[GIT pull] efi fix for 5.0

[GIT pull] efi fix for 5.0

[Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest efi-urgent-for-linus git tree from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git efi-urgent-for-linus

The dump info for the efi page table debugging lacks a terminator which
causes the kernel to crash when the debugfile is read.

Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Qian Cai (1):
      efi/arm64: Fix debugfs crash by adding a terminator for ptdump marker


 drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c
index 23ea1ed409d1..352bd2473162 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ extern u64 efi_system_table;
 static struct ptdump_info efi_ptdump_info = {
 	.mm		= &efi_mm,
 	.markers	= (struct addr_marker[]){
-		{ 0,		"UEFI runtime start" },
-		{ DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW_64, "UEFI runtime end" }
+		{ 0,				"UEFI runtime start" },
+		{ DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW_64,	"UEFI runtime end" },
+		{ -1,				NULL }
 	},
 	.base_addr	= 0,
 };

[GIT pull] cpu hotplug updates for 5.0

[Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest smp-urgent-for-linus git tree from:

       git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git smp-urgent-for-linus

Two fixes for the cpu hotplug machinery:

   - Replace the overly clever 'SMT disabled by BIOS' detection logic as it
     breaks KVM scenarios and prevents speculation control updates when the
     Hyperthreads are brought online late after boot.

   - Remove a redundant invocation of the speculation control update function.

Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Josh Poimboeuf (1):
      cpu/hotplug: Fix "SMT disabled by BIOS" detection for KVM

Zhenzhong Duan (1):
      x86/speculation: Remove redundant arch_smt_update() invocation


 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     |  3 ++-
 include/linux/cpu.h        |  2 --
 kernel/cpu.c               | 38 +++++---------------------------------
 kernel/sched/fair.c        |  1 +
 kernel/smp.c               |  2 --
 6 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1de0f4170178..01874d54f4fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	 * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
 	 * core code know.
 	 */
-	cpu_smt_check_topology_early();
+	cpu_smt_check_topology();
 
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
 		pr_info("CPU: ");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 4341175339f3..95d618045001 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
@@ -6823,7 +6824,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
 			 * insecure environment.
 			 */
-			if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+			if (sched_smt_active())
 				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
 			if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
 				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 218df7f4d3e1..5041357d0297 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -180,12 +180,10 @@ enum cpuhp_smt_control {
 #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT)
 extern enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control;
 extern void cpu_smt_disable(bool force);
-extern void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void);
 extern void cpu_smt_check_topology(void);
 #else
 # define cpu_smt_control		(CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
 static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
-static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 91d5c38eb7e5..d1c6d152da89 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -376,9 +376,6 @@ void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
 enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_control);
-
-static bool cpu_smt_available __read_mostly;
 
 void __init cpu_smt_disable(bool force)
 {
@@ -397,25 +394,11 @@ void __init cpu_smt_disable(bool force)
 
 /*
  * The decision whether SMT is supported can only be done after the full
- * CPU identification. Called from architecture code before non boot CPUs
- * are brought up.
- */
-void __init cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void)
-{
-	if (!topology_smt_supported())
-		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-}
-
-/*
- * If SMT was disabled by BIOS, detect it here, after the CPUs have been
- * brought online. This ensures the smt/l1tf sysfs entries are consistent
- * with reality. cpu_smt_available is set to true during the bringup of non
- * boot CPUs when a SMT sibling is detected. Note, this may overwrite
- * cpu_smt_control's previous setting.
+ * CPU identification. Called from architecture code.
  */
 void __init cpu_smt_check_topology(void)
 {
-	if (!cpu_smt_available)
+	if (!topology_smt_supported())
 		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
 }
 
@@ -428,18 +411,10 @@ early_param("nosmt", smt_cmdline_disable);
 
 static inline bool cpu_smt_allowed(unsigned int cpu)
 {
-	if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu))
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
 		return true;
 
-	/*
-	 * If the CPU is not a 'primary' thread and the booted_once bit is
-	 * set then the processor has SMT support. Store this information
-	 * for the late check of SMT support in cpu_smt_check_topology().
-	 */
-	if (per_cpu(cpuhp_state, cpu).booted_once)
-		cpu_smt_available = true;
-
-	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+	if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu))
 		return true;
 
