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* [PATCH] x86/unwind/orc: recheck address range after stack info was updated V2
@ 2022-04-17 13:23 Dmitry Monakhov
  2022-04-18 16:37 ` Josh Poimboeuf
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Monakhov @ 2022-04-17 13:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: x86, mingo, jpoimboe, Dmitry Monakhov

get_stack_info() detects stack type only by begin address, so we must
check that address range in question is fully covered by detected stack

Otherwise following crash is possible:
-> unwind_next_frame
   case ORC_TYPE_REGS:
     if (!deref_stack_regs(state, sp, &state->ip, &state->sp))
     -> deref_stack_regs
       -> stack_access_ok  <- addr is ok, but addr+len-1 is not, exit with success
     *ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->ip); <- Here we hit stack guard fault

Original OOPS log:
BUG: stack guard page was hit at 000000000dd984a2 (stack is 00000000d1caafca..00000000613712f0)
kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 93 PID: 23787 Comm: context_switch1 Not tainted 5.4.145 #1
RIP: 0010:unwind_next_frame
Call Trace:
 <NMI>
 perf_callchain_kernel
 ..
 get_perf_callchain
 perf_callchain
 perf_prepare_sample
 perf_event_output_forward
 ...
 __perf_event_overflow
 perf_ibs_handle_irq
 ....
 perf_ibs_nmi_handler
 nmi_handle
 default_do_nmi
 do_nmi
 end_repeat_nmi

Changes since v1:
 - Do not call on_stack() twice for valid range.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
index 794fdef2501a..38185aedf7d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -339,11 +339,11 @@ static bool stack_access_ok(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long _addr,
 	struct stack_info *info = &state->stack_info;
 	void *addr = (void *)_addr;
 
-	if (!on_stack(info, addr, len) &&
-	    (get_stack_info(addr, state->task, info, &state->stack_mask)))
-		return false;
+	if (on_stack(info, addr, len))
+		return true;
 
-	return true;
+	return !get_stack_info(addr, state->task, info, &state->stack_mask) &&
+		on_stack(info, addr, len);
 }
 
 static bool deref_stack_reg(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr,
-- 
2.7.4


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] x86/unwind/orc: recheck address range after stack info was updated V2
  2022-04-17 13:23 [PATCH] x86/unwind/orc: recheck address range after stack info was updated V2 Dmitry Monakhov
@ 2022-04-18 16:37 ` Josh Poimboeuf
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Josh Poimboeuf @ 2022-04-18 16:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dmitry Monakhov; +Cc: linux-kernel, x86, mingo, Kim Phillips, Peter Zijlstra

In the subject, the patch version should be in the [PATCH] field which
gets discarded by git.  Also "recheck" should be capitalized:

  [PATCH v2] x86/unwind/orc: Recheck address range after stack info was updated

> get_stack_info() detects stack type only by begin address, so we must
> check that address range in question is fully covered by detected stack

Try to use good grammar/punctuation.  This sentence doesn't even have a
period.

And, it should mention the fact that the root cause actually seems to be
a bug in the IBS handling code which is passing invalid regs to the
unwinder.

> 
> Otherwise following crash is possible:
> -> unwind_next_frame
>    case ORC_TYPE_REGS:
>      if (!deref_stack_regs(state, sp, &state->ip, &state->sp))
>      -> deref_stack_regs
>        -> stack_access_ok  <- addr is ok, but addr+len-1 is not, exit with success
>      *ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->ip); <- Here we hit stack guard fault
> 
> Original OOPS log:
> BUG: stack guard page was hit at 000000000dd984a2 (stack is 00000000d1caafca..00000000613712f0)
> kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
> CPU: 93 PID: 23787 Comm: context_switch1 Not tainted 5.4.145 #1
> RIP: 0010:unwind_next_frame
> Call Trace:
>  <NMI>
>  perf_callchain_kernel
>  ..
>  get_perf_callchain
>  perf_callchain
>  perf_prepare_sample
>  perf_event_output_forward
>  ...
>  __perf_event_overflow
>  perf_ibs_handle_irq
>  ....
>  perf_ibs_nmi_handler

This is definitely more readable than before, though I think all the
'...' can be removed, since you only trimmed the '?' entries which are
just bread crumbs on the stack and not actually part of the call path.

>  nmi_handle
>  default_do_nmi
>  do_nmi
>  end_repeat_nmi
> 
> Changes since v1:
>  - Do not call on_stack() twice for valid range.

This changelog shouldn't be a part of the patch description itself.
Instead it should be below the "---" line.

Also, a diffstat would be helpful.

See "The canonical patch format" in
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
> index 794fdef2501a..38185aedf7d1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
> @@ -339,11 +339,11 @@ static bool stack_access_ok(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long _addr,
>  	struct stack_info *info = &state->stack_info;
>  	void *addr = (void *)_addr;
>  
> -	if (!on_stack(info, addr, len) &&
> -	    (get_stack_info(addr, state->task, info, &state->stack_mask)))
> -		return false;
> +	if (on_stack(info, addr, len))
> +		return true;
>  
> -	return true;
> +	return !get_stack_info(addr, state->task, info, &state->stack_mask) &&
> +		on_stack(info, addr, len);

The change itself looks ok.

-- 
Josh


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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2022-04-17 13:23 [PATCH] x86/unwind/orc: recheck address range after stack info was updated V2 Dmitry Monakhov
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