[PATCH 0/3] Speculation CPU feature cleanups

[PATCH 0/3] Speculation CPU feature cleanups

[David Woodhouse]

Fix up the cpufeatures so that only the hardware features are visible in
/proc/cpuinfo. as "ibpb", "ibrs" and "stibp". The virtual features, and
software flags which are only in X86_FEATURE_* because that's the only
way to use alternatives, get masked away. We don't *want* to show that
stuff to all users in /proc/cpuinfo; it's available to a more restricted
audience in the sysfs vulnerability files instead.

(We should probably remove PTI too, but that can be done separately.)

Boris also wants to put things out of line to reduce the size of the
ALTERNATIVE blocks and simplify backports to older kernels, so tweak
and apply his patches for that too.

Borislav Petkov (2):
  x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
  x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()

David Woodhouse (1):
  x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags

 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S             |  3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S             |  3 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h |  3 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h    | 18 ++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h  | 83 +++++------------------------------
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h      |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c            | 11 +++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c           | 31 ++++++++-----
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                 |  1 +
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S              | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)

-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH 1/3] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags

[David Woodhouse]

We want to expose the hardware features simply in /proc/cpuinfo as "ibrs",
"ibpb" and "stibp". Since AMD gives us separate CPUID bits for those, use
them as the user-visible bits.

When the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit is set which indicates both IBRS and IBPB
capability, set those (AMD) bits accordingly. Likewise if the Intel STIBP
bit is set, set the AMD STIBP but that we're using for the generic hardware
capability.

Hide the rest from /proc/cpuinfo by putting "" in the comments. Including
RETPOLINE and RETPOLINE_AMD which shouldn't be visible there. There are
patches to make the sysfs vulnerabilities information non-readable by
root, and the same should apply to all information about which mitigations
are actually in use. Those *shouldn't* appear in /proc/cpuinfo.

The feature bit for whether we're actually *using* IBPB, which we need
like PTI does just because we're using it for ALTERNATIVEs, is renamed
to X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB.

Based on patches from Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  5 ++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c          | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 07934b2..73b5fff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,14 +203,14 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
 
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/
+#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -271,9 +271,9 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF		(13*32+ 1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR		(13*32+ 2) /* Always save/restore FP error pointers */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD	(13*32+12) /* Prediction Command MSR (AMD) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL	(13*32+14) /* Speculation Control MSR only (AMD) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP		(13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (AMD) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		(13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS		(13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP		(13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM		(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -325,8 +325,8 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 865192a..19ecb54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 				 "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
 				 "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
 				 "wrmsr",
-				 X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
+				 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB)
 		     : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
 			 [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
 		     : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index c988a8a..0c6dd43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -265,9 +265,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	}
 
 	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
-	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) {
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
 		pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
 	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 5faa487..0c8b916 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -175,17 +175,28 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (c->x86 >= 6 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IA64))
 		c->microcode = intel_get_microcode_revision();
 
-	if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
-	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
-	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL) ||
-	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD) ||
-	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
-		pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling SPEC_CTRL\n");
-		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
+	/*
+	 * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support,
+	 * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also,
+	 * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on
+	 * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+	}
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+
+	/* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */
+	if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ||
+	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
+		pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n");
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
 		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
-		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL);
-		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD);
-		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP);
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
 	}
 
 	/*
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH 2/3] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()

[David Woodhouse]

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>

Simplify it to call an asm-function instead of pasting 41 insn bytes at
every call site. Also, add alignment to the macro as suggested here:

  https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886

[dwmw2: Clean up comments, let it clobber %ebx and just tell the compiler]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S             |  3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S             |  3 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h |  3 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h  | 70 ++++-------------------------------
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                 |  1 +
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S              | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index 60c4c34..2a35b1e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -252,7 +252,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
+	/* Clobbers %ebx */
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
 #endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 63f4320..b4f0098 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -495,7 +495,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
+	/* Clobbers %rbx */
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
 #endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
index 1908214..4d11161 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -38,4 +38,7 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx)
 INDIRECT_THUNK(si)
 INDIRECT_THUNK(di)
 INDIRECT_THUNK(bp)
+asmlinkage void __fill_rsb(void);
+asmlinkage void __clear_rsb(void);
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 19ecb54..df4ececa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -7,50 +7,6 @@
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
 