 	/*
@@ -2090,10 +2065,8 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
 		 */
 		cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(cpu);
 	}
-	if (!ret) {
+	if (!ret)
 		cpu_smt_control = ctrlval;
-		arch_smt_update();
-	}
 	cpu_maps_update_done();
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -2104,7 +2077,6 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_enable(void)
 
 	cpu_maps_update_begin();
 	cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
-	arch_smt_update();
 	for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
 		/* Skip online CPUs and CPUs on offline nodes */
 		if (cpu_online(cpu) || !node_online(cpu_to_node(cpu)))
diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c
index 50aa2aba69bd..310d0637fe4b 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -5980,6 +5980,7 @@ static inline int find_idlest_cpu(struct sched_domain *sd, struct task_struct *p
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sched_smt_present);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sched_smt_present);
 
 static inline void set_idle_cores(int cpu, int val)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/smp.c b/kernel/smp.c
index 163c451af42e..f4cf1b0bb3b8 100644
--- a/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/kernel/smp.c
@@ -584,8 +584,6 @@ void __init smp_init(void)
 		num_nodes, (num_nodes > 1 ? "s" : ""),
 		num_cpus,  (num_cpus  > 1 ? "s" : ""));
 
-	/* Final decision about SMT support */
-	cpu_smt_check_topology();
 	/* Any cleanup work */
 	smp_cpus_done(setup_max_cpus);
 }

[GIT pull] perf updates for 5.0

[Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest perf-urgent-for-linus git tree from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git perf-urgent-for-linus

A pile of perf updates:

  - Fix the broken sanity check in the /proc/sys/kernel/perf_cpu_time_max_percent
    write handler.

  - Cure a perf script crash which caused by an unitinialized data structure.

  - Highlight the hottest instruction in perf top and not a random one.

  - Cure yet another clang issue when building perf python

  - Handle topology entries with no CPU correctly in the tools

  - Handle perf data which contains both tracepoints and performance
    counter entries correctly.

  - Add a missing NULL pointer check in perf ordered_events_free().

Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Andi Kleen (1):
      perf script: Fix crash with printing mixed trace point and other events

Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (1):
      perf python: Remove -fstack-clash-protection when building with some clang versions

He Kuang (1):
      perf top: Fix wrong hottest instruction highlighted

Jiri Olsa (1):
      perf ordered_events: Fix crash in ordered_events__free

Stephane Eranian (2):
      perf core: Fix perf_proc_update_handler() bug
      perf tools: Handle TOPOLOGY headers with no CPU

Tony Jones (1):
      perf script: Fix crash when processing recorded stat data


 kernel/events/core.c              | 14 +++++++-------
 tools/perf/builtin-script.c       |  9 +++------
 tools/perf/ui/browsers/annotate.c | 16 ++++++++++------
 tools/perf/util/cpumap.c          | 11 +++++++++--
 tools/perf/util/ordered-events.c  |  6 ++++--
 tools/perf/util/setup.py          |  2 ++
 6 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 3cd13a30f732..e5ede6918050 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -436,18 +436,18 @@ int perf_proc_update_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
 		loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	int ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
-
-	if (ret || !write)
-		return ret;
-
+	int ret;
+	int perf_cpu = sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent;
 	/*
 	 * If throttling is disabled don't allow the write:
 	 */
-	if (sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 100 ||
-	    sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 0)
+	if (write && (perf_cpu == 100 || perf_cpu == 0))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	if (ret || !write)
+		return ret;
+
 	max_samples_per_tick = DIV_ROUND_UP(sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate, HZ);
 	perf_sample_period_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC / sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate;
 	update_perf_cpu_limits();
diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-script.c b/tools/perf/builtin-script.c
index d079f36d342d..ac221f137ed2 100644
--- a/tools/perf/builtin-script.c
+++ b/tools/perf/builtin-script.c
@@ -1681,13 +1681,8 @@ static void perf_sample__fprint_metric(struct perf_script *script,
 		.force_header = false,
 	};
 	struct perf_evsel *ev2;
-	static bool init;
 	u64 val;
 
-	if (!init) {
-		perf_stat__init_shadow_stats();
-		init = true;
-	}
 	if (!evsel->stats)
 		perf_evlist__alloc_stats(script->session->evlist, false);
 	if (evsel_script(evsel->leader)->gnum++ == 0)
@@ -1794,7 +1789,7 @@ static void process_event(struct perf_script *script,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (PRINT_FIELD(TRACE)) {
+	if (PRINT_FIELD(TRACE) && sample->raw_data) {
 		event_format__fprintf(evsel->tp_format, sample->cpu,
 				      sample->raw_data, sample->raw_size, fp);
 	}
@@ -2359,6 +2354,8 @@ static int __cmd_script(struct perf_script *script)
 
 	signal(SIGINT, sig_handler);
 
