* [PATCHv3 0/3] Share common features between AMD SEV / TDX guest
@ 2021-12-06 13:55 Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 1/3] x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll Kirill A. Shutemov
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-06 13:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86
Cc: ak, dan.j.williams, hpa, jroedel, knsathya, linux-kernel, luto,
peterz, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy, thomas.lendacky, tony.luck,
Kirill A. Shutemov
Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protect guest VMs from malicious
hosts and some physical attacks. TDX has a lot of similarities to AMD SEV.
Features like encryption/decryption and string I/O unroll support can
be shared between these two technologies.
This patch set adds infrastructure changes required to share the code
between AMD SEV and TDX.
v3:
- Adjust wording in 1/3 based on Tom's feedback.
- Tested-by from Tom.
v2:
- Squash first two patches
- Rename print_amd_mem_encrypt_feature_info() to print_mem_encrypt_feature_info().
It will report TDX feature too.
Kirill A. Shutemov (1):
x86: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan (2):
x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll
x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c
arch/x86/Kconfig | 10 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 20 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 4 +
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 7 +-
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 441 +---------------------------------
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 438 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/cc_platform.h | 11 +
7 files changed, 473 insertions(+), 458 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCHv3 1/3] x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll 2021-12-06 13:55 [PATCHv3 0/3] Share common features between AMD SEV / TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-06 13:55 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-08 16:35 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 2/3] x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 3/3] x86: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c Kirill A. Shutemov 2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-06 13:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86 Cc: ak, dan.j.williams, hpa, jroedel, knsathya, linux-kernel, luto, peterz, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy, thomas.lendacky, tony.luck, Kirill A . Shutemov From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> INS/OUTS are not supported in TDX guests and cause #UD. Kernel has to avoid them when running in TDX guest. To support existing usage, string I/O operations are unrolled using IN/OUT instructions. AMD SEV platform implements this support by adding unroll logic in ins#bwl()/outs#bwl() macros with SEV specific checks. Since TDX VM guests will also need similar support, use CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO and generic cc_platform_has() API to implement it. String I/O helpers were the last users of sev_key_active() interface and sev_enable_key static key. Remove them. Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 20 +++----------------- arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 4 ++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 10 ---------- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 11 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h index 5c6a4af0b911..f6d91ecb8026 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/early_ioremap.h> #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> @@ -256,21 +257,6 @@ static inline void slow_down_io(void) #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT -#include <linux/jump_label.h> - -extern struct static_key_false sev_enable_key; -static inline bool sev_key_active(void) -{ - return static_branch_unlikely(&sev_enable_key); -} - -#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ - -static inline bool sev_key_active(void) { return false; } - -#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ - #define BUILDIO(bwl, bw, type) \ static inline void out##bwl(unsigned type value, int port) \ { \ @@ -301,7 +287,7 @@ static inline unsigned type in##bwl##_p(int port) \ \ static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count) \ { \ - if (sev_key_active()) { \ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO)) { \ unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr; \ while (count) { \ out##bwl(*value, port); \ @@ -317,7 +303,7 @@ static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count) \ \ static inline void ins##bwl(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count) \ { \ - if (sev_key_active()) { \ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO)) { \ unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr; \ while (count) { \ *value = in##bwl(port); \ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c index 03bb2f343ddb..cc1ffe710dd2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c @@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT: return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED; + case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO: + return (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) && + !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED); + default: return false; } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 35487305d8af..b520021a7e7b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ u64 sme_me_mask __section(".data") = 0; u64 sev_status __section(".data") = 0; u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0; EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key); /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); @@ -499,14 +497,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */ swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(); - /* - * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions, - * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler. - */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && - !cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) - static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key); - print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); } diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h index a075b70b9a70..f47f0c9edb3b 100644 --- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h +++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h @@ -61,6 +61,17 @@ enum cc_attr { * Examples include SEV-ES. */ CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT, + + /** + * @CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO: String I/O is implemented with + * IN/OUT instructions + * + * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine and uses + * IN/OUT instructions in place of string I/O. + * + * Examples include TDX Guest & SEV. + */ + CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO, }; #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM -- 2.32.