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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, roberto.sassu@polito.it,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/20] in-kernel IMA/EVM initialization
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 14:44:59 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1398365099.3395.24.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1398259638.git.d.kasatkin@samsung.com>

On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 16:30 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: 
> Hi,
> 
> Currently secure IMA/EVM initialization has to be done from the
> initramfs, embedded in the signed kernel image. Many systems do
> not want to use initramfs or use unsigned locally generated images.
> 
> This patchset introduces kernel functionality, which allows to perform
> IMA/EVM initialization without initramfs from the kernel, which
> includes mainly following:
> - loading EVM hmac encrypted keys
> - loading and verification of signed X509 certificates
> - loading and verification of signed IMA policy
> 
> Patchset introduces the set of new kernel configuration options,
> which makes this functionality entirely configurable.
> Not enabling any of the options does not change original IMA/EVM
> behavior. In order not to bloat security configuration menu,
> integrity subsystem options were moved to the separate menu.
> It does not affect existing configuration. Re-configuration is
> not needed.

Loading the IMA/EVM keys onto their respective keyrings by the kernel,
as early as possible, is a good idea, but unfortunately, at least in the
past, having the kernel open files (eg. configuration, policies, kernel
module public key) has not been permitted.  LSM policies were initially
loaded by the initramfs, but more recently by dracut.  As for the kernel
module public key, the key is built into the kernel and loaded onto the
system keyring.  I'm not aware that this limitation of opening files
from the kernel has been removed.

thanks,

Mimi

> 
> Dmitry Kasatkin (19):
>   integrity: initialize EVM before IMA
>   ima: move asymmetric keys config option
>   integrity: move integrity subsystem options to a separate menu
>   integrity: provide builtin 'trusted' keyrings
>   ima: create '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
>   integrity: provide x509 certificate loading from the kernel
>   ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
>   evm: create '_evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
>   evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel
>   ima: added kernel parameter for disabling IMA
>   ima: provide buffer hash calculation function
>   ima: replace opencount with bitop
>   ima: check if policy was set at open
>   ima: path based policy loading interface
>   ima: load policy from the kernel
>   ima: make IMA policy replaceable at runtime
>   evm: added kernel parameter for disabling EVM
>   evm: try enable EVM from the kernel
>   evm: read EVM key from the kernel
> 
> Mimi Zohar (1):
>   KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
> 
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |  85 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  security/integrity/Kconfig               |  41 ++++++++----
>  security/integrity/Makefile              |   4 +-
>  security/integrity/digsig.c              | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/integrity/evm/Kconfig           |  32 +++++++--
>  security/integrity/evm/evm.h             |  14 ++++
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c      | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c        |  25 +++++--
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c       |  13 ++--
>  security/integrity/ima/Kconfig           |  49 +++++++++++++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  19 ++++++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c      |  11 +++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c          |  48 ++++++++++----
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |   3 +
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c        |  12 +++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c      | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  security/integrity/integrity.h           |  20 ++++++
>  17 files changed, 626 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
> 



      parent reply	other threads:[~2014-04-24 18:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-04-23 13:30 [PATCH 00/20] in-kernel IMA/EVM initialization Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 01/20] KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 16:53   ` Mimi Zohar
2014-04-24 20:07     ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 21:03       ` Mimi Zohar
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 02/20] integrity: initialize EVM before IMA Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 03/20] ima: move asymmetric keys config option Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 04/20] integrity: move integrity subsystem options to a separate menu Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 05/20] integrity: provide builtin 'trusted' keyrings Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 06/20] ima: create '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 07/20] integrity: provide x509 certificate loading from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 08/20] ima: load x509 certificate " Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 09/20] evm: create '_evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 10/20] evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 11/20] ima: added kernel parameter for disabling IMA Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 12/20] ima: provide buffer hash calculation function Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 21:04   ` Mimi Zohar
2014-04-25 14:52     ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 13/20] ima: replace opencount with bitop Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 14/20] ima: check if policy was set at open Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 15/20] ima: path based policy loading interface Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 21:03   ` Mimi Zohar
2014-04-25 15:18     ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 16/20] ima: load policy from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 17/20] ima: make IMA policy replaceable at runtime Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-05-14 23:45   ` Mimi Zohar
2014-05-15  6:08     ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 18/20] evm: added kernel parameter for disabling EVM Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 19/20] evm: try enable EVM from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 20/20] evm: read EVM key " Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 18:44 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]

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