[PATCH] char random: fix boot id uniqueness race (v2)

[PATCH] char random: fix boot id uniqueness race (v2)

[Mathieu Desnoyers]

The proc file /proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently
by user-space processes. If two (or more) user-space processes
concurrently read boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race
can occur making boot_id differ between the reads. Because the whole
point of the boot id is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this
by protecting this operation with a mutex, and introduce a
boot_id_generated flag, along with appropriate memory barriers, to let
the fast-path know if the boot ID has been generated without having to
hold the mutex.

I propose this approach rather than setting it up within an initcall(),
because letting execution randomness add to entropy before populating
the boot id seems to be a wanted property. Also, populating it lazily
rather than at boot time only makes the performance hit be taken when
boot_id is being read.


Q: Why are these memory barriers required ? Aren't the mutexes already
   dealing with ordering ?

The need for memory barriers is a consequence of letting the fast-path
run without holding this mutex.

Here is the race dealt with by the smp_rmb()/smp_wmb(). I'm showing the
result of reversed write order here:

CPU A                             CPU B

Load boot_id_generated            
  (test -> false)
mutex_lock(&boot_id_mutex)
  (implied memory barrier
   with acquire semantic)
Load boot_id_generated again
   (test -> false)
boot_id_generated = 1
  (both the compiler and
   CPU are free to reorder
   the boot_id_generated
   store before uuid stores)
                                  Load boot_id_generated
                                    (test -> true)
                                  Load uuid content
                                    (races with generate_random_uuid:
                                     result either 0 or corrupted)
                                  Return corrupted uuid.
generate_random_uuid(uuid)
mutex_unlock(&boot_id_mutex)

I prefer not requiring the fast-path to take a mutex, because this
would transform a read-mostly operation into an operation that
requires cache-line exchanges (the mutex). However, if we want the
fast-path to be mutex-free, we need to enforce order with
memory barriers: smp_rmb on the read-side, smp_wmb on the
update-side. Failure to do so leads to the race shown above, where
a corrupted boot_id can be returned.


* Changelog since v1:
- boot_id_mutex is now declared within the proc_do_uuid scope.
- added explanation for memory barriers.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
CC: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |   20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Index: linux-2.6-lttng/drivers/char/random.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6-lttng.orig/drivers/char/random.c
+++ linux-2.6-lttng/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1244,16 +1244,30 @@ static char sysctl_bootid[16];
 static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
 			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	static int boot_id_generated;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(boot_id_mutex);
 	ctl_table fake_table;
 	unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
 
 	uuid = table->data;
 	if (!uuid) {
 		uuid = tmp_uuid;
-		uuid[8] = 0;
-	}
-	if (uuid[8] == 0)
 		generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+	} else {
+		if (unlikely(!ACCESS_ONCE(boot_id_generated))) {
+			mutex_lock(&boot_id_mutex);
+			if (!boot_id_generated) {
+				generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+				/* Store uuid before boot_id_generated. */
+				smp_wmb();
+				boot_id_generated = 1;
+			}
+			mutex_unlock(&boot_id_mutex);
+		} else {
+			/* Load boot_id_generated before uuid */
+			smp_rmb();
+		}
+	}
 
 	sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
 

-- 
Mathieu Desnoyers
Operating System Efficiency R&D Consultant
EfficiOS Inc.
http://www.efficios.com

Re: [PATCH] char random: fix boot id uniqueness race (v2)

[Eric Dumazet]

