[GIT pull] x86/apic for v5.13-rc1

[GIT pull] x86/apic for v5.13-rc1

[Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest x86/apic branch from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-apic-2021-04-26

up to:  9a98bc2cf08a: x86/vector: Add a sanity check to prevent IRQ2 allocations


A single commit to make the vector allocation code more resilent against an
accidental allocation attempt for IRQ2.

Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Thomas Gleixner (1):
      x86/vector: Add a sanity check to prevent IRQ2 allocations


 arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
index 3c9c7492252f..9b75a70ebf90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
@@ -543,6 +543,14 @@ static int x86_vector_alloc_irqs(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq,
 	if ((info->flags & X86_IRQ_ALLOC_CONTIGUOUS_VECTORS) && nr_irqs > 1)
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
+	/*
+	 * Catch any attempt to touch the cascade interrupt on a PIC
+	 * equipped system.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(info->flags & X86_IRQ_ALLOC_LEGACY &&
+			 virq == PIC_CASCADE_IR))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_irqs; i++) {
 		irqd = irq_domain_get_irq_data(domain, virq + i);
 		BUG_ON(!irqd);
@@ -745,6 +753,11 @@ void __init lapic_assign_system_vectors(void)
 
 	/* Mark the preallocated legacy interrupts */
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_irqs(); i++) {
+		/*
+		 * Don't touch the cascade interrupt. It's unusable
+		 * on PIC equipped machines. See the large comment
+		 * in the IO/APIC code.
+		 */
 		if (i != PIC_CASCADE_IR)
 			irq_matrix_assign(vector_matrix, ISA_IRQ_VECTOR(i));
 	}

[GIT pull] x86/entry for v5.13-rc1

[Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest x86/entry branch from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-entry-2021-04-26

up to:  70918779aec9: arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support


Entry code update:

 Provide support for randomized stack offsets per syscall to make
 stack-based attacks harder which rely on the deterministic stack layout.

 The feature is based on the original idea of PaX's RANDSTACK feature, but
 uses a significantly different implementation.

 The offset does not affect the pt_regs location on the task stack as this
 was agreed on to be of dubious value. The offset is applied before the
 actual syscall is invoked.

 The offset is stored per cpu and the randomization happens at the end of
 the syscall which is less predictable than on syscall entry.

 The mechanism to apply the offset is via alloca(), i.e. abusing the
 dispised VLAs. This comes with the drawback that stack-clash-protection
 has to be disabled for the affected compilation units and there is also
 a negative interaction with stack-protector.

 Those downsides are traded with the advantage that this approach does not
 require any intrusive changes to the low level assembly entry code, does
 not affect the unwinder and the correct stack alignment is handled
 automatically by the compiler.

 The feature is guarded with a static branch which avoids the overhead when
 disabled.

 Currently this is supported for X86 and ARM64.


 

Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Kees Cook (6):
      jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
      init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
      stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
      x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
      lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
      arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support


 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++++
 Makefile                                        |  4 ++
 arch/Kconfig                                    | 23 +++++++++++
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                              |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile                      |  5 +++
 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c                     | 16 ++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/common.c                         |  3 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h             | 16 ++++++++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c                       | 17 ++++++++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c                       |  1 +
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h                      |  1 +
 include/linux/jump_label.h                      | 19 +++++++++
 include/linux/mm.h                              | 10 +++--
 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h                | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 init/main.c                                     | 23 +++++++++++
 mm/page_alloc.c                                 |  4 +-
 mm/slab.h                                       |  6 ++-
 tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/.gitignore        |  1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/Makefile          |  1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh  | 36 +++++++++++++++++
 21 files changed, 245 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
 create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 04545725f187..bee8644a192e 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4061,6 +4061,17 @@
 			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
 			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
 
+	randomize_kstack_offset=
+			[KNL] Enable or disable kernel stack offset
+			randomization, which provides roughly 5 bits of
+			entropy, frustrating memory corruption attacks
+			that depend on stack address determinism or
+			cross-syscall address exposures. This is only
+			available on architectures that have defined
+			CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET.
+			Format: <bool>  (1/Y/y=enable, 0/N/n=disable)
+			Default is CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT.
+
 	ras=option[,option,...]	[KNL] RAS-specific options
 
 		cec_disable	[X86]
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index cc77fd45ca64..d3bf50326d69 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -813,6 +813,10 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang
 endif
 
+# While VLAs have been removed, GCC produces unreachable stack probes
+# for the randomize_kstack_offset feature. Disable it for all compilers.
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-clash-protection)
+
 DEBUG_CFLAGS	:=
 
 # Workaround for GCC versions < 5.0
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index ecfd3520b676..6b11c825fc36 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -1054,6 +1054,29 @@ config VMAP_STACK
 	  backing virtual mappings with real shadow memory, and KASAN_VMALLOC
 	  must be enabled.
 
