From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@kernel.org>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, jgg@ziepe.ca,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, crazyt2019+lml@gmail.com,
nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com, silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated
Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 21:46:00 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1564883160.11223.103.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aff3502c598fb76a1517795edaacd8c8ea330051.camel@linux.intel.com>
On Sat, 2019-08-03 at 17:44 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, 2019-08-02 at 15:23 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> > That wasn't the conclusion that I came to. I prefer Robert's proposed
> > change to trusted.ko.
> >
> > How do you propose that this be fixed in eCryptfs?
> >
> > Removing encrypted_key support from eCryptfs is the only way that I can
> > see to fix the bug in eCryptfs. That support has been there since 2011.
> > I'm not sure of the number of users that would be broken by removing
> > encrypted_key support. I don't think the number is high but I can't say
> > that confidently.
>
> Looking at the documentation [1] it is stated that
>
> "Encrypted keys do not depend on a TPM, and are faster, as they use AES
> for encryption/decryption."
>
> Why would you need to remove support for encrypted keys? Isn't it a
> regression in encrypted keys to hard depend on trusted keys given
> what the documentation says?
"Encrypted" key are symmetric keys, which are encrypted/decrypted
either by a "trusted" key or, for development purposes only, a "user"
key.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-04 1:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-05 16:37 [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated Roberto Sassu
2019-07-08 19:55 ` Tyler Hicks
2019-07-08 20:34 ` James Bottomley
2019-07-09 16:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-09 16:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-08-02 21:18 ` Tyler Hicks
2019-07-11 19:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-15 16:44 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-08-01 16:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-02 8:21 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-08-02 14:27 ` Tyler Hicks
2019-08-02 19:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-02 20:23 ` Tyler Hicks
2019-08-02 20:35 ` Tyler Hicks
2019-08-03 14:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 1:46 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2019-08-05 14:50 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-08-05 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-08-05 16:04 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-08-05 16:04 ` Tyler Hicks
2019-08-05 16:51 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-08-05 16:53 ` Tyler Hicks
2019-08-05 22:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-02 19:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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