+	perf_stat__init_shadow_stats();
+
 	/* override event processing functions */
 	if (script->show_task_events) {
 		script->tool.comm = process_comm_event;
diff --git a/tools/perf/ui/browsers/annotate.c b/tools/perf/ui/browsers/annotate.c
index 1d00e5ec7906..82e16bf84466 100644
--- a/tools/perf/ui/browsers/annotate.c
+++ b/tools/perf/ui/browsers/annotate.c
@@ -224,20 +224,24 @@ static unsigned int annotate_browser__refresh(struct ui_browser *browser)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int disasm__cmp(struct annotation_line *a, struct annotation_line *b)
+static double disasm__cmp(struct annotation_line *a, struct annotation_line *b,
+						  int percent_type)
 {
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < a->data_nr; i++) {
-		if (a->data[i].percent == b->data[i].percent)
+		if (a->data[i].percent[percent_type] == b->data[i].percent[percent_type])
 			continue;
-		return a->data[i].percent < b->data[i].percent;
+		return a->data[i].percent[percent_type] -
+			   b->data[i].percent[percent_type];
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void disasm_rb_tree__insert(struct rb_root *root, struct annotation_line *al)
+static void disasm_rb_tree__insert(struct annotate_browser *browser,
+				struct annotation_line *al)
 {
+	struct rb_root *root = &browser->entries;
 	struct rb_node **p = &root->rb_node;
 	struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
 	struct annotation_line *l;
@@ -246,7 +250,7 @@ static void disasm_rb_tree__insert(struct rb_root *root, struct annotation_line
 		parent = *p;
 		l = rb_entry(parent, struct annotation_line, rb_node);
 
-		if (disasm__cmp(al, l))
+		if (disasm__cmp(al, l, browser->opts->percent_type) < 0)
 			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
 		else
 			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
@@ -329,7 +333,7 @@ static void annotate_browser__calc_percent(struct annotate_browser *browser,
 			RB_CLEAR_NODE(&pos->al.rb_node);
 			continue;
 		}
-		disasm_rb_tree__insert(&browser->entries, &pos->al);
+		disasm_rb_tree__insert(browser, &pos->al);
 	}
 	pthread_mutex_unlock(&notes->lock);
 
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cpumap.c b/tools/perf/util/cpumap.c
index 1ccbd3342069..383674f448fc 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/cpumap.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cpumap.c
@@ -134,7 +134,12 @@ struct cpu_map *cpu_map__new(const char *cpu_list)
 	if (!cpu_list)
 		return cpu_map__read_all_cpu_map();
 
-	if (!isdigit(*cpu_list))
+	/*
+	 * must handle the case of empty cpumap to cover
+	 * TOPOLOGY header for NUMA nodes with no CPU
+	 * ( e.g., because of CPU hotplug)
+	 */
+	if (!isdigit(*cpu_list) && *cpu_list != '\0')
 		goto out;
 
 	while (isdigit(*cpu_list)) {
@@ -181,8 +186,10 @@ struct cpu_map *cpu_map__new(const char *cpu_list)
 
 	if (nr_cpus > 0)
 		cpus = cpu_map__trim_new(nr_cpus, tmp_cpus);
-	else
+	else if (*cpu_list != '\0')
 		cpus = cpu_map__default_new();
+	else
+		cpus = cpu_map__dummy_new();
 invalid:
 	free(tmp_cpus);
 out:
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/ordered-events.c b/tools/perf/util/ordered-events.c
index 897589507d97..ea523d3b248f 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/ordered-events.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/ordered-events.c
@@ -391,8 +391,10 @@ void ordered_events__free(struct ordered_events *oe)
 	 * Current buffer might not have all the events allocated
 	 * yet, we need to free only allocated ones ...
 	 */
-	list_del(&oe->buffer->list);
-	ordered_events_buffer__free(oe->buffer, oe->buffer_idx, oe);
+	if (oe->buffer) {
+		list_del(&oe->buffer->list);
+		ordered_events_buffer__free(oe->buffer, oe->buffer_idx, oe);
+	}
 
 	/* ... and continue with the rest */
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(buffer, tmp, &oe->to_free, list) {
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/setup.py b/tools/perf/util/setup.py
index 63f758c655d5..64d1f36dee99 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/setup.py
+++ b/tools/perf/util/setup.py
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ if cc == "clang":
             vars[var] = sub("-mcet", "", vars[var])
         if not clang_has_option("-fcf-protection"):
             vars[var] = sub("-fcf-protection", "", vars[var])
+        if not clang_has_option("-fstack-clash-protection"):
+            vars[var] = sub("-fstack-clash-protection", "", vars[var])
 
 from distutils.core import setup, Extension
 

[GIT pull] x86 updates for 5.0

[Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest x86-urgent-for-linus git tree from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-for-linus

A few updates for x86:

 - Fix an unintended sign extension issue in the fault handling code

 - Rename the new resource control config switch so it's less confusing

 - Avoid setting up EFI info in kexec when the EFI runtime is disabled.