+config HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+	def_bool n
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if it can support kernel stack
+	  offset randomization with calls to add_random_kstack_offset()
+	  during syscall entry and choose_random_kstack_offset() during
+	  syscall exit. Careful removal of -fstack-protector-strong and
+	  -fstack-protector should also be applied to the entry code and
+	  closely examined, as the artificial stack bump looks like an array
+	  to the compiler, so it will attempt to add canary checks regardless
+	  of the static branch state.
+
+config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT
+	bool "Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry"
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+	help
+	  The kernel stack offset can be randomized (after pt_regs) by
+	  roughly 5 bits of entropy, frustrating memory corruption
+	  attacks that depend on stack address determinism or
+	  cross-syscall address exposures. This feature is controlled
+	  by kernel boot param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", and this
+	  config chooses the default boot state.
+
 config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
 	def_bool n
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index e4e1b6550115..4640d2553b47 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
 	select HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS
+	select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
index ed65576ce710..6cc97730790e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_ftrace.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_insn.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_return_address.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 
+# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary
+# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset.
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall.o	 = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
+CFLAGS_syscall.o	+= -fno-stack-protector
+
 # Object file lists.
 obj-y			:= debug-monitors.o entry.o irq.o fpsimd.o		\
 			   entry-common.o entry-fpsimd.o process.o ptrace.o	\
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
index b9cf12b271d7..263d6c1a525f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 
 #include <asm/daifflags.h>
@@ -43,6 +44,8 @@ static void invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int scno,
 {
 	long ret;
 
+	add_random_kstack_offset();
+
 	if (scno < sc_nr) {
 		syscall_fn_t syscall_fn;
 		syscall_fn = syscall_table[array_index_nospec(scno, sc_nr)];
@@ -55,6 +58,19 @@ static void invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int scno,
 		ret = lower_32_bits(ret);
 
 	regs->regs[0] = ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
+	 * but not enough for arm64 stack utilization comfort. To keep
+	 * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 9 bits.
+	 *
+	 * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
+	 * applying stack alignment constraints: the AAPCS mandates a
+	 * 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned SP at function boundaries.
+	 *
+	 * The resulting 5 bits of entropy is seen in SP[8:4].
+	 */
+	choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_int() & 0x1FF);
 }
 
 static inline bool has_syscall_work(unsigned long flags)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2792879d398e..4b4ad8ec10d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP         if X86_64 && USERFAULTFD
 	select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK		if X86_64
+	select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 	select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
 	select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS
 	select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index 4efd39aacb9f..7b2542b13ebd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 __visible noinstr void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	add_random_kstack_offset();
 	nr = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, nr);
 
 	instrumentation_begin();
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ __visible noinstr void do_int80_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	unsigned int nr = syscall_32_enter(regs);
 
+	add_random_kstack_offset();
 	/*
 	 * Subtlety here: if ptrace pokes something larger than 2^32-1 into
 	 * orig_ax, the unsigned int return value truncates it.  This may
@@ -102,6 +104,7 @@ static noinstr bool __do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	unsigned int nr = syscall_32_enter(regs);
 	int res;
 
+	add_random_kstack_offset();
 	/*
 	 * This cannot use syscall_enter_from_user_mode() as it has to
 	 * fetch EBP before invoking any of the syscall entry work
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index 2b87b191b3b8..14ebd2196569 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H
 #define _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H
 
