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* [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid()
@ 2014-06-21  0:30 Waiman Long
  2014-06-23 12:34 ` Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2014-06-21  0:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, James Morris
  Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, Scott J Norton, Waiman Long

v1->v2:
 - Add an internal helper to switch on/off lock acquisition instead
   of modifying the external API.

With introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock() may hang
the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere in between.

With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
reported:

=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G            E
---------------------------------------------
load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
 (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170

but task is already holding lock:
 (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(policy_rwlock);
  lock(policy_rwlock);

This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() by adding a helper function
which has a 5th argument to indicate if the rwlock has been taken.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 4bca494..5f4c1f3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2277,20 +2277,22 @@ out:
 }
 
 /**
- * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
  * @fstype: filesystem type
  * @path: path from root of mount
  * @sclass: file security class
  * @sid: SID for path
+ * @locked: true if policy_rwlock taken
  *
  * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
  * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
  * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
  */
-int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
-		       char *path,
-		       u16 orig_sclass,
-		       u32 *sid)
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+				       char *path,
+				       u16 orig_sclass,
+				       u32 *sid,
+				       int locked)
 {
 	int len;
 	u16 sclass;
@@ -2301,7 +2303,8 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 	while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
 		path++;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	if (!locked)
+		read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
 	*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
@@ -2336,11 +2339,27 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 	*sid = c->sid[0];
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	if (!locked)
+		read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+		       char *path,
+		       u16 orig_sclass,
+		       u32 *sid)
+{
+	return __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
  * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
  * @sb: superblock in question
  */
@@ -2370,7 +2389,8 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
 		}
 		sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
 	} else {
-		rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
+		rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
+					  &sbsec->sid, true);
 		if (rc) {
 			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
 			rc = 0;
-- 
1.7.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid()
  2014-06-21  0:30 [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() Waiman Long
@ 2014-06-23 12:34 ` Stephen Smalley
  2014-06-23 14:30   ` Waiman Long
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2014-06-23 12:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long, Paul Moore, Eric Paris, James Morris
  Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, Scott J Norton

On 06/20/2014 08:30 PM, Waiman Long wrote:
> v1->v2:
>  - Add an internal helper to switch on/off lock acquisition instead
>    of modifying the external API.
> 
> With introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock() may hang
> the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere in between.
> 
> With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
> reported:
> 
> =============================================
> [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
> 3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G            E
> ---------------------------------------------
> load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
>  (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
> security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170
> 
> but task is already holding lock:
>  (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
> security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110
> 
> other info that might help us debug this:
>  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
> 
>        CPU0
>        ----
>   lock(policy_rwlock);
>   lock(policy_rwlock);
> 
> This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
> policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() by adding a helper function
> which has a 5th argument to indicate if the rwlock has been taken.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 4bca494..5f4c1f3 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -2277,20 +2277,22 @@ out:
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
> + * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
>   * @fstype: filesystem type
>   * @path: path from root of mount
>   * @sclass: file security class
>   * @sid: SID for path
> + * @locked: true if policy_rwlock taken
>   *
>   * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
>   * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
>   * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
>   */
> -int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
> -		       char *path,
> -		       u16 orig_sclass,
> -		       u32 *sid)
> +static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
> +				       char *path,
> +				       u16 orig_sclass,
> +				       u32 *sid,
> +				       int locked)
>  {
>  	int len;
>  	u16 sclass;
> @@ -2301,7 +2303,8 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
>  	while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
>  		path++;
>  
> -	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> +	if (!locked)
> +		read_lock(&policy_rwlock);

I believe that this kind of conditional lock-taking is frowned upon in
the kernel, although I could be wrong.  I think it would be cleaner to
instead just unconditionally take and release the lock around the call
to this helper in security_genfs_sid(), and not do so around the call to
it from security_fs_use().

>  
>  	sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
>  	*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> @@ -2336,11 +2339,27 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
>  	*sid = c->sid[0];
>  	rc = 0;
>  out:
> -	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> +	if (!locked)
> +		read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
>  /**
> + * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
> + * @fstype: filesystem type
> + * @path: path from root of mount
> + * @sclass: file security class
> + * @sid: SID for path
> + */
> +int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
> +		       char *path,
> +		       u16 orig_sclass,
> +		       u32 *sid)
> +{
> +	return __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid, false);
> +}
> +
> +/**
>   * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
>   * @sb: superblock in question
>   */
> @@ -2370,7 +2389,8 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
>  		}
>  		sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
>  	} else {
> -		rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
> +		rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
> +					  &sbsec->sid, true);
>  		if (rc) {
>  			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
>  			rc = 0;
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid()
  2014-06-23 12:34 ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2014-06-23 14:30   ` Waiman Long
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2014-06-23 14:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stephen Smalley
  Cc: Paul Moore, Eric Paris, James Morris, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module, Scott J Norton

On 06/23/2014 08:34 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 06/20/2014 08:30 PM, Waiman Long wrote:
>> v1->v2:
>>   - Add an internal helper to switch on/off lock acquisition instead
>>     of modifying the external API.
>>
>> With introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock() may hang
>> the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere in between.
>>
>> With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
>> reported:
>>
>> =============================================
>> [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
>> 3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G            E
>> ---------------------------------------------
>> load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
>>   (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
>> security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170
>>
>> but task is already holding lock:
>>   (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
>> security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110
>>
>> other info that might help us debug this:
>>   Possible unsafe locking scenario:
>>
>>         CPU0
>>         ----
>>    lock(policy_rwlock);
>>    lock(policy_rwlock);
>>
>> This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
>> policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() by adding a helper function
>> which has a 5th argument to indicate if the rwlock has been taken.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long<Waiman.Long@hp.com>
>> ---
>>   security/selinux/ss/services.c |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>>   1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
>> index 4bca494..5f4c1f3 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
>> @@ -2277,20 +2277,22 @@ out:
>>   }
>>
>>   /**
>> - * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
>> + * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
>>    * @fstype: filesystem type
>>    * @path: path from root of mount
>>    * @sclass: file security class
>>    * @sid: SID for path
>> + * @locked: true if policy_rwlock taken
>>    *
>>    * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
>>    * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
>>    * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
>>    */
>> -int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
>> -		       char *path,
>> -		       u16 orig_sclass,
>> -		       u32 *sid)
>> +static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
>> +				       char *path,
>> +				       u16 orig_sclass,
>> +				       u32 *sid,
>> +				       int locked)
>>   {
>>   	int len;
>>   	u16 sclass;
>> @@ -2301,7 +2303,8 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
>>   	while (path[0] == '/'&&  path[1] == '/')
>>   		path++;
>>
>> -	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
>> +	if (!locked)
>> +		read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> I believe that this kind of conditional lock-taking is frowned upon in
> the kernel, although I could be wrong.  I think it would be cleaner to
> instead just unconditionally take and release the lock around the call
> to this helper in security_genfs_sid(), and not do so around the call to
> it from security_fs_use().

Thank for the comments. Will send out a new patch with the suggested change.

-Longman


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

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2014-06-21  0:30 [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() Waiman Long
2014-06-23 12:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-06-23 14:30   ` Waiman Long

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