 - Fix the microcode version check in the AMD microcode loader so it only
   loads higher version numbers and never downgrades

 - Set EFER.LME in the 32bit trampoline before returning to long mode to
   handle older AMD/KVM behaviour properly.

 - Add Darren and Andy as x86/platform reviewers.


Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Borislav Petkov (1):
      MAINTAINERS: Add Andy and Darren as arch/x86/platform/ reviewers

Colin Ian King (1):
      x86/fault: Fix sign-extend unintended sign extension

Johannes Weiner (1):
      x86/resctrl: Avoid confusion over the new X86_RESCTRL config

Kairui Song (1):
      x86/kexec: Don't setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabled

Kan Liang (1):
      x86/cpu: Add Atom Tremont (Jacobsville)

Thomas Lendacky (1):
      x86/microcode/amd: Don't falsely trick the late loading mechanism

Wei Huang (1):
      x86/boot/compressed/64: Set EFER.LME=1 in 32-bit trampoline before returning to long mode


 Documentation/x86/resctrl_ui.txt     | 2 +-
 MAINTAINERS                          | 9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S   | 8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable.h   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h  | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/resctrl_sched.h | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile         | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c  | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/Makefile | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c    | 3 +++
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                  | 2 +-
 include/linux/sched.h                | 2 +-
 13 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/resctrl_ui.txt b/Documentation/x86/resctrl_ui.txt
index e8e8d14d3c4e..c1f95b59e14d 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/resctrl_ui.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/resctrl_ui.txt
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
 Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
 Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@intel.com>
 
-This feature is enabled by the CONFIG_X86_RESCTRL and the x86 /proc/cpuinfo
+This feature is enabled by the CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL and the x86 /proc/cpuinfo
 flag bits:
 RDT (Resource Director Technology) Allocation - "rdt_a"
 CAT (Cache Allocation Technology) - "cat_l3", "cat_l2"
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 32d444476a90..a98a7325df8c 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -16631,6 +16631,15 @@ S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/platform/x86/
 F:	drivers/platform/olpc/
 
+X86 PLATFORM DRIVERS - ARCH
+R:	Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
+R:	Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org>
+L:	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
+L:	x86@kernel.org
+T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86/core
+S:	Maintained
+F:	arch/x86/platform
+
 X86 VDSO
 M:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
 L:	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 26387c7bf305..68261430fe6e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -446,12 +446,12 @@ config RETPOLINE
 	  branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
 	  support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
 
-config X86_RESCTRL
-	bool "Resource Control support"
+config X86_CPU_RESCTRL
+	bool "x86 CPU resource control support"
 	depends on X86 && (CPU_SUP_INTEL || CPU_SUP_AMD)
 	select KERNFS
 	help
-	  Enable Resource Control support.
+	  Enable x86 CPU resource control support.
 
 	  Provide support for the allocation and monitoring of system resources
 	  usage by the CPU.
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index 64037895b085..f105ae8651c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -600,6 +600,14 @@ ENTRY(trampoline_32bit_src)
 	leal	TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_PGTABLE_OFFSET(%ecx), %eax
 	movl	%eax, %cr3
 3:
+	/* Set EFER.LME=1 as a precaution in case hypervsior pulls the rug */
+	pushl	%ecx
+	movl	$MSR_EFER, %ecx
+	rdmsr
+	btsl	$_EFER_LME, %eax
+	wrmsr
+	popl	%ecx
+
 	/* Enable PAE and LA57 (if required) paging modes */
 	movl	$X86_CR4_PAE, %eax
 	cmpl	$0, %edx
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable.h
index 91f75638f6e6..6ff7e81b5628 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable.h
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 #define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_PGTABLE_OFFSET	0
 
 #define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_CODE_OFFSET	PAGE_SIZE
-#define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_CODE_SIZE	0x60
+#define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_CODE_SIZE	0x70
 