+#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
 
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
@@ -70,6 +71,21 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 	 */
 	current_thread_info()->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT | TS_I386_REGS_POKED);
 #endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
+	 * but not enough for x86 stack utilization comfort. To keep
+	 * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 8 bits.
+	 *
+	 * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
+	 * applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in
+	 * arch/x86/Makefile), which will remove the 3 (x86_64) or 2 (ia32)
+	 * low bits from any entropy chosen here.
+	 *
+	 * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 5 (x86_64) or
+	 * 6 (ia32) bits.
+	 */
+	choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF);
 }
 #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare
 
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c
index 110f5a8538e9..0e8254d0cf0b 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c
@@ -134,6 +134,23 @@ noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG(void)
 	__lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK((void *)&data);
 }
 
+static pid_t stack_pid;
+static unsigned long stack_addr;
+
+void lkdtm_REPORT_STACK(void)
+{
+	volatile uintptr_t magic;
+	pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(current);
+
+	if (pid != stack_pid) {
+		pr_info("Starting stack offset tracking for pid %d\n", pid);
+		stack_pid = pid;
+		stack_addr = (uintptr_t)&magic;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("Stack offset: %d\n", (int)(stack_addr - (uintptr_t)&magic));
+}
+
 void lkdtm_UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE(void)
 {
 	static u8 data[5] __attribute__((aligned(4))) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c
index b2aff4d87c01..8024b6a5cc7f 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
 	CRASHTYPE(EXHAUST_STACK),
 	CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_STACK),
 	CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG),
+	CRASHTYPE(REPORT_STACK),
 	CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_ADD),
 	CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_DEL),
 	CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING),
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h
index 5ae48c64df24..99f90d3e5e9c 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ void lkdtm_LOOP(void);
 void lkdtm_EXHAUST_STACK(void);
 void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(void);
 void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG(void);
+void lkdtm_REPORT_STACK(void);
 void lkdtm_UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE(void);
 void lkdtm_SOFTLOCKUP(void);
 void lkdtm_HARDLOCKUP(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/jump_label.h b/include/linux/jump_label.h
index d92691262f51..05f5554d860f 100644
--- a/include/linux/jump_label.h
+++ b/include/linux/jump_label.h
@@ -382,6 +382,21 @@ struct static_key_false {
 		[0 ... (count) - 1] = STATIC_KEY_FALSE_INIT,	\
 	}
 
+#define _DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_1(name)	DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(name)
+#define _DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_0(name)	DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(name)
+#define DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(cfg, name)			\
+	__PASTE(_DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_, IS_ENABLED(cfg))(name)
+
+#define _DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_RO_1(name)	DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE_RO(name)
+#define _DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_RO_0(name)	DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(name)
+#define DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE_RO(cfg, name)			\
+	__PASTE(_DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_RO_, IS_ENABLED(cfg))(name)
+
+#define _DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_1(name)	DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(name)
+#define _DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_0(name)	DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(name)
+#define DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(cfg, name)			\
+	__PASTE(_DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_, IS_ENABLED(cfg))(name)
+
 extern bool ____wrong_branch_error(void);
 
 #define static_key_enabled(x)							\
@@ -482,6 +497,10 @@ extern bool ____wrong_branch_error(void);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL */
 
+#define static_branch_maybe(config, x)					\
+	(IS_ENABLED(config) ? static_branch_likely(x)			\
+			    : static_branch_unlikely(x))
+
 /*
  * Advanced usage; refcount, branch is enabled when: count != 0
  */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 8ba434287387..616dcaf08d99 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2904,18 +2904,20 @@ static inline void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages) { }
 static inline void kernel_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages) { }
 #endif
 
-DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_alloc);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON, init_on_alloc);
 static inline bool want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags)
 {
-	if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc))
+	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON,
+				&init_on_alloc))
 		return true;
 	return flags & __GFP_ZERO;
 }
 
-DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_free);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON, init_on_free);
 static inline bool want_init_on_free(void)
 {
-	return static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free);
+	return static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON,
+				   &init_on_free);
 }
 
 extern bool _debug_pagealloc_enabled_early;
diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fd80fab663a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H
+#define _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,
+			 randomize_kstack_offset);
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
+
+/*
+ * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because
+ * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct
+ * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of
+ * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see
+ * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
+ */
+void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size);
+/*
+ * Use, at most, 10 bits of entropy. We explicitly cap this to keep the
+ * "VLA" from being unbounded (see above). 10 bits leaves enough room for
+ * per-arch offset masks to reduce entropy (by removing higher bits, since
+ * high entropy may overly constrain usable stack space), and for
+ * compiler/arch-specific stack alignment to remove the lower bits.
+ */
+#define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x)	((x) & 0x3FF)
+
+/*
+ * These macros must be used during syscall entry when interrupts and
+ * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to
+ * the stack.
+ */
+#define add_random_kstack_offset() do {					\
+	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,	\
+				&randomize_kstack_offset)) {		\
+		u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset);		\
+		u8 *ptr = __builtin_alloca(KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset));	\
+		/* Keep allocation even after "ptr" loses scope. */	\
+		asm volatile("" : "=o"(*ptr) :: "memory");		\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+#define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do {				\
+	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,	\
+				&randomize_kstack_offset)) {		\
+		u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset);		\
+		offset ^= (rand);					\
+		raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset);			\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 53b278845b88..f498aac26e8c 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -844,6 +844,29 @@ static void __init mm_init(void)
 	pti_init();
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE_RO(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,
+			   randomize_kstack_offset);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
+
+static int __init early_randomize_kstack_offset(char *buf)
+{
+	int ret;
+	bool bool_result;
+
+	ret = kstrtobool(buf, &bool_result);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (bool_result)
+		static_branch_enable(&randomize_kstack_offset);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&randomize_kstack_offset);
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("randomize_kstack_offset", early_randomize_kstack_offset);
+#endif
+
 void __init __weak arch_call_rest_init(void)
 {
 	rest_init();
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index cfc72873961d..e2f19bf948db 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -167,10 +167,10 @@ unsigned long totalcma_pages __read_mostly;
 
 int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
 gfp_t gfp_allowed_mask __read_mostly = GFP_BOOT_MASK;
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_alloc);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON, init_on_alloc);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_on_alloc);
 
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_free);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON, init_on_free);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_on_free);
 
 static bool _init_on_alloc_enabled_early __read_mostly
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index 076582f58f68..774c7221efdc 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -601,7 +601,8 @@ static inline void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { }
 
 static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c)
 {
-	if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc)) {
+	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON,
+				&init_on_alloc)) {
 		if (c->ctor)
 			return false;
 		if (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON))
@@ -613,7 +614,8 @@ static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c)
 
 static inline bool slab_want_init_on_free(struct kmem_cache *c)
 {
-	if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free))
+	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON,
+				&init_on_free))
 		return !(c->ctor ||
 			 (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)));
 	return false;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/.gitignore
index f26212605b6b..d4b0be857deb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 *.sh
 !run.sh
+!stack-entropy.sh
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/Makefile
index 1bcc9ee990eb..c71109ceeb2d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/Makefile
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ include ../lib.mk
 
 # NOTE: $(OUTPUT) won't get default value if used before lib.mk
 TEST_FILES := tests.txt
+TEST_PROGS := stack-entropy.sh
 TEST_GEN_PROGS = $(patsubst %,$(OUTPUT)/%.sh,$(shell awk '{print $$1}' tests.txt | sed -e 's/\#//'))
 all: $(TEST_GEN_PROGS)
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..b1b8a5097cbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Measure kernel stack entropy by sampling via LKDTM's REPORT_STACK test.
+set -e
+samples="${1:-1000}"
+
+# Capture dmesg continuously since it may fill up depending on sample size.
+log=$(mktemp -t stack-entropy-XXXXXX)
+dmesg --follow >"$log" & pid=$!
+report=-1
+for i in $(seq 1 $samples); do
+        echo "REPORT_STACK" >/sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
+	if [ -t 1 ]; then
+		percent=$(( 100 * $i / $samples ))
+		if [ "$percent" -ne "$report" ]; then
+			/bin/echo -en "$percent%\r"
+			report="$percent"
+		fi
+	fi
+done
+kill "$pid"
+
+# Count unique offsets since last run.
+seen=$(tac "$log" | grep -m1 -B"$samples"0 'Starting stack offset' | \
+	grep 'Stack offset' | awk '{print $NF}' | sort | uniq -c | wc -l)
+bits=$(echo "obase=2; $seen" | bc | wc -L)
+echo "Bits of stack entropy: $bits"
+rm -f "$log"
+
+# We would expect any functional stack randomization to be at least 5 bits.
+if [ "$bits" -lt 5 ]; then
+	exit 1
+else
+	exit 0
+fi

