[PATCH v3] security: Yama LSM

* [PATCH v3] security: Yama LSM
@ 2010-06-23 18:20 Kees Cook
  2010-06-24  0:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2010-06-23 18:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel

This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect several security
features (symlink, hardlink, and PTRACE scope restrictions) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
---
v2:
 - add rcu locking, thanks to Tetsuo Handa.
 - add Documentation/Yama.txt for summary of features.

v3:
 - drop needless cap_ callbacks.
 - fix usage of get_task_comm.
 - drop CONFIG_ of sysctl defaults, as recommended by Andi Kleen.
 - require SYSCTL.
---
 Documentation/Yama.txt   |   91 ++++++++++++++++++
 fs/exec.c                |    1 +
 security/Kconfig         |    6 +
 security/Makefile        |    2 +
 security/yama/Kconfig    |   13 +++
 security/yama/Makefile   |    3 +
 security/yama/yama_lsm.c |  233 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 349 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/Yama.txt
 create mode 100644 security/yama/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/yama/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/yama/yama_lsm.c

diff --git a/Documentation/Yama.txt b/Documentation/Yama.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9f15d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/Yama.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects a number of security
+protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself.  To select
+it at boot time, specify "security=yama" (though this will disable any
+other LSM).
+
+Yama is controlled through sysctl in /proc/sys/kernel/yama:
+
+- protected_sticky_symlinks
+- protected_nonaccess_hardlinks
+- ptrace_scope
+
+==============================================================
+
+protected_sticky_symlinks:
+
+A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based
+time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
+directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
+is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a
+root process follows a symlink belonging to another user).  For a likely
+incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see:
+http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp
+
+When set to "0", symlink following behavior is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1" symlinks are permitted to be followed only when outside
+a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and
+follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity.
+
+==============================================================
+
+protected_nonaccess_hardlinks:
+
+Hardlinks can be abused in a similar fashion to symlinks in sticky
+world-writable directories, but their weakness is not limited to
+just that scenario. For example, if /etc and /home are on the same
+partition, a regular user can create a hardlink to /etc/shadow in their
+home directory. While it retains the original owner and permissions,
+it is possible for privileged programs that are otherwise symlink-safe
+to mistakenly access the file through its hardlink. Additionally, a very
+minor untraceable quota-bypassing local denial of service is possible by
+an attacker exhausting disk space by filling a world-writable directory
+with hardlinks.
+
+When set to "0", hardlink creation behavior is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1", hardlinks cannot be created to files that a given user
+would be unable to read and write originally, or are otherwise sensitive.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity.
+
+==============================================================
+
+ptrace_scope:
+
+As Linux grows in popularity, it will become a larger target for
+malware. One particularly troubling weakness of the Linux process
+interfaces is that a single user is able to examine the memory and
+running state of any of their processes. For example, if one application
+(e.g. Pidgin) was compromised, it would be possible for an attacker to
+attach to other running processes (e.g. Firefox, SSH sessions, GPG agent,
+etc) to extract additional credentials and continue to expand the scope
+of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing.
+
+This is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking
+(http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7) and arbitrary code injection
+(http://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already
+exist and remain possible if PTRACE is allowed to operate as before.
+PTRACE is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, so system
+builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system.
+
+For a solution, some applications use prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ...) to
+specifically disallow such PTRACE attachment (e.g. ssh-agent), but many
+do not. A more general solution is to only allow PTRACE directly from a
+parent to a child process (i.e. direct "gdb EXE" and "strace EXE" still
+work), or with CAP_SYS_PTRACE (i.e. "gdb --pid=PID", and "strace -p PID"
+still work as root).
+
+0 - classic PTRACE permissions: a process can PTRACE any other process
+    running under the same uid, as long as it is dumpable (i.e. did not
+    transition uids, start privileged, or have prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...)
+    called).
+
+1 - child-only PTRACE: a process can PTRACE only its descendants when
+    the above classic criteria is also met.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in grsecurity.
+
+==============================================================
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index e19de6a..85092e3 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 226b955..0e3a5ac 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+source security/yama/Kconfig
 
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 
@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ choice
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
 	help
@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ choice
 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
 		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
 
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
+		bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
+
 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
 