 #define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_STACK_END	TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_SIZE
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
index 0dd6b0f4000e..d9a9993af882 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * "Big Core" Processors (Branded as Core, Xeon, etc...)
  *
  * The "_X" parts are generally the EP and EX Xeons, or the
- * "Extreme" ones, like Broadwell-E.
+ * "Extreme" ones, like Broadwell-E, or Atom microserver.
  *
  * While adding a new CPUID for a new microarchitecture, add a new
  * group to keep logically sorted out in chronological order. Within
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
 #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT	0x5C /* Apollo Lake */
 #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_X	0x5F /* Denverton */
 #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS	0x7A /* Gemini Lake */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_X	0x86 /* Jacobsville */
 
 /* Xeon Phi */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/resctrl_sched.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/resctrl_sched.h
index 40ebddde6ac2..f6b7fe2833cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/resctrl_sched.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/resctrl_sched.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_RESCTRL_SCHED_H
 #define _ASM_X86_RESCTRL_SCHED_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_RESCTRL
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
@@ -88,6 +88,6 @@ static inline void resctrl_sched_in(void)
 
 static inline void resctrl_sched_in(void) {}
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_X86_RESCTRL */
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_RESCTRL_SCHED_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
index b6fa0869f7aa..cfd24f9f7614 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_UMC_32)		+= umc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE)			+= mce/
 obj-$(CONFIG_MTRR)			+= mtrr/
 obj-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE)			+= microcode/
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_RESCTRL)		+= resctrl/
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL)		+= resctrl/
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC)		+= perfctr-watchdog.o
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
index 51adde0a0f1a..e1f3ba19ba54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ load_microcode_amd(bool save, u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size)
 	if (!p) {
 		return ret;
 	} else {
-		if (boot_cpu_data.microcode == p->patch_id)
+		if (boot_cpu_data.microcode >= p->patch_id)
 			return ret;
 
 		ret = UCODE_NEW;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/Makefile
index 1cabe6fd8e11..4a06c37b9cf1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_RESCTRL)	+= core.o rdtgroup.o monitor.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_RESCTRL)	+= ctrlmondata.o pseudo_lock.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL)	+= core.o rdtgroup.o monitor.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL)	+= ctrlmondata.o pseudo_lock.o
 CFLAGS_pseudo_lock.o = -I$(src)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 0d5efa34f359..53917a3ebf94 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -167,6 +167,9 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
 	struct efi_info *current_ei = &boot_params.efi_info;
 	struct efi_info *ei = &params->efi_info;
 
+	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!current_ei->efi_memmap_size)
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 2ff25ad33233..9d5c75f02295 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static void show_ldttss(const struct desc_ptr *gdt, const char *name, u16 index)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	addr = desc.base0 | (desc.base1 << 16) | (desc.base2 << 24);
+	addr = desc.base0 | (desc.base1 << 16) | ((unsigned long)desc.base2 << 24);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	addr |= ((u64)desc.base3 << 32);
 #endif
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 224666226e87..8c328b14c424 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ struct task_struct {
 	/* cg_list protected by css_set_lock and tsk->alloc_lock: */
 	struct list_head		cg_list;
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_RESCTRL
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL
 	u32				closid;
 	u32				rmid;
 #endif

Re: [GIT pull] efi fix for 5.0

[pr-tracker-bot]

The pull request you sent on Sun, 03 Feb 2019 17:16:05 +0100:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git efi-urgent-for-linus

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/89401be6580eab6419bab1f553144131e7a335dc

Thank you!

-- 
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https://korg.wiki.kernel.org/userdoc/prtracker

Re: [GIT pull] cpu hotplug updates for 5.0

[pr-tracker-bot]

The pull request you sent on Sun, 03 Feb 2019 17:16:06 +0100:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git smp-urgent-for-linus

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/cc6810e36bd875f197fcd6c74ad01f48090ecc05

Thank you!

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Re: [GIT pull] perf updates for 5.0

[pr-tracker-bot]

The pull request you sent on Sun, 03 Feb 2019 17:16:06 +0100:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git perf-urgent-for-linus

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/58f6d4287af751a75b24f4d32e6e1b077146ab18

Thank you!

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Re: [GIT pull] x86 updates for 5.0

[pr-tracker-bot]

The pull request you sent on Sun, 03 Feb 2019 17:16:07 +0100:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-for-linus

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/24b888d8d59847871387aa3b241b524661070a6e

Thank you!

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Re: [GIT pull] x86 updates for 5.0

[pr-tracker-bot]

The pull request you sent on Sun, 27 Jan 2019 12:05:08 +0100:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-for-linus

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/8a5f06056a25ac7dbca2b0505cc0fe8ffb6947c1

Thank you!

