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From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
To: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org
Cc: roberto.sassu@polito.it, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Subject: [PATCH 11/20] ima: added kernel parameter for disabling IMA
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 16:30:29 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <50e70cb35c9fe517031db23565828c3e98bfcaf9.1398259638.git.d.kasatkin@samsung.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1398259638.git.d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1398259638.git.d.kasatkin@samsung.com>

If ima_tcb and ima_appraise_tcb are not specified on the kernel command
line, IMA policy remains empty and IMA functionality is disabled.

When policy is loaded from the kernel, IMA becomes enabled without specifying
ima_tcb and ima_appraise_tcb. There should be a possibiliy to disable IMA.
Distributions might want to compile IMA support, but leave for the user
to decide if to enable or disable IMA functionality.

This patch provides kernel parameter 'ima=off' that allows to disable IMA.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c0aaed8..6af4966 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -67,6 +67,15 @@ out:
 }
 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
 
+static int ima_mode = 1;
+static int __init ima_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
+		ima_mode = 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima=", ima_setup);
+
 /*
  * ima_rdwr_violation_check
  *
@@ -324,8 +333,9 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 	int error;
 
 	hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
+
 	error = ima_init();
-	if (!error)
+	if (!error && ima_mode)
 		ima_initialized = 1;
 	return error;
 }
-- 
1.8.3.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-04-23 13:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-04-23 13:30 [PATCH 00/20] in-kernel IMA/EVM initialization Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 01/20] KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 16:53   ` Mimi Zohar
2014-04-24 20:07     ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 21:03       ` Mimi Zohar
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 02/20] integrity: initialize EVM before IMA Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 03/20] ima: move asymmetric keys config option Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 04/20] integrity: move integrity subsystem options to a separate menu Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 05/20] integrity: provide builtin 'trusted' keyrings Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 06/20] ima: create '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 07/20] integrity: provide x509 certificate loading from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 08/20] ima: load x509 certificate " Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 09/20] evm: create '_evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 10/20] evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` Dmitry Kasatkin [this message]
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 12/20] ima: provide buffer hash calculation function Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 21:04   ` Mimi Zohar
2014-04-25 14:52     ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 13/20] ima: replace opencount with bitop Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 14/20] ima: check if policy was set at open Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 15/20] ima: path based policy loading interface Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 21:03   ` Mimi Zohar
2014-04-25 15:18     ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 16/20] ima: load policy from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 17/20] ima: make IMA policy replaceable at runtime Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-05-14 23:45   ` Mimi Zohar
2014-05-15  6:08     ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 18/20] evm: added kernel parameter for disabling EVM Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 19/20] evm: try enable EVM from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-23 13:30 ` [PATCH 20/20] evm: read EVM key " Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-04-24 18:44 ` [PATCH 00/20] in-kernel IMA/EVM initialization Mimi Zohar

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