[GIT pull] x86/splitlock for v5.13-rc1

[Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest x86/splitlock branch from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-splitlock-2021-04-26

up to:  ebca17707e38: Documentation/admin-guide: Change doc for split_lock_detect parameter


Support for enhanced split lock detection:

  Newer CPUs provide a second mechanism to detect operations with lock
  prefix which go accross a cache line boundary. Such operations have to
  take bus lock which causes a system wide performance degradation when
  these operations happen frequently.

  The new mechanism is not using the #AC exception. It triggers #DB and is
  restricted to operations in user space. Kernel side split lock access can
  only be detected by the #AC based variant. Contrary to the #AC based
  mechanism the #DB based variant triggers _after_ the instruction was
  executed. The mechanism is CPUID enumerated and contrary to the #AC
  version which is based on the magic TEST_CTRL_MSR and model/family based
  enumeration on the way to become architectural.


Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Fenghua Yu (3):
      x86/cpufeatures: Enumerate #DB for bus lock detection
      x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock
      Documentation/admin-guide: Change doc for split_lock_detect parameter


 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  22 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h                      |   7 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h              |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/debugreg.h            |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                    |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c                     | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c                         |   4 +
 8 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 04545725f187..aef927cec602 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5100,27 +5100,37 @@
 	spia_peddr=
 
 	split_lock_detect=
-			[X86] Enable split lock detection
+			[X86] Enable split lock detection or bus lock detection
 
 			When enabled (and if hardware support is present), atomic
 			instructions that access data across cache line
-			boundaries will result in an alignment check exception.
+			boundaries will result in an alignment check exception
+			for split lock detection or a debug exception for
+			bus lock detection.
 
 			off	- not enabled
 
-			warn	- the kernel will emit rate limited warnings
+			warn	- the kernel will emit rate-limited warnings
 				  about applications triggering the #AC
-				  exception. This mode is the default on CPUs
-				  that supports split lock detection.
+				  exception or the #DB exception. This mode is
+				  the default on CPUs that support split lock
+				  detection or bus lock detection. Default
+				  behavior is by #AC if both features are
+				  enabled in hardware.
 
 			fatal	- the kernel will send SIGBUS to applications
-				  that trigger the #AC exception.
+				  that trigger the #AC exception or the #DB
+				  exception. Default behavior is by #AC if
+				  both features are enabled in hardware.
 
 			If an #AC exception is hit in the kernel or in
 			firmware (i.e. not while executing in user mode)
 			the kernel will oops in either "warn" or "fatal"
 			mode.
 
+			#DB exception for bus lock is triggered only when
+			CPL > 0.
+
 	srbds=		[X86,INTEL]
 			Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
 			(SRBDS) mitigation.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
index da78ccbd493b..0d7fc0e2bfc9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
@@ -41,12 +41,13 @@ unsigned int x86_family(unsigned int sig);
 unsigned int x86_model(unsigned int sig);
 unsigned int x86_stepping(unsigned int sig);
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
-extern void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void __init sld_setup(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn);
 extern bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
 extern bool handle_guest_split_lock(unsigned long ip);
+extern void handle_bus_lock(struct pt_regs *regs);
 #else
-static inline void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
+static inline void __init sld_setup(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
 static inline void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn) {}
 static inline bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 {
@@ -57,6 +58,8 @@ static inline bool handle_guest_split_lock(unsigned long ip)
 {
 	return false;
 }
+
+static inline void handle_bus_lock(struct pt_regs *regs) {}
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_FEAT_CTL
 void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index cc96e26d69f7..faec3d92d09b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ	(16*32+14) /* POPCNT for vectors of DW/QW */
 #define X86_FEATURE_LA57		(16*32+16) /* 5-level page tables */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RDPID		(16*32+22) /* RDPID instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT	(16*32+24) /* Bus Lock detect */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLDEMOTE		(16*32+25) /* CLDEMOTE instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI		(16*32+27) /* MOVDIRI instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B		(16*32+28) /* MOVDIR64B instruction */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 546d6ecf0a35..32c496fb11b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR			(1UL <<  0) /* last branch recording */
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF_SHIFT		1
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF			(1UL <<  1) /* single-step on branches */
+#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT	(1UL <<  2)
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_TR			(1UL <<  6)
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS			(1UL <<  7)
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTINT		(1UL <<  8)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/debugreg.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/debugreg.h
index d95d080b30e3..0007ba077c0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/debugreg.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/debugreg.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #define DR_TRAP3	(0x8)		/* db3 */
 #define DR_TRAP_BITS	(DR_TRAP0|DR_TRAP1|DR_TRAP2|DR_TRAP3)
 
+#define DR_BUS_LOCK	(0x800)		/* bus_lock */
 #define DR_STEP		(0x4000)	/* single-step */
 #define DR_SWITCH	(0x8000)	/* task switch */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index ab640abe26b6..1a4e260b9027 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1330,7 +1330,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	cpu_set_bug_bits(c);
 
-	cpu_set_core_cap_bits(c);
+	sld_setup(c);
 
 	fpu__init_system(c);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 0e422a544835..e25e52bafeb6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ enum split_lock_detect_state {
 };
 
 /*
- * Default to sld_off because most systems do not support split lock detection
- * split_lock_setup() will switch this to sld_warn on systems that support
- * split lock detect, unless there is a command line override.
+ * Default to sld_off because most systems do not support split lock detection.
+ * sld_state_setup() will switch this to sld_warn on systems that support
+ * split lock/bus lock detect, unless there is a command line override.
  */
 static enum split_lock_detect_state sld_state __ro_after_init = sld_off;
 static u64 msr_test_ctrl_cache __ro_after_init;
@@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ static void init_intel_misc_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 }
 
 static void split_lock_init(void);
+static void bus_lock_init(void);
 
 static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
@@ -720,6 +721,7 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		tsx_disable();
 
 	split_lock_init();
+	bus_lock_init();
 
 	intel_init_thermal(c);
 }
@@ -1020,16 +1022,15 @@ static bool split_lock_verify_msr(bool on)
 	return ctrl == tmp;
 }
 
-static void __init split_lock_setup(void)
+static void __init sld_state_setup(void)
 {
 	enum split_lock_detect_state state = sld_warn;
 	char arg[20];
 	int i, ret;
 
-	if (!split_lock_verify_msr(false)) {
-		pr_info("MSR access failed: Disabled\n");
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
 		return;
-	}
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "split_lock_detect",
 				  arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -1041,17 +1042,14 @@ static void __init split_lock_setup(void)
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	sld_state = state;
+}
 
-	switch (state) {
-	case sld_off:
-		pr_info("disabled\n");
+static void __init __split_lock_setup(void)
+{
+	if (!split_lock_verify_msr(false)) {
+		pr_info("MSR access failed: Disabled\n");
 		return;
-	case sld_warn:
-		pr_info("warning about user-space split_locks\n");
-		break;
-	case sld_fatal:
-		pr_info("sending SIGBUS on user-space split_locks\n");
-		break;
 	}
 
 	rdmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, msr_test_ctrl_cache);
@@ -1061,7 +1059,9 @@ static void __init split_lock_setup(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	sld_state = state;
+	/* Restore the MSR to its cached value. */
+	wrmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, msr_test_ctrl_cache);
+
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT);
 }
 
@@ -1118,6 +1118,29 @@ bool handle_guest_split_lock(unsigned long ip)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(handle_guest_split_lock);
 
+static void bus_lock_init(void)
+{
+	u64 val;
+
+	/*
+	 * Warn and fatal are handled by #AC for split lock if #AC for
+	 * split lock is supported.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT) ||
+	    (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT) &&
+	    (sld_state == sld_warn || sld_state == sld_fatal)) ||
+	    sld_state == sld_off)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Enable #DB for bus lock. All bus locks are handled in #DB except
+	 * split locks are handled in #AC in the fatal case.
+	 */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, val);
+	val |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, val);
+}
+
 bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 {
 	if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC) || sld_state == sld_fatal)
@@ -1126,6 +1149,21 @@ bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 	return true;
 }
 
+void handle_bus_lock(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	switch (sld_state) {
+	case sld_off:
+		break;
+	case sld_warn:
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("#DB: %s/%d took a bus_lock trap at address: 0x%lx\n",
+				    current->comm, current->pid, regs->ip);
+		break;
+	case sld_fatal:
+		force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, NULL);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * This function is called only when switching between tasks with
  * different split-lock detection modes. It sets the MSR for the
@@ -1166,7 +1204,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id split_lock_cpu_ids[] __initconst = {
 	{}
 };
 
-void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+static void __init split_lock_setup(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
 	u64 ia32_core_caps;
@@ -1193,5 +1231,40 @@ void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 
 	cpu_model_supports_sld = true;
-	split_lock_setup();
+	__split_lock_setup();
+}
+
+static void sld_state_show(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
+		return;
+
+	switch (sld_state) {
+	case sld_off:
+		pr_info("disabled\n");
+		break;
+	case sld_warn:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
+			pr_info("#AC: crashing the kernel on kernel split_locks and warning on user-space split_locks\n");
+		else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
+			pr_info("#DB: warning on user-space bus_locks\n");
+		break;
+	case sld_fatal:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT)) {
+			pr_info("#AC: crashing the kernel on kernel split_locks and sending SIGBUS on user-space split_locks\n");
+		} else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT)) {
+			pr_info("#DB: sending SIGBUS on user-space bus_locks%s\n",
+				boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT) ?
+				" from non-WB" : "");
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void __init sld_setup(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	split_lock_setup(c);
+	sld_state_setup();
+	sld_state_show();
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index ac1874a2a70e..7bb94a6edc04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -978,6 +978,10 @@ static __always_inline void exc_debug_user(struct pt_regs *regs,
 		goto out_irq;
 	}
 
+	/* #DB for bus lock can only be triggered from userspace. */
+	if (dr6 & DR_BUS_LOCK)
+		handle_bus_lock(regs);
+
 	/* Add the virtual_dr6 bits for signals. */
 	dr6 |= current->thread.virtual_dr6;
 	if (dr6 & (DR_STEP | DR_TRAP_BITS) || icebp)

[GIT pull] x86/vdso for v5.13-rc1

[Thomas Gleixner]

Linus,

please pull the latest x86/vdso branch from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-vdso-2021-04-26

up to:  70c9d959226b: x86/vdso: Use proper modifier for len's format specifier in extract()


A single fix for the x86 VDSO build infrastructure to address a compiler
warning on 32bit hosts due to a fprintf() modifier/argument mismatch.

Thanks,

	tglx

------------------>
Jiri Slaby (1):
      x86/vdso: Use proper modifier for len's format specifier in extract()


 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
index 1c7cfac7e64a..5264daa8859f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(extract)(const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
 	if (offset + len > data_len)
 		fail("section to extract overruns input data");
 
-	fprintf(outfile, "static const unsigned char %s[%lu] = {", name, len);
+	fprintf(outfile, "static const unsigned char %s[%zu] = {", name, len);
 	BITSFUNC(copy)(outfile, data + offset, len);
 	fprintf(outfile, "\n};\n\n");
 }

Re: [GIT pull] x86/apic for v5.13-rc1

[pr-tracker-bot]

The pull request you sent on Mon, 26 Apr 2021 12:17:33 -0000:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-apic-2021-04-26

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/6f78c2a7b7219bc2e455250365f438621e5819d0

Thank you!

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Re: [GIT pull] x86/entry for v5.13-rc1

[pr-tracker-bot]

The pull request you sent on Mon, 26 Apr 2021 12:17:34 -0000:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-entry-2021-04-26

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/eea2647e74cd7bd5d04861ce55fa502de165de14

Thank you!

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Re: [GIT pull] x86/splitlock for v5.13-rc1

[pr-tracker-bot]

The pull request you sent on Mon, 26 Apr 2021 12:17:35 -0000:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-splitlock-2021-04-26

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/64f8e73de08d11cbe01347340db95b4011872ec5

Thank you!

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Re: [GIT pull] x86/vdso for v5.13-rc1

[pr-tracker-bot]

The pull request you sent on Mon, 26 Apr 2021 12:17:36 -0000:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-vdso-2021-04-26

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/69f737ed3a1c0e7619565bb4c01dff5ec8991d85

Thank you!

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