-- 
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[GIT pull] x86 updates for 5.0

[Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest x86-urgent-for-linus git tree from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-for-linus

A set of fixes for x86:

 - Fix the swapped outb() parameters in the KASLR code

 - Fix the PKEY handling at fork which missed to preserve the pkey state
   for the child. Comes with a test case to validate that.

 - Fix the entry stack handling for XEN PV to respect that XEN PV systems
   enter the function already on the current thread stack and not on the
   trampoline.

 - Fix kexec load failure caused by using a stale value when the kexec_buf
   structure is reused for subsequent allocations.

 - Fix a bogus sizeof() in the memory encryption code

 - Enforce PCI dependency for the Intel Low Power Subsystem

 - Enforce PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG when PCI is enabled

Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Daniel Drake (1):
      x86/kaslr: Fix incorrect i8254 outb() parameters

Dave Hansen (2):
      x86/pkeys: Properly copy pkey state at fork()
      x86/selftests/pkeys: Fork() to check for state being preserved

Dave Young (1):
      x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load() failure

Jan Beulich (1):
      x86/entry/64/compat: Fix stack switching for XEN PV

Peng Hao (1):
      x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Fix erroneous sizeof()

Sinan Kaya (2):
      x86/intel/lpss: Make PCI dependency explicit
      x86/Kconfig: Select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG if PCI is enabled


 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  4 +--
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S              |  6 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h            | 18 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/crash.c                       |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c             |  2 ++
 arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c                          |  4 +--
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c            |  4 +--
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
 8 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 15af091611e2..26387c7bf305 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ config X86
 	select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
 	select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
 	select PCI_DOMAINS			if PCI
-	select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG
+	select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG		if PCI
 	select PERF_EVENTS
 	select RTC_LIB
 	select RTC_MC146818_LIB
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ config X86_INTEL_QUARK
 
 config X86_INTEL_LPSS
 	bool "Intel Low Power Subsystem Support"
-	depends on X86 && ACPI
+	depends on X86 && ACPI && PCI
 	select COMMON_CLK
 	select PINCTRL
 	select IOSF_MBI
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 8eaf8952c408..39913770a44d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -361,7 +361,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
 
 	/* Need to switch before accessing the thread stack. */
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi
-	movq	%rsp, %rdi
+	/* In the Xen PV case we already run on the thread stack. */
+	ALTERNATIVE "movq %rsp, %rdi", "jmp .Lint80_keep_stack", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
 	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
 
 	pushq	6*8(%rdi)		/* regs->ss */
@@ -370,8 +371,9 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
 	pushq	3*8(%rdi)		/* regs->cs */
 	pushq	2*8(%rdi)		/* regs->ip */
 	pushq	1*8(%rdi)		/* regs->orig_ax */
-
 	pushq	(%rdi)			/* pt_regs->di */
+.Lint80_keep_stack:
+
 	pushq	%rsi			/* pt_regs->si */
 	xorl	%esi, %esi		/* nospec   si */
 	pushq	%rdx			/* pt_regs->dx */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 0ca50611e8ce..19d18fae6ec6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ static inline void switch_ldt(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)
 
 void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk);
 
+/*
+ * Init a new mm.  Used on mm copies, like at fork()
+ * and on mm's that are brand-new, like at execve().
+ */
 static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				   struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
@@ -228,8 +232,22 @@ do {						\
 } while (0)
 #endif
 
+static inline void arch_dup_pkeys(struct mm_struct *oldmm,
+				  struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		return;
+
+	/* Duplicate the oldmm pkey state in mm: */
+	mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = oldmm->context.pkey_allocation_map;
+	mm->context.execute_only_pkey   = oldmm->context.execute_only_pkey;
+#endif
+}
+
 static inline int arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
+	arch_dup_pkeys(oldmm, mm);
 	paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
 	return ldt_dup_context(oldmm, mm);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index c8b07d8ea5a2..17ffc869cab8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ int crash_load_segments(struct kimage *image)
 
 	kbuf.memsz = kbuf.bufsz;
 	kbuf.buf_align = ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN;
+	kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
 	ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
 	if (ret) {
 		vfree((void *)image->arch.elf_headers);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 278cd07228dd..0d5efa34f359 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
 	kbuf.memsz = PAGE_ALIGN(header->init_size);
 	kbuf.buf_align = header->kernel_alignment;
 	kbuf.buf_min = MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR;
+	kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
 	ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_free_params;
@@ -448,6 +449,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
 		kbuf.bufsz = kbuf.memsz = initrd_len;
 		kbuf.buf_align = PAGE_SIZE;
 		kbuf.buf_min = MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR;
+		kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
 		ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out_free_params;
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
index 79778ab200e4..a53665116458 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ static inline u16 i8254(void)
 	u16 status, timer;
 
