From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.
Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2012 23:35:24 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20121214233524.GA13659@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87hanoxpdh.fsf@xmission.com>
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
>
> Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> found a nasty little bug in
> the permissions of setns. With unprivileged user namespaces it
> became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.
>
> However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
> the user nameapce of the targed namespace.
>
> Which made the following nasty sequence possible.
>
> pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
> if (pid == 0) { /* child */
> system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
> }
> else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
> char path[PATH_MAX];
> snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
> fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
> setns(fd, 0);
> system("su -");
> }
>
> Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.
>
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
> ---
> fs/namespace.c | 3 ++-
> ipc/namespace.c | 3 ++-
> kernel/pid_namespace.c | 3 ++-
> kernel/utsname.c | 3 ++-
> net/core/net_namespace.c | 3 ++-
> 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index c1bbe86..398a50f 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -2781,7 +2781,8 @@ static int mntns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
> struct path root;
>
> if (!ns_capable(mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> - !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
> + !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT) ||
> + !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> if (fs->users != 1)
> diff --git a/ipc/namespace.c b/ipc/namespace.c
> index cf3386a..7c1fa45 100644
> --- a/ipc/namespace.c
> +++ b/ipc/namespace.c
> @@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ static void ipcns_put(void *ns)
> static int ipcns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
> {
> struct ipc_namespace *ns = new;
> - if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> + !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> /* Ditch state from the old ipc namespace */
> diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> index 560da0d..fdbd0cd 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> @@ -325,7 +325,8 @@ static int pidns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
> struct pid_namespace *active = task_active_pid_ns(current);
> struct pid_namespace *ancestor, *new = ns;
>
> - if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> + !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> /*
> diff --git a/kernel/utsname.c b/kernel/utsname.c
> index f6336d5..08b197e 100644
> --- a/kernel/utsname.c
> +++ b/kernel/utsname.c
> @@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int utsns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
> {
> struct uts_namespace *ns = new;
>
> - if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> + !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> get_uts_ns(ns);
> diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
> index 2e9a313..8acce01 100644
> --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
> +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
> @@ -649,7 +649,8 @@ static int netns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
> {
> struct net *net = ns;
>
> - if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> + !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> put_net(nsproxy->net_ns);
> --
> 1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-12-14 23:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-12-14 22:01 [PATCH 0/4] user namespace fixes Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 22:03 ` [PATCH 1/4] Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 22:03 ` [PATCH 2/4] userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 23:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2012-12-17 19:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-14 22:04 ` [PATCH 3/4] userns: Add a more complete capability subset test to commit_creds Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-15 0:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-15 0:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-15 0:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-15 0:48 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-15 2:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-17 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-14 22:05 ` [PATCH 4/4] userns: Fix typo in description of the limitation of userns_install Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 23:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-17 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-17 19:03 ` [PATCH 0/4] user namespace fixes Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-17 21:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20121214233524.GA13659@mail.hallyn.com \
--to=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=containers@lists.linux-foundation.org \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).