From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
djm@mindrot.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, jmorris@namei.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, luto@mit.edu, mingo@elte.hu,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
borislav.petkov@amd.com, oleg@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de, dhowells@redhat.com,
daniel.lezcano@free.fr, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, indan@nul.nu, mcgrathr@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2012 12:13:13 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABqD9hZh-Rkjgvn8fu2PUf-KRHmBEiai3cJhcoPZ8-FHbW7BzQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1327749669.15441.9.camel@cr0>
On Sat, Jan 28, 2012 at 3:21 AM, Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2012-01-27 at 17:24 -0600, Will Drewry wrote:
>> +config SECCOMP_FILTER
>> + bool "Enable seccomp-based system call filtering"
>> + select SECCOMP
>
> Is 'depends on SECCOMP' better?
Either way is fine for me. I chose select so that SECCOMP_FILTER
wouldn't be hidden if SECCOMP was off when they hit the security menu.
>
>> + help
>> + This option provide support for limiting the accessibility
>> of
>
> s/provide/provides/
>
>> + systems calls at a task-level using a dynamically defined
>> policy.
>
>
> s/systems/system/
>
>> +
>> + System call filtering policy is expressed by the user using
>> + a Berkeley Packet Filter program. The program is attached
>> using
>
> s/the user using//
>
>> + prctl(2). For every system call the task makes, its number,
>> + arguments, and other metadata will be evaluated by the
>> attached
>> + filter program. The result determines if the system call
>> may
>> + may proceed or if the task should be terminated.
>
> One more "may"... and "be proceeded"
>
>> +
>> + This behavior is meant to aid security-conscious software in
>> + its ability to minimize the risk of running potentially
>> + risky code.
>> +
>> + See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for more detail.
>> +
>
>
> Thanks.
Thanks! Cleaned up, as recommended, and slightly reworded. I'll
include the updates in the next salvo.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-28 20:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-27 23:24 [PATCH v5 1/3] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-01-27 23:24 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-01-28 11:21 ` Cong Wang
2012-01-28 20:13 ` Will Drewry [this message]
2012-01-28 16:28 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-28 19:50 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-29 4:39 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-29 20:27 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 2:37 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-30 22:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:29 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:42 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:59 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-31 1:42 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-01-31 11:04 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-31 15:18 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-01 1:36 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-01 9:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-01 10:56 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-01 17:34 ` Roland McGrath
2012-01-27 23:24 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-01-27 23:41 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Greg KH
2012-01-27 23:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-28 0:38 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-28 11:13 ` Cong Wang
2012-01-28 21:06 ` Will Drewry
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