 	do {
-		outb(I8254_PORT_CONTROL,
-		     I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0);
+		outb(I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0,
+		     I8254_PORT_CONTROL);
 		status = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
 		timer  = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
 		timer |= inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0) << 8;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index a19ef1a416ff..4aa9b1480866 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
 	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
 	if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
 		pte = ppd->pgtable_area;
-		memset(pte, 0, sizeof(pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
-		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
+		memset(pte, 0, sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
+		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
 		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(PMD_FLAGS | __pa(pte)));
 	}
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
index 460b4bdf4c1e..5d546dcdbc80 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
@@ -1133,6 +1133,21 @@ void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
 	pkey_assert(err);
 }
 
+void become_child(void)
+{
+	pid_t forkret;
+
+	forkret = fork();
+	pkey_assert(forkret >= 0);
+	dprintf3("[%d] fork() ret: %d\n", getpid(), forkret);
+
+	if (!forkret) {
+		/* in the child */
+		return;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
 /* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
 void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
 {
@@ -1141,7 +1156,7 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
 	int nr_allocated_pkeys = 0;
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*2; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*3; i++) {
 		int new_pkey;
 		dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
 		new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
@@ -1152,20 +1167,26 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
 		if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
 			dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
 				__func__, nr_allocated_pkeys);
-			break;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Ensure the number of successes never
+			 * exceeds the number of keys supported
+			 * in the hardware.
+			 */
+			pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
+			allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
 		}
-		pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
-		allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
+
+		/*
+		 * Make sure that allocation state is properly
+		 * preserved across fork().
+		 */
+		if (i == NR_PKEYS*2)
+			become_child();
 	}
 
 	dprintf3("%s()::%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
 
-	/*
-	 * ensure it did not reach the end of the loop without
-	 * failure:
-	 */
-	pkey_assert(i < NR_PKEYS*2);
-
 	/*
 	 * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware.  Three are
 	 * allocated by the time we get here:

[GIT pull] x86 updates for 5.0

[Thomas Gleixner, Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest x86-urgent-for-linus git tree from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-for-linus

A set of fixes for x86:

 - Fix the swapped outb() parameters in the KASLR code

 - Fix the PKEY handling at fork which missed to preserve the pkey state
   for the child. Comes with a test case to validate that.

 - Fix the entry stack handling for XEN PV to respect that XEN PV systems
   enter the function already on the current thread stack and not on the
   trampoline.

 - Fix kexec load failure caused by using a stale value when the kexec_buf
   structure is reused for subsequent allocations.

 - Fix a bogus sizeof() in the memory encryption code

 - Enforce PCI dependency for the Intel Low Power Subsystem

 - Enforce PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG when PCI is enabled

Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Daniel Drake (1):
      x86/kaslr: Fix incorrect i8254 outb() parameters

Dave Hansen (2):
      x86/pkeys: Properly copy pkey state at fork()
      x86/selftests/pkeys: Fork() to check for state being preserved

Dave Young (1):
      x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load() failure

Jan Beulich (1):
      x86/entry/64/compat: Fix stack switching for XEN PV

Peng Hao (1):
      x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Fix erroneous sizeof()

Sinan Kaya (2):
      x86/intel/lpss: Make PCI dependency explicit
      x86/Kconfig: Select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG if PCI is enabled


 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  4 +--
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S              |  6 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h            | 18 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/crash.c                       |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c             |  2 ++
 arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c                          |  4 +--
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c            |  4 +--
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
 8 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 15af091611e2..26387c7bf305 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ config X86
 	select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
 	select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
 	select PCI_DOMAINS			if PCI
-	select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG
+	select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG		if PCI
 	select PERF_EVENTS
 	select RTC_LIB
 	select RTC_MC146818_LIB
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ config X86_INTEL_QUARK
 
 config X86_INTEL_LPSS
 	bool "Intel Low Power Subsystem Support"
-	depends on X86 && ACPI
+	depends on X86 && ACPI && PCI
 	select COMMON_CLK
 	select PINCTRL
 	select IOSF_MBI
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 8eaf8952c408..39913770a44d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -361,7 +361,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
 