@@ -173,6 +178,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
 	default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
 	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
 	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
 endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index da20a19..04354d1 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y					+= commoncap.o
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c03646
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+config SECURITY_YAMA
+	bool "Yama NAC Support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select SECURITYFS
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects Yama, the NAKed Access Control system which
+	  provides additional global security settings above regular
+	  Linux discretionary access controls.  Currently available
+	  are symlink, hardlink, and PTRACE scope restrictions.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/yama/Makefile b/security/yama/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b5e065
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) := yama.o
+
+yama-y := yama_lsm.o
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d15303
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/*
+ * Yama Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Canonical, Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+
+static int ptrace_scope = 1;
+static int protected_sticky_symlinks = 1;
+static int protected_nonaccess_hardlinks = 1;
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptrace_access_check - validate PTRACE_ATTACH calls
+ * @child: child task pointer
+ * @mode: ptrace attach mode
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+				    unsigned int mode)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
+	if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH && ptrace_scope &&
+	    !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) {
+		struct task_struct *walker = child;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		while (walker->pid > 0) {
+			if (walker == current)
+				break;
+			walker = walker->real_parent;
+		}
+		if (walker->pid == 0)
+			rc = -EPERM;
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO "ptrace of non-child"
+			" pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
+			child->pid, get_task_comm(name, current),
+			current->pid);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_inode_follow_link - check for symlinks in sticky world-writeable dirs
+ * @dentry: The inode/dentry of the symlink
+ * @nameidata: The path data of the symlink
+ *
+ * In the case of the protected_sticky_symlinks sysctl being enabled,
+ * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is
+ * in a sticky world-writable directory.  This is to protect privileged
+ * processes from failing races against path names that may change out
+ * from under them by way of other users creating malicious symlinks.
+ * It will permit symlinks to only be followed when outside a sticky
+ * world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower
+ * match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if following the symlink is allowed, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
+				  struct nameidata *nameidata)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	const struct inode *parent;
+	const struct inode *inode;
+	const struct cred *cred;
+
+	if (!protected_sticky_symlinks)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* owner and follower match? */
+	cred = current_cred();
+	inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* check parent directory mode and owner */
+	spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
+	parent = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
+	if ((parent->i_mode & (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH)) == (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH) &&
+	    parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) {
+		rc = -EACCES;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
+
+	if (rc) {
+		char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "non-matching-uid symlink "
+			"following attempted in sticky world-writable "
+			"directory by %s (fsuid %d != %d)\n",
+			get_task_comm(name, current),
+			cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_path_link - verify that hardlinking is allowed
+ * @old_dentry: the source inode/dentry to hardlink from
+ * @new_dir: target directory
+ * @new_dentry: the target inode/dentry to hardlink to
+ *
+ * Block hardlink when all of:
+ *  - fsuid does not match inode
+ *  - not CAP_FOWNER
+ *  - and at least one of:
+ *    - inode is not a regular file
+ *    - inode is setuid
+ *    - inode is setgid and group-exec
+ *    - access failure for read and write
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+			  struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct inode *inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
+	const int mode = inode->i_mode;
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	if (!protected_nonaccess_hardlinks)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (cred->fsuid != inode->i_uid &&
+	    (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) ||
+	     ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) ||
+	     (generic_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, NULL))) &&
+	    !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) {
+		char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO "non-accessible hardlink"
+			" creation was attempted by: %s (fsuid %d)\n",
+			get_task_comm(name, current), cred->fsuid);
+		rc = -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
+	.name =			"yama",
+
+	.ptrace_access_check =	yama_ptrace_access_check,
+	.inode_follow_link =	yama_inode_follow_link,
+	.path_link =		yama_path_link,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int zero;
+static int one = 1;
+
+struct ctl_path yama_sysctl_path[] = {
+	{ .procname = "kernel", },
+	{ .procname = "yama", },
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname       = "protected_sticky_symlinks",
+		.data           = &protected_sticky_symlinks,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+	{
+		.procname       = "protected_nonaccess_hardlinks",
+		.data           = &protected_nonaccess_hardlinks,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+	{
+		.procname       = "ptrace_scope",
+		.data           = &ptrace_scope,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+	{ }
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+static __init int yama_init(void)
+{
+	if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops))
+		return 0;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
+
+	if (register_security(&yama_ops))
+		panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n");
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+	if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))
+		panic("Yama: sysctl registration failed.\n");
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(yama_init);
-- 
1.7.1


-- 
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team

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