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 1/3] x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-08 16:35 ` tip-bot2 for Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: tip-bot2 for Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan @ 2021-12-08 16:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-tip-commits Cc: Tom Lendacky, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan, Kirill A. Shutemov, Borislav Petkov, Tony Luck, x86, linux-kernel The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip: Commit-ID: 8260b9820f7050461b8969305bbd8cb5654f0c74 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/8260b9820f7050461b8969305bbd8cb5654f0c74 Author: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Mon, 06 Dec 2021 16:55:03 +03:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> CommitterDate: Wed, 08 Dec 2021 16:49:42 +01:00 x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll INS/OUTS are not supported in TDX guests and cause #UD. Kernel has to avoid them when running in TDX guest. To support existing usage, string I/O operations are unrolled using IN/OUT instructions. AMD SEV platform implements this support by adding unroll logic in ins#bwl()/outs#bwl() macros with SEV-specific checks. Since TDX VM guests will also need similar support, use CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO and generic cc_platform_has() API to implement it. String I/O helpers were the last users of sev_key_active() interface and sev_enable_key static key. Remove them. [ bp: Move comment too and do not delete it. ] Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 20 +++----------------- arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 10 ---------- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 11 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h index 5c6a4af..f6d91ec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/early_ioremap.h> #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> @@ -256,21 +257,6 @@ static inline void slow_down_io(void) #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT -#include <linux/jump_label.h> - -extern struct static_key_false sev_enable_key; -static inline bool sev_key_active(void) -{ - return static_branch_unlikely(&sev_enable_key); -} - -#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ - -static inline bool sev_key_active(void) { return false; } - -#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ - #define BUILDIO(bwl, bw, type) \ static inline void out##bwl(unsigned type value, int port) \ { \ @@ -301,7 +287,7 @@ static inline unsigned type in##bwl##_p(int port) \ \ static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count) \ { \ - if (sev_key_active()) { \ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO)) { \ unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr; \ while (count) { \ out##bwl(*value, port); \ @@ -317,7 +303,7 @@ static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count) \ \ static inline void ins##bwl(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count) \ { \ - if (sev_key_active()) { \ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO)) { \ unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr; \ while (count) { \ *value = in##bwl(port); \ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c index 03bb2f3..8a25b1c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c @@ -50,6 +50,14 @@ static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT: return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED; + /* + * With SEV, the rep string I/O instructions need to be unrolled + * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler. + */ + case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO: + return (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) && + !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED); + default: return false; } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 3548730..b520021 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ u64 sme_me_mask __section(".data") = 0; u64 sev_status __section(".data") = 0; u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0; EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key); /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); @@ -499,14 +497,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */ swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(); - /* - * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions, - * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler. - */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && - !cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) - static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key); - print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); } diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h index a075b70..efd8205 100644 --- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h +++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h @@ -61,6 +61,17 @@ enum cc_attr { * Examples include SEV-ES. */ CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT, + + /** + * @CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO: String I/O is implemented with + * IN/OUT instructions + * + * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine and uses + * IN/OUT instructions in place of string I/O. + * + * Examples include TDX guest & SEV. + */ + CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO, }; #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCHv3 2/3] x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c 2021-12-06 13:55 [PATCHv3 0/3] Share common features between AMD SEV / TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 1/3] x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-06 13:55 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-08 16:35 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 3/3] x86: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c Kirill A. Shutemov 2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-06 13:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86 Cc: ak, dan.j.williams, hpa, jroedel, knsathya, linux-kernel, luto, peterz, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy, thomas.lendacky, tony.luck, Kirill A . Shutemov From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Both TDX and AMD SEV/SME implement memory encryption features. But the bulk of the code in mem_encrypt.c is AMD specific. Rename the file to mem_encrypt_amd.c. A subsequent patch will extract the parts that can be shared by both TDX and AMD SEV/SME into a generic file. No functional changes. Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> --- arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/mm/{mem_encrypt.c => mem_encrypt_amd.c} | 0 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) rename arch/x86/mm/{mem_encrypt.c => mem_encrypt_amd.c} (100%) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile index 5864219221ca..c9c480641153 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Kernel does not boot with instrumentation of tlb.c and mem_encrypt*.c KCOV_INSTRUMENT_tlb.o := n -KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o := n +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n -KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n # Disable KCSAN entirely, because otherwise we get warnings that some functions @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n KCSAN_SANITIZE := n ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER -CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_amd.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_identity.o = -pg endif @@ -52,6 +52,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o -obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o +obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_amd.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c similarity index 100% rename from arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c rename to arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c -- 2.32.