-/*
- * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
- *
- * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
- * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
- *
- * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
- * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
- * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
- * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
- * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
- *
- * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
- * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
- * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
- */
-
-#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS		32	/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
-#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS		16	/* To avoid underflow */
-
-/*
- * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
- * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
- * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
- */
-#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp)	\
-	mov	$(nr/2), reg;			\
-771:						\
-	call	772f;				\
-773:	/* speculation trap */			\
-	pause;					\
-	lfence;					\
-	jmp	773b;				\
-772:						\
-	call	774f;				\
-775:	/* speculation trap */			\
-	pause;					\
-	lfence;					\
-	jmp	775b;				\
-774:						\
-	dec	reg;				\
-	jnz	771b;				\
-	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
-
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 /*
@@ -121,17 +77,10 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
- /*
-  * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
-  * monstrosity above, manually.
-  */
-.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+/* This clobbers the BX register */
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER nr:req ftr:req
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@",				\
-		__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP))	\
-		\ftr
-.Lskip_rsb_\@:
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "call __clear_rsb", \ftr
 #endif
 .endm
 
@@ -206,15 +155,10 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	unsigned long loops;
-
-	asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-		      ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
-				  __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
-				  X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
-		      "910:"
-		      : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
-		      : : "memory" );
+	alternative_input("",
+			  "call __fill_rsb",
+			  X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,
+			  ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory"));
 #endif
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index d435c89..d0a3170 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
+OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_retpoline.o :=y
 
 obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index c909961..3040848 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/export.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
 
 .macro THUNK reg
 	.section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk
@@ -46,3 +47,58 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(r13)
 GENERATE_THUNK(r14)
 GENERATE_THUNK(r15)
 #endif
+
+/*
+ * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
+ *
+ * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
+ * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
+ *
+ * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
+ * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
+ * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
+ * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
+ * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
+ *
+ * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
+ * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
+ * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
+ */
+.macro STUFF_RSB nr:req sp:req
+	mov	$(\nr / 2), %_ASM_BX
+	.align 16
+771:
+	call	772f
+773:						/* speculation trap */
+	pause
+	lfence
+	jmp	773b
+	.align 16
+772:
+	call	774f
+775:						/* speculation trap */
+	pause
+	lfence
+	jmp	775b
+	.align 16
+774:
+	dec	%_ASM_BX
+	jnz	771b
+	add	$((BITS_PER_LONG/8) * \nr), \sp
+.endm
+
+#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS		16	/* To avoid underflow */
+
+ENTRY(__fill_rsb)
+	STUFF_RSB RSB_FILL_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP
+	ret
+END(__fill_rsb)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fill_rsb)
+
+#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS		32	/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+
+ENTRY(__clear_rsb)
+	STUFF_RSB RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP
+	ret
+END(__clear_rsb)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__clear_rsb)
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH 3/3] x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()

[David Woodhouse]

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

Make it all a function which does the WRMSR instead of having a hairy
inline asm.

[dwmw2: export it, fix CONFIG_RETPOLINE issues]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 ++++---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h     |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index df4ececa..d15d471 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -164,15 +164,10 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 
 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 {
-	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
-				 "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
-				 "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
-				 "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
-				 "wrmsr",
-				 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB)
-		     : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
-			 [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
-		     : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
+	alternative_input("",
+			  "call __ibp_barrier",
+			  X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB,
+			  ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER("eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"));
 }
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 9c18da6..881ca3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -970,4 +970,7 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void);
 
 void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy);
 void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+
+void __ibp_barrier(void);
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0c6dd43..dd99808 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -303,3 +303,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 		       spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "");
 }
 #endif
+
+void __ibp_barrier(void)
+{
+	__wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__ibp_barrier);
-- 
2.7.4

[tip:x86/pti] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags

[tip-bot for David Woodhouse]

Commit-ID:  2961298efe1ea1b6fc0d7ee8b76018fa6c0bcef2
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/2961298efe1ea1b6fc0d7ee8b76018fa6c0bcef2
Author:     David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
AuthorDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 16:24:32 +0000
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 19:10:44 +0100

x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags

We want to expose the hardware features simply in /proc/cpuinfo as "ibrs",
"ibpb" and "stibp". Since AMD has separate CPUID bits for those, use them
as the user-visible bits.

When the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit is set which indicates both IBRS and IBPB
capability, set those (AMD) bits accordingly. Likewise if the Intel STIBP
bit is set, set the AMD STIBP that's used for the generic hardware
capability.

Hide the rest from /proc/cpuinfo by putting "" in the comments. Including
RETPOLINE and RETPOLINE_AMD which shouldn't be visible there. There are
patches to make the sysfs vulnerabilities information non-readable by
non-root, and the same should apply to all information about which
mitigations are actually in use. Those *shouldn't* appear in /proc/cpuinfo.

The feature bit for whether IBPB is actually used, which is needed for
ALTERNATIVEs, is renamed to X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB.

Originally-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  7 +++----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c          | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 07934b2..73b5fff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,14 +203,14 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
 
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/
+#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -271,9 +271,9 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF		(13*32+ 1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR		(13*32+ 2) /* Always save/restore FP error pointers */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD	(13*32+12) /* Prediction Command MSR (AMD) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL	(13*32+14) /* Speculation Control MSR only (AMD) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP		(13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (AMD) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		(13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS		(13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP		(13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM		(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -325,8 +325,8 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 865192a..19ecb54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 				 "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
 				 "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
 				 "wrmsr",
-				 X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
+				 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB)
 		     : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
 			 [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
 		     : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b0b7157..32d8e6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -273,9 +273,8 @@ retpoline_auto:
 	}
 
 	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
-	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) {
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
 		pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
 	}
 }
@@ -308,7 +307,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
-		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
+		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
 		       spectre_v2_module_string());
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 5faa487..0c8b916 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -175,17 +175,28 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (c->x86 >= 6 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IA64))
 		c->microcode = intel_get_microcode_revision();
 
-	if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
-	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
-	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL) ||
-	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD) ||
-	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
-		pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling SPEC_CTRL\n");
-		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
+	/*
+	 * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support,
+	 * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also,
+	 * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on
+	 * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+	}
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+
+	/* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */
+	if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ||
+	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
+		pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n");
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
 		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
-		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL);
-		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD);
-		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP);
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
 	}
 
 	/*

[tip:x86/pti] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()

[tip-bot for Borislav Petkov]

Commit-ID:  1dde7415e99933bb7293d6b2843752cbdb43ec11
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/1dde7415e99933bb7293d6b2843752cbdb43ec11
Author:     Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
AuthorDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 16:24:33 +0000
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 19:10:45 +0100

x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()

Simplify it to call an asm-function instead of pasting 41 insn bytes at
every call site. Also, add alignment to the macro as suggested here:

  https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886

[dwmw2: Clean up comments, let it clobber %ebx and just tell the compiler]

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S             |  3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S             |  3 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h |  3 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h  | 70 ++++-------------------------------
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                 |  1 +
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S              | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index 60c4c34..2a35b1e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -252,7 +252,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
+	/* Clobbers %ebx */
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
 #endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 63f4320..b4f0098 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -495,7 +495,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
+	/* Clobbers %rbx */
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
 #endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
index 1908214..4d11161 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -38,4 +38,7 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx)
 INDIRECT_THUNK(si)
 INDIRECT_THUNK(di)
 INDIRECT_THUNK(bp)
+asmlinkage void __fill_rsb(void);
+asmlinkage void __clear_rsb(void);
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 19ecb54..df4ececa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -7,50 +7,6 @@
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
 
-/*
- * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
- *
- * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
- * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
- *
- * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
- * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
- * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
- * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
- * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
- *
- * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
- * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
- * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
- */
-
-#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS		32	/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
-#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS		16	/* To avoid underflow */
-
-/*
- * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
- * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
- * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
- */
-#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp)	\
-	mov	$(nr/2), reg;			\
-771:						\
-	call	772f;				\
-773:	/* speculation trap */			\
-	pause;					\
-	lfence;					\
-	jmp	773b;				\
-772:						\
-	call	774f;				\
-775:	/* speculation trap */			\
-	pause;					\
-	lfence;					\
-	jmp	775b;				\
-774:						\
-	dec	reg;				\
-	jnz	771b;				\
-	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
-
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 /*
@@ -121,17 +77,10 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
- /*
-  * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
-  * monstrosity above, manually.
-  */
-.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+/* This clobbers the BX register */
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER nr:req ftr:req
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@",				\
-		__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP))	\
-		\ftr
-.Lskip_rsb_\@:
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "call __clear_rsb", \ftr
 #endif
 .endm
 
@@ -206,15 +155,10 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	unsigned long loops;
-
-	asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-		      ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
-				  __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
-				  X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
-		      "910:"
-		      : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
-		      : : "memory" );
+	alternative_input("",
+			  "call __fill_rsb",
+			  X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,
+			  ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory"));
 #endif
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index d435c89..d0a3170 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
+OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_retpoline.o :=y
 
 obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index c909961..480edc3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/export.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
 
 .macro THUNK reg
 	.section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk
@@ -46,3 +47,58 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(r13)
 GENERATE_THUNK(r14)
 GENERATE_THUNK(r15)
 #endif
+
+/*
+ * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
+ *
+ * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
+ * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
+ *
+ * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
+ * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
+ * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
+ * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
+ * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
+ *
+ * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
+ * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
+ * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
+ */
+.macro STUFF_RSB nr:req sp:req
+	mov	$(\nr / 2), %_ASM_BX
+	.align 16
+771:
+	call	772f
+773:						/* speculation trap */
+	pause
+	lfence
+	jmp	773b
+	.align 16
+772:
+	call	774f
+775:						/* speculation trap */
+	pause
+	lfence
+	jmp	775b
+	.align 16
+774:
+	dec	%_ASM_BX
+	jnz	771b
+	add	$((BITS_PER_LONG/8) * \nr), \sp
+.endm
+
+#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS		16	/* To avoid underflow */
+
+ENTRY(__fill_rsb)
+	STUFF_RSB RSB_FILL_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP
+	ret
+END(__fill_rsb)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fill_rsb)
+
+#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS		32	/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+
+ENTRY(__clear_rsb)
+	STUFF_RSB RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP
+	ret
+END(__clear_rsb)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__clear_rsb)

[tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()

[tip-bot for Borislav Petkov]

Commit-ID:  64e16720ea0879f8ab4547e3b9758936d483909b
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/64e16720ea0879f8ab4547e3b9758936d483909b
Author:     Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
AuthorDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 16:24:34 +0000
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 19:10:45 +0100

x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()

Make it all a function which does the WRMSR instead of having a hairy
inline asm.

[dwmw2: export it, fix CONFIG_RETPOLINE issues]

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 ++++---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h     |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index df4ececa..d15d471 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -164,15 +164,10 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 
 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 {
-	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
-				 "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
-				 "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
-				 "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
-				 "wrmsr",
-				 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB)
-		     : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
-			 [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
-		     : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
+	alternative_input("",
+			  "call __ibp_barrier",
+			  X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB,
+			  ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER("eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"));
 }
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 9c18da6..881ca3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -970,4 +970,7 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void);
 
 void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy);
 void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+
+void __ibp_barrier(void);
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 32d8e6c..3bfb2b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -311,3 +311,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 		       spectre_v2_module_string());
 }
 #endif
+
+void __ibp_barrier(void)
+{
+	__wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__ibp_barrier);