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From: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
	djm@mindrot.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, luto@mit.edu, mingo@elte.hu,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
	borislav.petkov@amd.com, oleg@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de, dhowells@redhat.com,
	daniel.lezcano@free.fr, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
	mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, indan@nul.nu, mcgrathr@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2012 19:21:09 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1327749669.15441.9.camel@cr0> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1327706681-11959-2-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

On Fri, 2012-01-27 at 17:24 -0600, Will Drewry wrote:
> +config SECCOMP_FILTER
> +       bool "Enable seccomp-based system call filtering"
> +       select SECCOMP

Is 'depends on SECCOMP' better?

> +       help
> +         This option provide support for limiting the accessibility
> of

s/provide/provides/

> +         systems calls at a task-level using a dynamically defined
> policy.


s/systems/system/

> +
> +         System call filtering policy is expressed by the user using
> +         a Berkeley Packet Filter program.  The program is attached
> using

s/the user using//

> +         prctl(2).  For every system call the task makes, its number,
> +         arguments, and other metadata will be evaluated by the
> attached
> +         filter program.  The result determines if the system call
> may
> +         may proceed or if the task should be terminated.

One more "may"... and "be proceeded"

> +
> +         This behavior is meant to aid security-conscious software in
> +         its ability to minimize the risk of running potentially
> +         risky code.
> +
> +         See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for more detail.
> + 


Thanks.


  reply	other threads:[~2012-01-28 11:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-01-27 23:24 [PATCH v5 1/3] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-01-27 23:24 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-01-28 11:21   ` Cong Wang [this message]
2012-01-28 20:13     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-28 16:28   ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-28 19:50     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-29  4:39   ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-29 20:27     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30  2:37       ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-30 22:26         ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:29           ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:42             ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:59             ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-31  1:42           ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-31 11:04             ` Will Drewry
2012-01-31 15:18               ` Will Drewry
2012-02-01  1:36               ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-01  9:02                 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-01 10:56                   ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-01 17:34                 ` Roland McGrath
2012-01-27 23:24 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-01-27 23:41 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Greg KH
2012-01-27 23:47   ` Will Drewry
2012-01-28  0:38     ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-28 11:13     ` Cong Wang
2012-01-28 21:06       ` Will Drewry

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