From: "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@driverdev.osuosl.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions
Date: Mon, 2 May 2016 11:37:52 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <142feb98-3a97-0b00-0b17-b029fa2c637f@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160429201744.GD27821@intel.com>
On 2016-04-29 16:17, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 09:00:10PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
>> On Mon 2016-04-25 20:34:07, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>>> Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by
>>> applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code
>>> outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory inside the
>>> enclave by the CPU access control.
>>>
>>> The firmware uses PRMRR registers to reserve an area of physical memory
>>> called Enclave Page Cache (EPC). There is a hardware unit in the
>>> processor called Memory Encryption Engine. The MEE encrypts and decrypts
>>> the EPC pages as they enter and leave the processor package.
>>
>> What are non-evil use cases for this?
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by non-evil.
>
I would think that this should be pretty straightforward. Pretty much
every security technology integrated in every computer in existence has
the potential to be used by malware for various purposes. Based on a
cursory look at SGX, it is pretty easy to figure out how to use this to
hide arbitrary code from virus scanners and the OS itself unless you
have some way to force everything to be a debug enclave, which entirely
defeats the stated purpose of the extensions. I can see this being
useful for tight embedded systems. On a desktop which I have full
control of physical access to though, it's something I'd immediately
turn off, because the risk of misuse is so significant (I've done so on
my new Thinkpad L560 too, although that's mostly because Linux doesn't
support it yet).
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-02 15:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-25 17:34 [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 17:34 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86: add SGX definition to cpufeature Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 19:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-25 19:48 ` Andi Kleen
2016-04-25 17:34 ` [PATCH 2/6] x86, sgx: common macros and definitions Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 17:34 ` [PATCH 3/6] intel_sgx: driver for Intel Secure Guard eXtensions Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 17:55 ` Greg KH
2016-04-25 19:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-27 6:49 ` Jethro Beekman
2016-04-27 12:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-27 23:32 ` Jethro Beekman
2016-04-29 20:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-29 22:22 ` Jethro Beekman
2016-05-09 5:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-09 7:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 17:34 ` [PATCH 4/6] intel_sgx: ptrace() support for the driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 17:34 ` [PATCH 5/6] intel_sgx: driver documentation Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 20:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-05 22:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-06 0:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-06 11:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-06 16:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-25 17:34 ` [PATCH 6/6] intel_sgx: TODO file for the staging area Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 17:54 ` Greg KH
2016-04-25 18:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 19:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-04-25 20:01 ` Andi Kleen
2016-04-26 11:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-27 6:38 ` Jethro Beekman
2016-05-17 9:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 17:53 ` [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions Greg KH
2016-04-25 19:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-25 19:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 19:00 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-26 19:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 19:41 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-26 19:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 20:11 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-26 20:59 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-04-26 21:52 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-26 22:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 7:32 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 8:18 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-04-27 14:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-06 11:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-06 16:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 20:16 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-04-26 20:19 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-04-29 20:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-01 9:40 ` Pavel Machek
2016-05-02 15:37 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn [this message]
2016-05-03 9:06 ` Dr. Greg Wettstein
2016-05-03 15:38 ` Pavel Machek
2016-05-04 9:04 ` Dr. Greg Wettstein
2016-05-04 11:07 ` Pavel Machek
2016-05-06 11:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-06 11:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-05-09 5:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-09 6:27 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-05-09 9:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-12 8:50 ` Dr. Greg Wettstein
2016-05-09 7:04 ` Greg KH
2016-05-09 9:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-08 9:58 ` Dr. Greg Wettstein
2016-05-09 1:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-13 9:42 ` Dr. Greg Wettstein
2016-05-13 14:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-05 22:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-05-06 7:14 ` Pavel Machek
2016-05-06 11:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2016-04-29 22:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=142feb98-3a97-0b00-0b17-b029fa2c637f@gmail.com \
--to=ahferroin7@gmail.com \
--cc=Vincent.Wan@amd.com \
--cc=boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com \
--cc=bp@suse.de \
--cc=devel@driverdev.osuosl.org \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kristen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@kernel.org \
--cc=minipli@googlemail.com \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).