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 2/3] x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-08 16:35 ` tip-bot2 for Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: tip-bot2 for Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan @ 2021-12-08 16:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-tip-commits Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan, Kirill A. Shutemov, Borislav Petkov, Tony Luck, Tom Lendacky, x86, linux-kernel The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip: Commit-ID: dbca5e1a04f8b30aea4e2c91e5045ee6e7c3ef43 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/dbca5e1a04f8b30aea4e2c91e5045ee6e7c3ef43 Author: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Mon, 06 Dec 2021 16:55:04 +03:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> CommitterDate: Wed, 08 Dec 2021 16:49:47 +01:00 x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c Both Intel TDX and AMD SEV implement memory encryption features. But the bulk of the code in mem_encrypt.c is AMD-specific. Rename the file to mem_encrypt_amd.c. A subsequent patch will extract the parts that can be shared by both TDX and AMD SEV/SME into a generic file. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 8 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 507 +--------------------------------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 507 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 511 insertions(+), 511 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile index 5864219..c9c4806 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Kernel does not boot with instrumentation of tlb.c and mem_encrypt*.c KCOV_INSTRUMENT_tlb.o := n -KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o := n +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n -KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n # Disable KCSAN entirely, because otherwise we get warnings that some functions @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n KCSAN_SANITIZE := n ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER -CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_amd.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_identity.o = -pg endif @@ -52,6 +52,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o -obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o +obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_amd.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c deleted file mode 100644 index b520021..0000000 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,507 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* - * AMD Memory Encryption Support - * - * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. - * - * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> - */ - -#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING - -#include <linux/linkage.h> -#include <linux/init.h> -#include <linux/mm.h> -#include <linux/dma-direct.h> -#include <linux/swiotlb.h> -#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> -#include <linux/device.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/bitops.h> -#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> -#include <linux/virtio_config.h> -#include <linux/cc_platform.h> - -#include <asm/tlbflush.h> -#include <asm/fixmap.h> -#include <asm/setup.h> -#include <asm/bootparam.h> -#include <asm/set_memory.h> -#include <asm/cacheflush.h> -#include <asm/processor-flags.h> -#include <asm/msr.h> -#include <asm/cmdline.h> - -#include "mm_internal.h" - -/* - * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must - * reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed out when the .bss - * section is later cleared. - */ -u64 sme_me_mask __section(".data") = 0; -u64 sev_status __section(".data") = 0; -u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0; -EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); - -/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ -static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); - -/* - * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the - * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is - * meant to be accessed as either encrypted or decrypted but the contents - * are currently not in the desired state. - * - * This routine follows the steps outlined in the AMD64 Architecture - * Programmer's Manual Volume 2, Section 7.10.8 Encrypt-in-Place. - */ -static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr, - unsigned long size, bool enc) -{ - void *src, *dst; - size_t len; - - if (!sme_me_mask) - return; - - wbinvd(); - - /* - * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most) - * one page at time. - */ - while (size) { - len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size); - - /* - * Create mappings for the current and desired format of - * the memory. Use a write-protected mapping for the source. - */ - src = enc ? early_memremap_decrypted_wp(paddr, len) : - early_memremap_encrypted_wp(paddr, len); - - dst = enc ? early_memremap_encrypted(paddr, len) : - early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, len); - - /* - * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the operation, - * then eventual access of that area in the desired mode - * will cause a crash. - */ - BUG_ON(!src || !dst); - - /* - * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to - * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM. - */ - memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len); - memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len); - - early_memunmap(dst, len); - early_memunmap(src, len); - - paddr += len; - size -= len; - } -} - -void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size) -{ - __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, true); -} - -void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size) -{ - __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false); -} - -static void __init __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(void *vaddr, unsigned long size, - bool map) -{ - unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET; - pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd; - - /* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */ - pmd_flags = __sme_clr(early_pmd_flags); - - do { - pmd = map ? (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags : 0; - __early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd); - - vaddr += PMD_SIZE; - paddr += PMD_SIZE; - size = (size <= PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE; - } while (size); - - flush_tlb_local(); -} - -void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) -{ - struct boot_params *boot_data; - unsigned long cmdline_paddr; - - if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - return; - - /* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */ - boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data; - cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32); - - __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), false); - - if (!cmdline_paddr) - return; - - __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, false); -} - -void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) -{ - struct boot_params *boot_data; - unsigned long cmdline_paddr; - - if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - return; - - __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true); - - /* Get the command line address after mapping the real_mode_data */ - boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data; - cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32); - - if (!cmdline_paddr) - return; - - __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, true); -} - -void __init sme_early_init(void) -{ - unsigned int i; - - if (!sme_me_mask) - return; - - early_pmd_flags = __sme_set(early_pmd_flags); - - __supported_pte_mask = __sme_set(__supported_pte_mask); - - /* Update the protection map with memory encryption mask */ - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++) - protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]); - - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE; -} - -void __init sev_setup_arch(void) -{ - phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size(); - unsigned long size; - - if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - return; - - /* - * For SEV, all DMA has to occur via shared/unencrypted pages. - * SEV uses SWIOTLB to make this happen without changing device - * drivers. However, depending on the workload being run, the - * default 64MB of SWIOTLB may not be enough and SWIOTLB may - * run out of buffers for DMA, resulting in I/O errors and/or - * performance degradation especially with high I/O workloads. - * - * Adjust the default size of SWIOTLB for SEV guests using - * a percentage of guest memory for SWIOTLB buffers. - * Also, as the SWIOTLB bounce buffer memory is allocated - * from low memory, ensure that the adjusted size is within - * the limits of low available memory. - * - * The percentage of guest memory used here for SWIOTLB buffers - * is more of an approximation of the static adjustment which - * 64MB for <1G, and ~128M to 256M for 1G-to-4G, i.e., the 6% - */ - size = total_mem * 6 / 100; - size = clamp_val(size, IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE, SZ_1G); - swiotlb_adjust_size(size); -} - -static unsigned long pg_level_to_pfn(int level, pte_t *kpte, pgprot_t *ret_prot) -{ - unsigned long pfn = 0; - pgprot_t prot; - - switch (level) { - case PG_LEVEL_4K: - pfn = pte_pfn(*kpte); - prot = pte_pgprot(*kpte); - break; - case PG_LEVEL_2M: - pfn = pmd_pfn(*(pmd_t *)kpte); - prot = pmd_pgprot(*(pmd_t *)kpte); - break; - case PG_LEVEL_1G: - pfn = pud_pfn(*(pud_t *)kpte); - prot = pud_pgprot(*(pud_t *)kpte); - break; - default: - WARN_ONCE(1, "Invalid level for kpte\n"); - return 0; - } - - if (ret_prot) - *ret_prot = prot; - - return pfn; -} - -void notify_range_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT - unsigned long sz = npages << PAGE_SHIFT; - unsigned long vaddr_end = vaddr + sz; - - while (vaddr < vaddr_end) { - int psize, pmask, level; - unsigned long pfn; - pte_t *kpte; - - kpte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level); - if (!kpte || pte_none(*kpte)) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "kpte lookup for vaddr\n"); - return; - } - - pfn = pg_level_to_pfn(level, kpte, NULL); - if (!pfn) - continue; - - psize = page_level_size(level); - pmask = page_level_mask(level); - - notify_page_enc_status_changed(pfn, psize >> PAGE_SHIFT, enc); - - vaddr = (vaddr & pmask) + psize; - } -#endif -} - -static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc) -{ - pgprot_t old_prot, new_prot; - unsigned long pfn, pa, size; - pte_t new_pte; - - pfn = pg_level_to_pfn(level, kpte, &old_prot); - if (!pfn) - return; - - new_prot = old_prot; - if (enc) - pgprot_val(new_prot) |= _PAGE_ENC; - else - pgprot_val(new_prot) &= ~_PAGE_ENC; - - /* If prot is same then do nothing. */ - if (pgprot_val(old_prot) == pgprot_val(new_prot)) - return; - - pa = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; - size = page_level_size(level); - - /* - * We are going to perform in-place en-/decryption and change the - * physical page attribute from C=1 to C=0 or vice versa. Flush the - * caches to ensure that data gets accessed with the correct C-bit. - */ - clflush_cache_range(__va(pa), size); - - /* Encrypt/decrypt the contents in-place */ - if (enc) - sme_early_encrypt(pa, size); - else - sme_early_decrypt(pa, size); - - /* Change the page encryption mask. */ - new_pte = pfn_pte(pfn, new_prot); - set_pte_atomic(kpte, new_pte); -} - -static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr, - unsigned long size, bool enc) -{ - unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next, start; - unsigned long psize, pmask; - int split_page_size_mask; - int level, ret; - pte_t *kpte; - - start = vaddr; - vaddr_next = vaddr; - vaddr_end = vaddr + size; - - for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = vaddr_next) { - kpte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level); - if (!kpte || pte_none(*kpte)) { - ret = 1; - goto out; - } - - if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K) { - __set_clr_pte_enc(kpte, level, enc); - vaddr_next = (vaddr & PAGE_MASK) + PAGE_SIZE; - continue; - } - - psize = page_level_size(level); - pmask = page_level_mask(level); - - /* - * Check whether we can change the large page in one go. - * We request a split when the address is not aligned and - * the number of pages to set/clear encryption bit is smaller - * than the number of pages in the large page. - */ - if (vaddr == (vaddr & pmask) && - ((vaddr_end - vaddr) >= psize)) { - __set_clr_pte_enc(kpte, level, enc); - vaddr_next = (vaddr & pmask) + psize; - continue; - } - - /* - * The virtual address is part of a larger page, create the next - * level page table mapping (4K or 2M). If it is part of a 2M - * page then we request a split of the large page into 4K - * chunks. A 1GB large page is split into 2M pages, resp. - */ - if (level == PG_LEVEL_2M) - split_page_size_mask = 0; - else - split_page_size_mask = 1 << PG_LEVEL_2M; - - /* - * kernel_physical_mapping_change() does not flush the TLBs, so - * a TLB flush is required after we exit from the for loop. - */ - kernel_physical_mapping_change(__pa(vaddr & pmask), - __pa((vaddr_end & pmask) + psize), - split_page_size_mask); - } - - ret = 0; - - notify_range_enc_status_changed(start, PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT, enc); -out: - __flush_tlb_all(); - return ret; -} - -int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) -{ - return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, false); -} - -int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) -{ - return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, true); -} - -void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) -{ - notify_range_enc_status_changed(vaddr, npages, enc); -} - -/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ -bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) -{ - /* - * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. - */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - return true; - - /* - * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the - * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the - * encryption mask. - */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { - u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); - u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, - dev->bus_dma_limit); - - if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) - return true; - } - - return false; -} - -void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) -{ - unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, npages; - int r; - - vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted_unused; - vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_bss_decrypted; - npages = (vaddr_end - vaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - - /* - * The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption - * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it. - */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { - r = set_memory_encrypted(vaddr, npages); - if (r) { - pr_warn("failed to free unused decrypted pages\n"); - return; - } - } - - free_init_pages("unused decrypted", vaddr, vaddr_end); -} - -static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) -{ - pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:"); - - /* Secure Memory Encryption */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { - /* - * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV - * features below. - */ - pr_cont(" SME\n"); - return; - } - - /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - pr_cont(" SEV"); - - /* Encrypted Register State */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) - pr_cont(" SEV-ES"); - - pr_cont("\n"); -} - -/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ -void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) -{ - if (!sme_me_mask) - return; - - /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */ - swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(); - - print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); -} - -int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) -{ - return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b520021 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c @@ -0,0 +1,507 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AMD Memory Encryption Support + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> + */ + +#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING + +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/dma-direct.h> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <linux/virtio_config.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> + +#include <asm/tlbflush.h> +#include <asm/fixmap.h> +#include <asm/setup.h> +#include <asm/bootparam.h> +#include <asm/set_memory.h> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h> +#include <asm/msr.h> +#include <asm/cmdline.h> + +#include "mm_internal.h" + +/* + * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must + * reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed out when the .bss + * section is later cleared. + */ +u64 sme_me_mask __section(".data") = 0; +u64 sev_status __section(".data") = 0; +u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); + +/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ +static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); + +/* + * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the + * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is + * meant to be accessed as either encrypted or decrypted but the contents + * are currently not in the desired state. + * + * This routine follows the steps outlined in the AMD64 Architecture + * Programmer's Manual Volume 2, Section 7.10.8 Encrypt-in-Place. + */ +static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr, + unsigned long size, bool enc) +{ + void *src, *dst; + size_t len; + + if (!sme_me_mask) + return; + + wbinvd(); + + /* + * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most) + * one page at time. + */ + while (size) { + len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size); + + /* + * Create mappings for the current and desired format of + * the memory. Use a write-protected mapping for the source. + */ + src = enc ? early_memremap_decrypted_wp(paddr, len) : + early_memremap_encrypted_wp(paddr, len); + + dst = enc ? early_memremap_encrypted(paddr, len) : + early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, len); + + /* + * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the operation, + * then eventual access of that area in the desired mode + * will cause a crash. + */ + BUG_ON(!src || !dst); + + /* + * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to + * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM. + */ + memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len); + memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len); + + early_memunmap(dst, len); + early_memunmap(src, len); + + paddr += len; + size -= len; + } +} + +void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size) +{ + __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, true); +} + +void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size) +{ + __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false); +} + +static void __init __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(void *vaddr, unsigned long size, + bool map) +{ + unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET; + pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd; + + /* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */ + pmd_flags = __sme_clr(early_pmd_flags); + + do { + pmd = map ? (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags : 0; + __early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd); + + vaddr += PMD_SIZE; + paddr += PMD_SIZE; + size = (size <= PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE; + } while (size); + + flush_tlb_local(); +} + +void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) +{ + struct boot_params *boot_data; + unsigned long cmdline_paddr; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return; + + /* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */ + boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data; + cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32); + + __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), false); + + if (!cmdline_paddr) + return; + + __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, false); +} + +void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) +{ + struct boot_params *boot_data; + unsigned long cmdline_paddr; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return; + + __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true); + + /* Get the command line address after mapping the real_mode_data */ + boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data; + cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32); + + if (!cmdline_paddr) + return; + + __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, true); +} + +void __init sme_early_init(void) +{ + unsigned int i; + + if (!sme_me_mask) + return; + + early_pmd_flags = __sme_set(early_pmd_flags); + + __supported_pte_mask = __sme_set(__supported_pte_mask); + + /* Update the protection map with memory encryption mask */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++) + protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]); + + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE; +} + +void __init sev_setup_arch(void) +{ + phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size(); + unsigned long size; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return; + + /* + * For SEV, all DMA has to occur via shared/unencrypted pages. + * SEV uses SWIOTLB to make this happen without changing device + * drivers. However, depending on the workload being run, the + * default 64MB of SWIOTLB may not be enough and SWIOTLB may + * run out of buffers for DMA, resulting in I/O errors and/or + * performance degradation especially with high I/O workloads. + * + * Adjust the default size of SWIOTLB for SEV guests using + * a percentage of guest memory for SWIOTLB buffers. + * Also, as the SWIOTLB bounce buffer memory is allocated + * from low memory, ensure that the adjusted size is within + * the limits of low available memory. + * + * The percentage of guest memory used here for SWIOTLB buffers + * is more of an approximation of the static adjustment which + * 64MB for <1G, and ~128M to 256M for 1G-to-4G, i.e., the 6% + */ + size = total_mem * 6 / 100; + size = clamp_val(size, IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE, SZ_1G); + swiotlb_adjust_size(size); +} + +static unsigned long pg_level_to_pfn(int level, pte_t *kpte, pgprot_t *ret_prot) +{ + unsigned long pfn = 0; + pgprot_t prot; + + switch (level) { + case PG_LEVEL_4K: + pfn = pte_pfn(*kpte); + prot = pte_pgprot(*kpte); + break; + case PG_LEVEL_2M: + pfn = pmd_pfn(*(pmd_t *)kpte); + prot = pmd_pgprot(*(pmd_t *)kpte); + break; + case PG_LEVEL_1G: + pfn = pud_pfn(*(pud_t *)kpte); + prot = pud_pgprot(*(pud_t *)kpte); + break; + default: + WARN_ONCE(1, "Invalid level for kpte\n"); + return 0; + } + + if (ret_prot) + *ret_prot = prot; + + return pfn; +} + +void notify_range_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT + unsigned long sz = npages << PAGE_SHIFT; + unsigned long vaddr_end = vaddr + sz; + + while (vaddr < vaddr_end) { + int psize, pmask, level; + unsigned long pfn; + pte_t *kpte; + + kpte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level); + if (!kpte || pte_none(*kpte)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "kpte lookup for vaddr\n"); + return; + } + + pfn = pg_level_to_pfn(level, kpte, NULL); + if (!pfn) + continue; + + psize = page_level_size(level); + pmask = page_level_mask(level); + + notify_page_enc_status_changed(pfn, psize >> PAGE_SHIFT, enc); + + vaddr = (vaddr & pmask) + psize; + } +#endif +} + +static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc) +{ + pgprot_t old_prot, new_prot; + unsigned long pfn, pa, size; + pte_t new_pte; + + pfn = pg_level_to_pfn(level, kpte, &old_prot); + if (!pfn) + return; + + new_prot = old_prot; + if (enc) + pgprot_val(new_prot) |= _PAGE_ENC; + else + pgprot_val(new_prot) &= ~_PAGE_ENC; + + /* If prot is same then do nothing. */ + if (pgprot_val(old_prot) == pgprot_val(new_prot)) + return; + + pa = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; + size = page_level_size(level); + + /* + * We are going to perform in-place en-/decryption and change the + * physical page attribute from C=1 to C=0 or vice versa. Flush the + * caches to ensure that data gets accessed with the correct C-bit. + */ + clflush_cache_range(__va(pa), size); + + /* Encrypt/decrypt the contents in-place */ + if (enc) + sme_early_encrypt(pa, size); + else + sme_early_decrypt(pa, size); + + /* Change the page encryption mask. */ + new_pte = pfn_pte(pfn, new_prot); + set_pte_atomic(kpte, new_pte); +} + +static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr, + unsigned long size, bool enc) +{ + unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next, start; + unsigned long psize, pmask; + int split_page_size_mask; + int level, ret; + pte_t *kpte; + + start = vaddr; + vaddr_next = vaddr; + vaddr_end = vaddr + size; + + for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = vaddr_next) { + kpte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level); + if (!kpte || pte_none(*kpte)) { + ret = 1; + goto out; + } + + if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K) { + __set_clr_pte_enc(kpte, level, enc); + vaddr_next = (vaddr & PAGE_MASK) + PAGE_SIZE; + continue; + } + + psize = page_level_size(level); + pmask = page_level_mask(level); + + /* + * Check whether we can change the large page in one go. + * We request a split when the address is not aligned and + * the number of pages to set/clear encryption bit is smaller + * than the number of pages in the large page. + */ + if (vaddr == (vaddr & pmask) && + ((vaddr_end - vaddr) >= psize)) { + __set_clr_pte_enc(kpte, level, enc); + vaddr_next = (vaddr & pmask) + psize; + continue; + } + + /* + * The virtual address is part of a larger page, create the next + * level page table mapping (4K or 2M). If it is part of a 2M + * page then we request a split of the large page into 4K + * chunks. A 1GB large page is split into 2M pages, resp. + */ + if (level == PG_LEVEL_2M) + split_page_size_mask = 0; + else + split_page_size_mask = 1 << PG_LEVEL_2M; + + /* + * kernel_physical_mapping_change() does not flush the TLBs, so + * a TLB flush is required after we exit from the for loop. + */ + kernel_physical_mapping_change(__pa(vaddr & pmask), + __pa((vaddr_end & pmask) + psize), + split_page_size_mask); + } + + ret = 0; + + notify_range_enc_status_changed(start, PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT, enc); +out: + __flush_tlb_all(); + return ret; +} + +int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) +{ + return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, false); +} + +int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) +{ + return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, true); +} + +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) +{ + notify_range_enc_status_changed(vaddr, npages, enc); +} + +/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ +bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) +{ + /* + * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return true; + + /* + * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the + * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the + * encryption mask. + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); + u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, + dev->bus_dma_limit); + + if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) +{ + unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, npages; + int r; + + vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted_unused; + vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_bss_decrypted; + npages = (vaddr_end - vaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + /* + * The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption + * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it. + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + r = set_memory_encrypted(vaddr, npages); + if (r) { + pr_warn("failed to free unused decrypted pages\n"); + return; + } + } + + free_init_pages("unused decrypted", vaddr, vaddr_end); +} + +static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) +{ + pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:"); + + /* Secure Memory Encryption */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + /* + * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV + * features below. + */ + pr_cont(" SME\n"); + return; + } + + /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + pr_cont(" SEV"); + + /* Encrypted Register State */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) + pr_cont(" SEV-ES"); + + pr_cont("\n"); +} + +/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ +void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) +{ + if (!sme_me_mask) + return; + + /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */ + swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(); + + print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); +} + +int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) +{ + return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access); ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCHv3 3/3] x86: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c 2021-12-06 13:55 [PATCHv3 0/3] Share common features between AMD SEV / TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 1/3] x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 2/3] x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-06 13:55 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-08 16:35 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: " tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov 2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-06 13:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86 Cc: ak, dan.j.williams, hpa, jroedel, knsathya, linux-kernel, luto, peterz, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy, thomas.lendacky, tony.luck, Kirill A. Shutemov SEV and TDX both protect guest memory from the host access. They both use guest physical address bits to communicate to the hardware which pages receive protection or not. SEV and TDX both assume that all I/O (real devices and virtio) must be performed to pages *without* protection. To add this support, AMD SEV code forces force_dma_unencrypted() to decrypt DMA pages when DMA pages were allocated for I/O. It also uses swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() to update decryption bits in SWIOTLB DMA buffers. Since TDX also uses a similar memory sharing design, all the above mentioned changes can be reused. So move force_dma_unencrypted(), SWIOTLB update code and virtio changes out of mem_encrypt_amd.c to mem_encrypt.c. Introduce a new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT that can be selected by platforms which uses x86 memory encryption features (needed in both AMD SEV and Intel TDX guest platforms). Since the code is moved from mem_encrypt_amdc.c, inherit the same make flags. This is preparation for enabling TDX memory encryption support and it has no functional changes. Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 10 +++-- arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 5 +++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 69 ---------------------------- 4 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 95dd1ee01546..793e9b42ace0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1523,16 +1523,20 @@ config X86_CPA_STATISTICS helps to determine the effectiveness of preserving large and huge page mappings when mapping protections are changed. +config X86_MEM_ENCRYPT + select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED + select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK + select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS + def_bool n + config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support" depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD select DMA_COHERENT_POOL - select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT - select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED select INSTRUCTION_DECODER - select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM + select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT help Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory. This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile index c9c480641153..fe3d3061fc11 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Kernel does not boot with instrumentation of tlb.c and mem_encrypt*.c KCOV_INSTRUMENT_tlb.o := n +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n @@ -12,6 +14,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n KCSAN_SANITIZE := n ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER +CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_amd.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_identity.o = -pg endif @@ -52,6 +55,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_amd.o + obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..50d209939c66 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Memory Encryption Support Common Code + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> + */ + +#include <linux/dma-direct.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> +#include <linux/virtio_config.h> + +/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ +bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) +{ + /* + * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return true; + + /* + * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the + * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the + * encryption mask. + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); + u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, + dev->bus_dma_limit); + + if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) +{ + pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:"); + + /* Secure Memory Encryption */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + /* + * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV + * features below. + */ + pr_cont(" SME\n"); + return; + } + + /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + pr_cont(" SEV"); + + /* Encrypted Register State */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) + pr_cont(" SEV-ES"); + + pr_cont("\n"); +} + +/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ +void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) +{ + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return; + + /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */ + swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(); + + print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); +} + +int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) +{ + return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c index b520021a7e7b..2b2d018ea345 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c @@ -413,32 +413,6 @@ void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, boo notify_range_enc_status_changed(vaddr, npages, enc); } -/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ -bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) -{ - /* - * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. - */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - return true; - - /* - * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the - * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the - * encryption mask. - */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { - u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); - u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, - dev->bus_dma_limit); - - if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) - return true; - } - - return false; -} - void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, npages; @@ -462,46 +436,3 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) free_init_pages("unused decrypted", vaddr, vaddr_end); } - -static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) -{ - pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:"); - - /* Secure Memory Encryption */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { - /* - * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV - * features below. - */ - pr_cont(" SME\n"); - return; - } - - /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - pr_cont(" SEV"); - - /* Encrypted Register State */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) - pr_cont(" SEV-ES"); - - pr_cont("\n"); -} - -/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ -void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) -{ - if (!sme_me_mask) - return; - - /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */ - swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(); - - print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); -} - -int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) -{ - return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access); -- 2.32.