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From: "Kani, Toshimitsu" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 16:17:36 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1478880929.20881.148.camel@hpe.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003631.3280.73292.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On Wed, 2016-11-09 at 18:36 -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system
> is booted and needs to be accessed unencrypted.  Add support to apply
> the proper attributes to the EFI page tables and to the
> early_memremap and memremap APIs to identify the type of data being
> accessed so that the proper encryption attribute can be applied.
 :
> +static bool memremap_apply_encryption(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> +				      unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	/* SME is not active, just return true */
> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
> +		return true;
> +
> +	/* Check if the address is part of the setup data */
> +	if (memremap_setup_data(phys_addr, size))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* Check if the address is part of EFI boot/runtime data */
> +	switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
> +	case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
> +	case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA:
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
> +	switch (e820_get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size -
> 1)) {
> +	case E820_RESERVED:
> +	case E820_ACPI:
> +	case E820_NVS:
> +	case E820_UNUSABLE:
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	return true;
> +}

Are you supporting encryption for E820_PMEM ranges?  If so, this
encryption will persist across a reboot and does not need to be
encrypted again, right?  Also, how do you keep a same key across a
reboot?

Thanks,
-Toshi

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-11 16:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-10  0:34 [RFC PATCH v3 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 17:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 13:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-11  1:26     ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-14 16:51       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 11:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10  0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 12:10   ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 14:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 15:33         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 16:06           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:33             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 17:08               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:33         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 22:01           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:32     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/20] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 17:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 18:18     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 20:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10  0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-11-16 10:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 19:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 12:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 16:17   ` Kani, Toshimitsu [this message]
2016-11-14 16:24     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 15:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:33     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-20 23:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-12-07 13:19   ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-09 14:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 17:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-21  8:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 18:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:39   ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 17:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 18:17       ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 20:33         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 15:16   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 18:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 19:16       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 11:38       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 15:22         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:41           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 20:41             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:32   ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-11-22 19:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:00     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-24 12:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:40     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] " Tom Lendacky
2016-11-22 18:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-26 20:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 19:56       ` Borislav Petkov

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