 	/* Need to switch before accessing the thread stack. */
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi
-	movq	%rsp, %rdi
+	/* In the Xen PV case we already run on the thread stack. */
+	ALTERNATIVE "movq %rsp, %rdi", "jmp .Lint80_keep_stack", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
 	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
 
 	pushq	6*8(%rdi)		/* regs->ss */
@@ -370,8 +371,9 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
 	pushq	3*8(%rdi)		/* regs->cs */
 	pushq	2*8(%rdi)		/* regs->ip */
 	pushq	1*8(%rdi)		/* regs->orig_ax */
-
 	pushq	(%rdi)			/* pt_regs->di */
+.Lint80_keep_stack:
+
 	pushq	%rsi			/* pt_regs->si */
 	xorl	%esi, %esi		/* nospec   si */
 	pushq	%rdx			/* pt_regs->dx */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 0ca50611e8ce..19d18fae6ec6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ static inline void switch_ldt(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)
 
 void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk);
 
+/*
+ * Init a new mm.  Used on mm copies, like at fork()
+ * and on mm's that are brand-new, like at execve().
+ */
 static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				   struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
@@ -228,8 +232,22 @@ do {						\
 } while (0)
 #endif
 
+static inline void arch_dup_pkeys(struct mm_struct *oldmm,
+				  struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		return;
+
+	/* Duplicate the oldmm pkey state in mm: */
+	mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = oldmm->context.pkey_allocation_map;
+	mm->context.execute_only_pkey   = oldmm->context.execute_only_pkey;
+#endif
+}
+
 static inline int arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
+	arch_dup_pkeys(oldmm, mm);
 	paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
 	return ldt_dup_context(oldmm, mm);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index c8b07d8ea5a2..17ffc869cab8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ int crash_load_segments(struct kimage *image)
 
 	kbuf.memsz = kbuf.bufsz;
 	kbuf.buf_align = ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN;
+	kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
 	ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
 	if (ret) {
 		vfree((void *)image->arch.elf_headers);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 278cd07228dd..0d5efa34f359 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
 	kbuf.memsz = PAGE_ALIGN(header->init_size);
 	kbuf.buf_align = header->kernel_alignment;
 	kbuf.buf_min = MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR;
+	kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
 	ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_free_params;
@@ -448,6 +449,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
 		kbuf.bufsz = kbuf.memsz = initrd_len;
 		kbuf.buf_align = PAGE_SIZE;
 		kbuf.buf_min = MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR;
+		kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
 		ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out_free_params;
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
index 79778ab200e4..a53665116458 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ static inline u16 i8254(void)
 	u16 status, timer;
 
 	do {
-		outb(I8254_PORT_CONTROL,
-		     I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0);
+		outb(I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0,
+		     I8254_PORT_CONTROL);
 		status = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
 		timer  = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
 		timer |= inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0) << 8;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index a19ef1a416ff..4aa9b1480866 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
 	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
 	if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
 		pte = ppd->pgtable_area;
-		memset(pte, 0, sizeof(pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
-		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
+		memset(pte, 0, sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
+		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
 		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(PMD_FLAGS | __pa(pte)));
 	}
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
index 460b4bdf4c1e..5d546dcdbc80 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
@@ -1133,6 +1133,21 @@ void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
 	pkey_assert(err);
 }
 
+void become_child(void)
+{
+	pid_t forkret;
+
+	forkret = fork();
+	pkey_assert(forkret >= 0);
+	dprintf3("[%d] fork() ret: %d\n", getpid(), forkret);
+
+	if (!forkret) {
+		/* in the child */
+		return;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
 /* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
 void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
 {
@@ -1141,7 +1156,7 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
 	int nr_allocated_pkeys = 0;
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*2; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*3; i++) {
 		int new_pkey;
 		dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
 		new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
@@ -1152,20 +1167,26 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
 		if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
 			dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
 				__func__, nr_allocated_pkeys);
-			break;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Ensure the number of successes never
+			 * exceeds the number of keys supported
+			 * in the hardware.
+			 */
+			pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
+			allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
 		}
-		pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
-		allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
+
+		/*
+		 * Make sure that allocation state is properly
+		 * preserved across fork().
+		 */
+		if (i == NR_PKEYS*2)
+			become_child();
 	}
 
 	dprintf3("%s()::%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
 
-	/*
-	 * ensure it did not reach the end of the loop without
-	 * failure:
-	 */
-	pkey_assert(i < NR_PKEYS*2);
-
 	/*
 	 * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware.  Three are
 	 * allocated by the time we get here: