From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: PING^7 (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] Corrections and customization of the SG_IO command whitelist (CVE-2012-4542))
Date: Fri, 24 May 2013 21:35:02 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1369456502.5008.5.camel@dabdike> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAOS58YODjkSF=V7wADqbn_z8c6bmj=r03hWxEs5B1O+1cd0n6g@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, 2013-05-24 at 17:02 +0900, Tejun Heo wrote:
> On Fri, May 24, 2013 at 4:13 PM, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> >> The same filtering table being applied to different classes of
> >> hardware is a software bug, but my point is that the practive
> >> essentially entrusts non-insignificant part of security enforcement to
> >> the hardware itself. The variety of hardware in question is very wide
> >> and significant portion has historically been known to be flaky.
> >
> > Unproven theory, and contradicted by actual practice. Bugs are more
> > common in the handling of borderline conditions, not in the handling of
> > unimplemented commands.
> >
> > If you want to be secure aginst buggy firmware, the commands you have to
> > block are READ and WRITE. Check out the list of existing USB quirks.
>
> Well, I'd actually much prefer disabling CDB whitelisting for all !MMC
> devices if at all possible.
I'll go along with this. I'm also wondering what the problem would be
if we just allowed all commands on either CAP_SYS_RAWIO or opening the
device for write, so we just defer to the filesystem permissions and
restricted read only opens to the basic all device opcodes.
> You're basically arguing that because what
> we have is already broken, it should be okay to break it further.
> Also, RW commands having more quirks doesn't necessarily indicate that
> they tend to be more broken. They just get hammered on a lot in
> various ways so problems on those commands tend to be more noticeable.
I agree with this, so finding a way to get rid of the opcode table seems
to be what we need.
> > You need to allow more commands.
> > The count-me-out knob allows all commands.
> > You cannot always allow all commands.
> > Ergo, you cannot always use the count-me-out knob.
Do we have a real world example of this? Getting the kernel out of the
command filtering business does seem to be a good idea to me.
> The thing is that both approaches aren't perfect here so you can make
> similar type of argument from the other side. If the system wants to
> give out raw hardware access to VMs, requiring it to delegate the
> device fully could be reasonable. Not ideal but widening direct
> command access by default is pretty nasty too.
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-05-25 4:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-02-06 15:15 [PATCH v2 00/14] Corrections and customization of the SG_IO command whitelist (CVE-2012-4542) Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 01/14] sg_io: pass request_queue to blk_verify_command Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 02/14] sg_io: reorganize list of allowed commands Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 03/14] sg_io: use different default filters for each device class Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 04/14] sg_io: resolve conflicts between commands assigned to multiple classes (CVE-2012-4542) Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 05/14] sg_io: whitelist a few more commands for rare & obsolete device types Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 06/14] sg_io: whitelist another command for multimedia devices Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 07/14] sg_io: whitelist a few more commands for media changers Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 08/14] sg_io: whitelist a few more commands for tapes Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 09/14] sg_io: whitelist a few more commands for disks Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 10/14] sg_io: whitelist a few obsolete commands Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 11/14] sg_io: mark blk_set_cmd_filter_defaults as __init Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:15 ` [PATCH v2 12/14] sg_io: remove remnants of sysfs SG_IO filters Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:16 ` [PATCH v2 13/14] sg_io: introduce unpriv_sgio queue flag Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-06 15:16 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] sg_io: use unpriv_sgio to disable whitelisting for scanners Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-13 8:32 ` [PATCH v2 00/14] Corrections and customization of the SG_IO command whitelist (CVE-2012-4542) Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-13 15:35 ` Douglas Gilbert
2013-02-13 15:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-02-20 16:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-03-22 22:30 ` PING^2 " Paolo Bonzini
2013-04-04 18:18 ` PING^3 " Paolo Bonzini
2013-04-17 12:26 ` PING^4 aka The Jon Corbet Effect " Paolo Bonzini
2013-04-27 13:31 ` PING^5 aka New ways to attract attentions " Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-06 20:43 ` PING^6 " Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 6:35 ` PING^7 (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] Corrections and customization of the SG_IO command whitelist (CVE-2012-4542)) Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 9:32 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-22 9:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 10:02 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-22 10:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 12:07 ` James Bottomley
2013-05-22 14:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 16:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 13:41 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-22 14:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 14:30 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-22 15:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 19:30 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-22 21:18 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 22:17 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-23 0:54 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-23 7:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-23 9:02 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-23 9:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-24 1:44 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-24 7:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-24 8:02 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-24 8:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-24 9:07 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-24 9:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-24 22:20 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-25 4:35 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2013-05-25 5:27 ` Christoph Hellwig
2013-05-25 7:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-25 7:11 ` Christoph Hellwig
2013-05-25 7:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-06-21 11:57 ` Christoph Hellwig
2013-05-25 8:37 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-25 11:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-25 12:48 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-25 12:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 15:03 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-05-22 15:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 16:32 ` Martin K. Petersen
2013-05-22 17:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 18:11 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-05-22 19:37 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-22 20:19 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-05-22 20:36 ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-05-25 3:54 ` Vladislav Bolkhovitin
2013-05-28 20:25 ` Martin K. Petersen
2013-05-29 6:12 ` Vladislav Bolkhovitin
2013-05-22 20:39 ` Tejun Heo
2013-05-22 21:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
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