Le mardi 14 février 2012 à 23:10 -0500, Mathieu Desnoyers a écrit :
> The proc file /proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently
> by user-space processes. If two (or more) user-space processes
> concurrently read boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race
> can occur making boot_id differ between the reads. Because the whole
> point of the boot id is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this
> by protecting this operation with a mutex, and introduce a
> boot_id_generated flag, along with appropriate memory barriers, to let
> the fast-path know if the boot ID has been generated without having to
> hold the mutex.
> 
> I propose this approach rather than setting it up within an initcall(),
> because letting execution randomness add to entropy before populating
> the boot id seems to be a wanted property. Also, populating it lazily
> rather than at boot time only makes the performance hit be taken when
> boot_id is being read.
> 
> 
> Q: Why are these memory barriers required ? Aren't the mutexes already
>    dealing with ordering ?
> 
> The need for memory barriers is a consequence of letting the fast-path
> run without holding this mutex.
> 
> Here is the race dealt with by the smp_rmb()/smp_wmb(). I'm showing the
> result of reversed write order here:
> 
> CPU A                             CPU B
> 
> Load boot_id_generated            
>   (test -> false)
> mutex_lock(&boot_id_mutex)
>   (implied memory barrier
>    with acquire semantic)
> Load boot_id_generated again
>    (test -> false)
> boot_id_generated = 1
>   (both the compiler and
>    CPU are free to reorder
>    the boot_id_generated
>    store before uuid stores)
>                                   Load boot_id_generated
>                                     (test -> true)
>                                   Load uuid content
>                                     (races with generate_random_uuid:
>                                      result either 0 or corrupted)
>                                   Return corrupted uuid.
> generate_random_uuid(uuid)
> mutex_unlock(&boot_id_mutex)
> 
> I prefer not requiring the fast-path to take a mutex, because this
> would transform a read-mostly operation into an operation that
> requires cache-line exchanges (the mutex). However, if we want the
> fast-path to be mutex-free, we need to enforce order with
> memory barriers: smp_rmb on the read-side, smp_wmb on the
> update-side. Failure to do so leads to the race shown above, where
> a corrupted boot_id can be returned.
> 
> 
> * Changelog since v1:
> - boot_id_mutex is now declared within the proc_do_uuid scope.
> - added explanation for memory barriers.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
> CC: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
> CC: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
> ---
>  drivers/char/random.c |   20 +++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> Index: linux-2.6-lttng/drivers/char/random.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux-2.6-lttng.orig/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ linux-2.6-lttng/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -1244,16 +1244,30 @@ static char sysctl_bootid[16];
>  static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
>  			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
>  {
> +	static int boot_id_generated;
> +	static DEFINE_MUTEX(boot_id_mutex);
>  	ctl_table fake_table;
>  	unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
>  
>  	uuid = table->data;
>  	if (!uuid) {
>  		uuid = tmp_uuid;
> -		uuid[8] = 0;
> -	}
> -	if (uuid[8] == 0)
>  		generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> +	} else {
> +		if (unlikely(!ACCESS_ONCE(boot_id_generated))) {
> +			mutex_lock(&boot_id_mutex);
> +			if (!boot_id_generated) {
> +				generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> +				/* Store uuid before boot_id_generated. */
> +				smp_wmb();
> +				boot_id_generated = 1;
> +			}
> +			mutex_unlock(&boot_id_mutex);
> +		} else {
> +			/* Load boot_id_generated before uuid */
> +			smp_rmb();
> +		}
> +	}
>  
>  	sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
>  
> 

This seems overly complex to me.

I doubt this is performance critical path ?

What about a basic patch like :

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 54ca8b2..af6040d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1260,11 +1260,15 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
 	uuid = table->data;
 	if (!uuid) {
 		uuid = tmp_uuid;
-		uuid[8] = 0;
-	}
-	if (uuid[8] == 0)
 		generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+	} else {
+		static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock);
 
+		spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock);
+		if (!uuid[8])
+			generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+		spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
+	}
 	sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
 
 	fake_table.data = buf;

Re: [PATCH] char random: fix boot id uniqueness race (v2)

[Mathieu Desnoyers]

* Eric Dumazet (eric.dumazet@gmail.com) wrote:
> Le mardi 14 février 2012 à 23:10 -0500, Mathieu Desnoyers a écrit :
> > The proc file /proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently
> > by user-space processes. If two (or more) user-space processes
> > concurrently read boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race
> > can occur making boot_id differ between the reads. Because the whole
> > point of the boot id is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this
> > by protecting this operation with a mutex, and introduce a
> > boot_id_generated flag, along with appropriate memory barriers, to let
> > the fast-path know if the boot ID has been generated without having to
> > hold the mutex.
> > 
> > I propose this approach rather than setting it up within an initcall(),
> > because letting execution randomness add to entropy before populating
> > the boot id seems to be a wanted property. Also, populating it lazily
> > rather than at boot time only makes the performance hit be taken when
> > boot_id is being read.
> > 
> > 
> > Q: Why are these memory barriers required ? Aren't the mutexes already
> >    dealing with ordering ?
> > 
> > The need for memory barriers is a consequence of letting the fast-path
> > run without holding this mutex.
> > 
> > Here is the race dealt with by the smp_rmb()/smp_wmb(). I'm showing the
> > result of reversed write order here:
> > 
> > CPU A                             CPU B
> > 
> > Load boot_id_generated            
> >   (test -> false)
> > mutex_lock(&boot_id_mutex)
> >   (implied memory barrier
> >    with acquire semantic)
> > Load boot_id_generated again
> >    (test -> false)
> > boot_id_generated = 1
> >   (both the compiler and
> >    CPU are free to reorder
> >    the boot_id_generated
> >    store before uuid stores)
> >                                   Load boot_id_generated
> >                                     (test -> true)
> >                                   Load uuid content
> >                                     (races with generate_random_uuid:
> >                                      result either 0 or corrupted)
> >                                   Return corrupted uuid.
> > generate_random_uuid(uuid)
> > mutex_unlock(&boot_id_mutex)
> > 
> > I prefer not requiring the fast-path to take a mutex, because this
> > would transform a read-mostly operation into an operation that
> > requires cache-line exchanges (the mutex). However, if we want the
> > fast-path to be mutex-free, we need to enforce order with
> > memory barriers: smp_rmb on the read-side, smp_wmb on the
> > update-side. Failure to do so leads to the race shown above, where
> > a corrupted boot_id can be returned.
> > 
> > 
> > * Changelog since v1:
> > - boot_id_mutex is now declared within the proc_do_uuid scope.
> > - added explanation for memory barriers.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
> > CC: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
> > CC: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
> > CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
> > ---
> >  drivers/char/random.c |   20 +++++++++++++++++---
> >  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > 
> > Index: linux-2.6-lttng/drivers/char/random.c
> > ===================================================================
> > --- linux-2.6-lttng.orig/drivers/char/random.c
> > +++ linux-2.6-lttng/drivers/char/random.c
> > @@ -1244,16 +1244,30 @@ static char sysctl_bootid[16];
> >  static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
> >  			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> >  {
> > +	static int boot_id_generated;
> > +	static DEFINE_MUTEX(boot_id_mutex);
> >  	ctl_table fake_table;
> >  	unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
> >  
> >  	uuid = table->data;
> >  	if (!uuid) {
> >  		uuid = tmp_uuid;
> > -		uuid[8] = 0;
> > -	}
> > -	if (uuid[8] == 0)
> >  		generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> > +	} else {
> > +		if (unlikely(!ACCESS_ONCE(boot_id_generated))) {
> > +			mutex_lock(&boot_id_mutex);
> > +			if (!boot_id_generated) {
> > +				generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> > +				/* Store uuid before boot_id_generated. */
> > +				smp_wmb();
> > +				boot_id_generated = 1;
> > +			}
> > +			mutex_unlock(&boot_id_mutex);
> > +		} else {
> > +			/* Load boot_id_generated before uuid */
> > +			smp_rmb();
> > +		}
> > +	}
> >  
> >  	sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
> >  
> > 
> 
> This seems overly complex to me.
> 
> I doubt this is performance critical path ?

Fair point, I don't see many use-cases where an application would like
to get the boot_id value (which stays constant over an entire kernel
execution) very frequently, unlike /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid.

> 
> What about a basic patch like :
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index 54ca8b2..af6040d 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -1260,11 +1260,15 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
>  	uuid = table->data;
>  	if (!uuid) {
>  		uuid = tmp_uuid;
> -		uuid[8] = 0;
> -	}
> -	if (uuid[8] == 0)
>  		generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> +	} else {
> +		static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock);
>  
> +		spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock);
> +		if (!uuid[8])
> +			generate_random_uuid(uuid);
> +		spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);

That would make sense, as long as we're OK about turning a read-mostly
operation into a fully serialized operation that requires to exchange
the lock between processor cache-lines. But as you point out, it should
be fairly unfrequently used.

Any particular reason to use a spin lock rather than a mutex ? I did put
a mutex in my implementation assuming that it would be a little more
RT-friendly.

Thanks,

Mathieu

> +	}
>  	sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
>  
>  	fake_table.data = buf;
> 
> 
> 

-- 
Mathieu Desnoyers
Operating System Efficiency R&D Consultant
EfficiOS Inc.
http://www.efficios.com

Re: [PATCH] char random: fix boot id uniqueness race (v2)

[Eric Dumazet]

Le mercredi 15 février 2012 à 08:35 -0500, Mathieu Desnoyers a écrit :

> That would make sense, as long as we're OK about turning a read-mostly
> operation into a fully serialized operation that requires to exchange
> the lock between processor cache-lines. But as you point out, it should
> be fairly unfrequently used.
> 
> Any particular reason to use a spin lock rather than a mutex ? I did put
> a mutex in my implementation assuming that it would be a little more
> RT-friendly.

generate_random_uuid(uuid) is very fast and doesnt sleep.