {
>>> + *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS - 1]) {
>>> nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) /
>>> EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE;
>>> *addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr];
>>>
>> No, this patch is wrong.
>>
>> early_idt_handler_array is a 2-dimensional array:
>>
>> const char
>> early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS][EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE];
>>
>> So above code doesn't do an out of bounds array access, but checks for
>> *addr being in the array or outside of it (note the "<" used for the
>> test).
> Thank you for your explanation.
This looks like a smatch bug. I'd feed it back upstream.
It is explicitly permitted in the C spec to construct a pointer to
one-past-the-end of an array, for the purposes of a < comparison.
I'm not entirely sure where the "32 <= 32" statement is coming from.
~Andrew
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH -next] x86/xen: Fix read buffer overflow
2018-12-18 11:28 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
@ 2018-12-18 17:35 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-12-18 21:56 ` Dan Carpenter
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Boris Ostrovsky @ 2018-12-18 17:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Cooper, YueHaibing, Juergen Gross, sstabellini, tglx,
mingo, bp, hpa
Cc: xen-devel, x86, linux-kernel, Dan Carpenter
On 12/18/18 6:28 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 18/12/2018 10:42, YueHaibing wrote:
>> On 2018/12/18 16:31, Juergen Gross wrote:
>>> On 18/12/2018 09:19, YueHaibing wrote:
>>>> Fix smatch warning:
>>>>
>>>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:649 get_trap_addr() error:
>>>> buffer overflow 'early_idt_handler_array' 32 <= 32
>>>>
>>>> Fixes: 42b3a4cb5609 ("x86/xen: Support early interrupts in xen pv guests")
>>>> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>> index 2f6787f..81f200d 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
>>>>
>>>> if (nr == ARRAY_SIZE(trap_array) &&
>>>> *addr >= (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0] &&
>>>> - *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]) {
>>>> + *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS - 1]) {
>>>> nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) /
>>>> EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE;
>>>> *addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr];
>>>>
>>> No, this patch is wrong.
>>>
>>> early_idt_handler_array is a 2-dimensional array:
>>>
>>> const char
>>> early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS][EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE];
>>>
>>> So above code doesn't do an out of bounds array access, but checks for
>>> *addr being in the array or outside of it (note the "<" used for the
>>> test).
>> Thank you for your explanation.
> This looks like a smatch bug. I'd feed it back upstream.
+Dan
>
> It is explicitly permitted in the C spec to construct a pointer to
> one-past-the-end of an array, for the purposes of a < comparison.
>
> I'm not entirely sure where the "32 <= 32" statement is coming from.
>
> ~Andrew
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH -next] x86/xen: Fix read buffer overflow
2018-12-18 17:35 ` Boris Ostrovsky
@ 2018-12-18 21:56 ` Dan Carpenter
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dan Carpenter @ 2018-12-18 21:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Boris Ostrovsky
Cc: Andrew Cooper, YueHaibing, Juergen Gross, sstabellini, tglx,
mingo, bp, hpa, xen-devel, x86, linux-kernel
On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:35:34PM -0500, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 12/18/18 6:28 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> > On 18/12/2018 10:42, YueHaibing wrote:
> >> On 2018/12/18 16:31, Juergen Gross wrote:
> >>> On 18/12/2018 09:19, YueHaibing wrote:
> >>>> Fix smatch warning:
> >>>>
> >>>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:649 get_trap_addr() error:
> >>>> buffer overflow 'early_idt_handler_array' 32 <= 32
> >>>>
> >>>> Fixes: 42b3a4cb5609 ("x86/xen: Support early interrupts in xen pv guests")
> >>>> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
> >>>> ---
> >>>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
> >>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>>>
> >>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
> >>>> index 2f6787f..81f200d 100644
> >>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
> >>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
> >>>> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
> >>>>
> >>>> if (nr == ARRAY_SIZE(trap_array) &&
> >>>> *addr >= (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0] &&
> >>>> - *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]) {
> >>>> + *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS - 1]) {
> >>>> nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) /
> >>>> EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE;
> >>>> *addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr];
> >>>>
> >>> No, this patch is wrong.
> >>>
> >>> early_idt_handler_array is a 2-dimensional array:
> >>>
> >>> const char
> >>> early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS][EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE];
> >>>
> >>> So above code doesn't do an out of bounds array access, but checks for
> >>> *addr being in the array or outside of it (note the "<" used for the
> >>> test).
> >> Thank you for your explanation.
> > This looks like a smatch bug. I'd feed it back upstream.
>
> +Dan
>
Yep. Thanks for the bug report. Let me test my fix and push it later
this week.
Btw, it might help readability slightly if we made it more clear we were
doing pointer math:
*addr >= (void *)&early_idt_handler_array[0] &&
*addr < (void *)&early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]) {
nr = (*addr - (void *)&early_idt_handler_array[0]) /
Regardless, this is definitely a bug in Smatch and I will push a fix.
regards,
dan carpenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2018-12-18 21:57 UTC | newest]
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2018-12-18 8:19 [PATCH -next] x86/xen: Fix read buffer overflow YueHaibing
2018-12-18 8:31 ` Juergen Gross
2018-12-18 10:42 ` YueHaibing
2018-12-18 11:28 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2018-12-18 17:35 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-12-18 21:56 ` Dan Carpenter
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