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 3/3] x86: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-08 16:35 ` tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2021-12-08 16:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-tip-commits Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan, Kirill A. Shutemov, Borislav Petkov, Andi Kleen, Tony Luck, Tom Lendacky, x86, linux-kernel The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip: Commit-ID: 20f07a044a76aebaaa0603038857229b5c460d69 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/20f07a044a76aebaaa0603038857229b5c460d69 Author: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Mon, 06 Dec 2021 16:55:05 +03:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> CommitterDate: Wed, 08 Dec 2021 16:49:53 +01:00 x86/sev: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c SEV and TDX both protect guest memory from host accesses. They both use guest physical address bits to communicate to the hardware which pages receive protection or not. SEV and TDX both assume that all I/O (real devices and virtio) must be performed to pages *without* protection. To add this support, AMD SEV code forces force_dma_unencrypted() to decrypt DMA pages when DMA pages were allocated for I/O. It also uses swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() to update decryption bits in SWIOTLB DMA buffers. Since TDX also uses a similar memory sharing design, all the above mentioned changes can be reused. So move force_dma_unencrypted(), SWIOTLB update code and virtio changes out of mem_encrypt_amd.c to mem_encrypt.c. Introduce a new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT that can be selected by platforms which use x86 memory encryption features (needed in both AMD SEV and Intel TDX guest platforms). Since the code is moved from mem_encrypt_amd.c, inherit the same make flags. This is preparation for enabling TDX memory encryption support and it has no functional changes. Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 10 ++-- arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 5 ++- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 69 +---------------------------- 4 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 95dd1ee..793e9b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1523,16 +1523,20 @@ config X86_CPA_STATISTICS helps to determine the effectiveness of preserving large and huge page mappings when mapping protections are changed. +config X86_MEM_ENCRYPT + select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED + select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK + select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS + def_bool n + config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support" depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD select DMA_COHERENT_POOL - select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT - select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED select INSTRUCTION_DECODER - select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM + select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT help Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory. This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile index c9c4806..fe3d306 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Kernel does not boot with instrumentation of tlb.c and mem_encrypt*.c KCOV_INSTRUMENT_tlb.o := n +KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n @@ -12,6 +14,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n KCSAN_SANITIZE := n ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER +CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_amd.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_identity.o = -pg endif @@ -52,6 +55,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_amd.o + obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50d2099 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Memory Encryption Support Common Code + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> + */ + +#include <linux/dma-direct.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> +#include <linux/virtio_config.h> + +/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ +bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) +{ + /* + * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return true; + + /* + * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the + * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the + * encryption mask. + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); + u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, + dev->bus_dma_limit); + + if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) +{ + pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:"); + + /* Secure Memory Encryption */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + /* + * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV + * features below. + */ + pr_cont(" SME\n"); + return; + } + + /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + pr_cont(" SEV"); + + /* Encrypted Register State */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) + pr_cont(" SEV-ES"); + + pr_cont("\n"); +} + +/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ +void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) +{ + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return; + + /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */ + swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(); + + print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); +} + +int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) +{ + return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c index b520021..2b2d018 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c @@ -413,32 +413,6 @@ void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, boo notify_range_enc_status_changed(vaddr, npages, enc); } -/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ -bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) -{ - /* - * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. - */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - return true; - - /* - * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the - * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the - * encryption mask. - */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { - u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); - u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, - dev->bus_dma_limit); - - if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) - return true; - } - - return false; -} - void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, npages; @@ -462,46 +436,3 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) free_init_pages("unused decrypted", vaddr, vaddr_end); } - -static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) -{ - pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:"); - - /* Secure Memory Encryption */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { - /* - * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV - * features below. - */ - pr_cont(" SME\n"); - return; - } - - /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) - pr_cont(" SEV"); - - /* Encrypted Register State */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) - pr_cont(" SEV-ES"); - - pr_cont("\n"); -} - -/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ -void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) -{ - if (!sme_me_mask) - return; - - /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */ - swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(); - - print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); -} - -int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) -{ - return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access); ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-12-08 16:35 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2021-12-06 13:55 [PATCHv3 0/3] Share common features between AMD SEV / TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 1/3] x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-08 16:35 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 2/3] x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-08 16:35 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 2021-12-06 13:55 ` [PATCHv3 3/3] x86: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-12-08 16:35 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: " tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov
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